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ABSTRACT 
The separation of ownership and control of corporations lies at the core of the debate on 
the involvement of Board of Directors (BoDs) in strategic decision-making and the 
influence of the board attributes on corporate performance. Corporate governance 
scholars and practitioners have argued that individual board member demographic 
characteristics as well corporate board composition influence firm performance. Despite 
the increased focus on BoDs' contribution to the corporate performance, little research 
exists in developing countries. This study therefore sought to contribute to knowledge by 
assessing the relationship between BoDs' attributes, strategic decision-making processes 
and corporate performance among the listed firms in Kenya. The study used an 
integration of agency, stewardship, resource dependency and stakeholder theories of 
corporate governance. 
The board attributes studied were board composition features such as board size, 
executive, non-executive and independent directors. Other board composition attributes 
studied were interlocking directors and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality. 
Individual board member demographic characteristics included age, gender diversity, 
educational background and professional experience of the board members. Board 
involvement in strategic decision-making was analyzed as a moderating factor in the 
relationship between board attributes and corporate performance. Board operating 
environment and firm characteristics were also examined as intervening variables in the 
relationship between board attributes and corporate performance. 
The main objective of the study was to analyze the relationships between board of 
directors' attributes, strategic decision-making and corporate performance. The specific 
objectives were to assess the extent to which board of directors' attributes determine their 
(board) involvement in strategic decision-making; establish the effect of board attributes 
on corporate performance and determine the effect of board environment on 
organizational performance. Other specific objectives included assessing the influence of 
firm characteristics on corporate performance and establishing the relationship between 
Board of Directors' inveKvement in strategic decision-making, board operating 
environment, firm characteristics and corporate performance. 
The population of the study consisted all the forty-seven (47) companies listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange under the main investment market segment (MIMS) as of 
December 2010. The study was a cross-sectional design. The survey period covered four 
financial years from 2006 to 2009. Both primary and secondary data was collected and 
analyzed. Corporation secretaries or in their absence a member of the board filled the 
questionnaire. Hypotheses were tested on a sample of 40 firms, which responded to the 
questionnaire representing 85 percent response rate. Empirical analyses were undertaken 
using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) that included Correlation analysis, multi-variate 
regression analysis and descriptive statistics. 
The findings of the study indicate that the board size in Kenya among the listed firms 
consist of an average of nine (9) board members. We also found out that that the average 
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age of the board members of the firms surveyed was 56 years old. Majority of the board 
members were male board members at ninety-three (93) percent while women made up 
only seven (7) percent of the total board members. The most common area of educational 
specialization for most of the board members was Business Administration (21 percent) 
and Finance and Accounting consisted 22 percent. The two options had a combined total 
of 43 percent. 
While there was statistically significant relationship between the number of Executive 
Directors sitting on the board and the number of inter-locking directors and Return on 
Assets (ROA), Executive Directors and Inter-locking directors were statistically 
significant in determining firm performance measured using ROA and ROE. CEO duality 
was negatively statistically significant in determining performance-using ROE as a 
measure of firm performance. 
From the findings, we conclude that there was statistically significant relationship 
between the number of Executive Directors sitting on the board and the number of inter-
locking directors and return on equity (ROE). We further concluded that there was 
statistically significant relationship between non-executive directors (NEDs) and Price-
Earnings (P/E) Ratio. The rest of the board composition attributes had no statistically 
significant relationship with PE. 
The findings further showed that with regard to moderating effect of board involvement 
in strategic decision-making (SDM), the number of Non-Executive Directors (NEDS) 
had a non-statistically significant negative relationship with board's involvement in 
strategic decision-making. With respect to moderating effect of board attributes, there 
seemed to be an impact on ROE arising from executive directors, interlocking directors 
and board appointment criteria. There was also a moderating effect by board appointment 
on ROA. None of the Board of Directors' demographic characteristics had statistically 
significant moderating effect on the relationship between board attributes and firm 
performance. However, the results revealed that the moderating effect of board 
involvement in strategic decision-making increases the relationship between the Board of 
Directors attributes such a s t E O duality as well as the explanatory power of the board 
composition over PE ratio. It had no effect on the other measures of corporate 
performance. 
The results indicated either a support or positive relationship between Board of Directors' 
involvement in strategic decision-making and some measures of corporate performance. 
There was a positive significant relationship between board involvement with reference 
to Executive Directors and interlocking board members in strategic decision-making and 
corporate performance with regard to ROA and ROE. There was no statistically 
significant relationship between firm characteristics and firm performance. Future 
research could consider the role of women on boards and dynamics of their presence on the 
board, which requires an observational and qualitative study. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter gives a brief background to the study. It also presents the statement of the 
problem, research objectives and questions that the study seeks to address. Additionally, 
it provides the justification and significance of the study. The chapter concludes with an 
overview of the contents of subsequent chapters. 
1.1 Background of the Study 
The separation of ownership and control of corporations lies at the core of the debate on 
the involvement of Board of Directors (BoDs) in strategic decision-making and the 
influence of the boards' attributes on corporate performance. Arguments have been 
advanced either to support the influence of BoDs' attributes on organizational 
performance or to emphasize the role of management in performance. The changing 
corporate governance landscape globally has rekindled interest in the role of corporate 
boards in strategic decision-making and firm performance. Prompt strategic decision-
making and versatility of corporate executive leadership to make optimal decisions 
determines the success of companies. Boards of directors are part of the strategic 
decision-making mechanisms of firms in business. Scholars, practitioners and policy 
makers, have for the last two decades, debated on the role of boards of directors as one of 
the key pillars of corporate governance(Malin, 2007; Monks and Minow, 2008; Tricker, 
2009). They have asserted that the attributes of Boards of Directors may influence 
strategic decision-making, which in turn impacts firm performance (Cutting and 
Kouzmin, 2002; Van den Berghe and Baelden, 2005). 
Balta (2008) contends that the global arena has put in place several reforms meant to 
guide boards of directors in strategic decisions-making processes. The pertinent reforms 
include those instituted in the developed economies such as the United States of 
America's Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) principles of corporate governance (2008) in Europe. There 
have been efforts in the developing economies too, which include Kenya, to improve 
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corporate governance. This was evident from the publication of the Principles for 
Corporate Governance and a Sample Code for Best Practice in Corporate Governance by 
the Centre for Corporate Governance (CCG, 2000). The codes of best practice seek to 
guide the directors as they carry out their fiduciary responsibilities on behalf of the 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Good corporate governance for a listed company is achieved through a balanced board. 
Such a board should consist of executive and non-executive directors and the 
establishment of board committees to decentralize decision-making processes 
(Companies Act, Cap 486, 1948 and the CMA Act 2002). However, in some corporation 
especially state-owned firms, the roles of the boards of directors and the top management 
teams in decision-making are not clearly delineated (Monks and Minnow, 2008). Thus, 
there is need to assess whether board of directors' attributes, strategic decision-making 
and operating environment of a board affect corporate performance. 
1.1.1 Board of Directors' Attributes 
From the early 1990s, corporate governance as an area of study has generated a lot of 
interest among key stakeholders (Tricker, 2009). Following the collapse of some leading 
corporations in the developed world like Parmalat, Enron and Worldcom, the need for 
good corporate governance, especially a proper definition of the role of the board has 
gained momentum (Malljn, 2007). Scherrer (2003) asserts that the fiduciary role of 
directors of corporations is to protect the shareholders. Hence, the need to provide boards 
with accurate financial information is critical. Nevertheless, individually and collectively, 
board members must be possessed of characteristics or attributes that enable them to 
utilize that information to the advancement of the firm and offer policy direction that is 
consistent with the firm's objective interests. 
The study assumed that board attributes such as board composition and demographic 
characteristics or such other elements influenced board members in the decisions they 
made. Past research efforts have identified formal attributes of the board of directors as 
size, composition, and separation of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the board 
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chairperson positions and board independence without considering demographic 
characteristics (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). 
The relevant theory and research on boards of directors have focused on directors' 
independence and power to explain their involvement in strategic decision-making and 
organizational behaviour (Carpenter and Westphal, 1999). However, there are inherent 
difficulties in exploring the effects of a board member's demographic characteristics on a 
firm's performance and effectiveness (Pettigrew, 1990; Carpenter and Westphal, 1999; 
Scherrer, 2003; Bathula, 2008). 
According to Irungu (2007), decision-making processes reflect the attributes of decision 
makers. Other scholars (Balta, 2008; Bathula, 2008) have argued that different board of 
directors' attributes impact organizational performance owing to different orientations. 
The board of directors' commonest attributes include age, education, gender, and industry 
experience. Others are board size, appointment of directors, CEO duality, executive, 
inter-locking, independent and non-executive directors. 
The ever-increasing interest in the effect of board of directors' attributes and the 
influence of the board operating environment on strategic decision-making and 
organizational performance among scholars and practitioners may be attributed to the 
board's roles in creating linkages to other resource dependencies (Balta, 2008; Bathula, 
2008). Hambrick and d'Aveni (1992) and Levitt (1998) also assert that the composition 
of outside directors' ownership and involvement in decision-making process affects the 
probability of financial success or distress of the companies in which they are directors. 
This therefore calls for more scrutiny to establish the likely role of attributes on firm 
performance. 
Many studies have attempted to identify the attributes or mechanisms of the boards of 
directors that lead to improved strategic decision-making and corporate performance 
(Van den Berghe and Baelden, 2005; Barako et al, 2006; Balta, 2008; Kajola, 2008; 
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Maharaj, 2009). However, the results of these studies have been inconclusive in terms of 
decision-making processes and board involvement. 
1.1.2 The Role of the Board of Directors in Strategic Decision-Making 
Strategic decision-making is essential to firm performance. Scholars continue to debate 
the extent of influence in strategic decision-making by corporations' board of directors 
(BoDs) and the top management teams (Ireland and Miller, 2004). Some scholars argue 
that strategic leadership is vested in the boards of directors; they also come up with the 
vision, formulate the corporate mission, identify the core values and generate policies for 
the alignment of the firm to the environment (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Bathula, 
2008). The board is assumed to also make decisions on succession planning and board-
management relationships that have long-term implications on firm performance. On the 
other hand, other scholars argue that it is the top management teams (TMTs) that make 
strategic decisions, which influence firm performance (Irungu, 2007). Consequently, 
there is need to establish the contribution of the board members' attributes to strategic 
decision-making processes, and by extension the firm performance. 
Organizations operating both locally and globally have established cross-country and 
divisional networks that promote speedy board decision-making processes (Hambrick 
and Pettigrew, 2001). Studies on the upper echelons indicate that executives including 
board members play a vety significant role in strategic decision-making through their 
individual and collective influences arising from their experience and networks 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Irungu, 2007). 
Other scholars have argued that boards of directors are "rubber stamps" of top 
management teams (Pfeffer, 1972; Herman, 1981). On the positive side, boards of 
directors influence firms' strategies in two main ways namely decision control and 
decision management. Fama and Jensen (1983) asserted that most of the boards review 
strategy and performance as a way of measuring firm success. The influence of the 
decision-making process might be demonstrated by the board's involvement in the 
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monitoring and advisory role to the top management teams of their organizations in 
strategic issues (Mizruchi, 1996; Scherrer, 2003). 
1.1.3 Board of Directors' Operating Environment 
Board environment refers to the context in which directors exist and operate as they 
perform their duties. Van den Berghe and Baelden (2005) classified board environments 
into three categories, namelyboard culture, access to information, and formal 
independence of the board members. The influence of board environment in shaping 
strategy formulation and execution has been a subject of interest to academicians (Ireland 
and Miller, 2004). The scholars argue that in order for corporations to thrive, their boards 
need to be able to change and adapt to meet the demands and opportunities within their 
environments (Robbins et al., 2003). The environment may either foster or stifle the 
development of an independent and critical strategic thinking attitude of decision-makers 
(Tricker, 2009). Therefore, access to relevant and current corporate information is 
necessary for effective and objective decision-making among all board members. 
According to Balta (2008) in the study on the impact of business environment and 
strategic-decision processes conducted in Greece, the external environment was not 
statistically significant in relation to the board composition with respect to board size and 
the number of interlocking directorates. Other factors, like the presence of a sufficient 
number of formal independent directors are easier to evaluate and may prove to be useful 
ex-ante indicators of objective decisions (Balta, 2008; Tricker, 2009). Companies need to 
be sufficiently transparent with respect to these issues by putting forward the measures 
they take to create such a facilitating environment for strategic decision-making. This 
could provide a supplementary assurance for external parties about anticipated firm 
performance (Van den Berghe and Baelden, 2005). 
The board environment therefore influences the decisions that business leaders make, 
affect firm performance, and the outcome of the strategic decisions. Other structural 
factors that influence decisions include communication processes, co-ordination of work, 
reporting relationships, forms of complexity or dynamism and distinguishing firm 
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characteristics (Irungu, 2007). The role of the strategic leaders is therefore to combine 
both the contextual and structural elements and to create a working relationship that 
improves corporate performance. 
1.1.4 Corporate Performance 
Corporate performance is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon in strategic 
management literature (Balta, 2008). Corporate performance relates to the way and 
manner in which financial resources available to an organization are judiciously used to 
achieve the overall corporate objective of an organization. It keeps the organization in 
business and creates a greater prospect for future opportunities (Kajola, 2008). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) ignited interest in empirical study on corporate governance as it relates 
to performance. Much of this research (reviewed extensively by Shleifer and Vishney, 
1997), examines whether corporate governance mechanisms or managerial decisions 
generate predictable stock price impacts., 
In addition, organizations have different ways of measuring their success. The level of 
success is generally based on organizational performance (Irungu, 2007; Waweru, 2008). 
In order to measure the extent of success, firms tend to use traditional performance 
measures. The performance measures are financial in nature such as profitability, asset 
and revenue growth. The various measures of performance are either quantitative or 
qualitative. Quantitative measures include return on investments (ROI), return on assets 
(ROA) and dividend yield (DY) (Ongore, 2008). Qualitative measures, on the other hand, 
include market share, employee and customer satisfaction and corporate image or 
reputation. 
Moseng and Bredrup (1993) assert that organizational performance is the integration of 
three broad dimensions: effectiveness, efficiency and adaptability. The measure of firm 
performance can be evaluated from the perspective of various stakeholders (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1992). Kaplan and Norton (1992) contended that stakeholders are identified 
mainly as shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, government and the general 
public. Many scholars (Gugler et al, 2004; Leng, 2004; Klein et al., 2005) sought to 
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establish whether such corporate governance mechanisms as board composition and 
individual board member demographic characteristics affect corporate performance. 
Shin-Ping and Tsung-Hsien (2009) have analyzed corporate performance data over many 
years. The data was measured by a single traditional financial index. Such index could 
either be return on assets (ROA) or earnings per share (EPS). In addition, both the 
finance and economics literature argued that non-market measures of performance are not 
adequate indicators of true performance given the peculiarities of accounting practices 
(Shin-Ping and Tsung-Hsien, 2009). From the finance point of view, the stock market 
provides the best measure of a firm's worth: a firm is worth only what the market is 
willing to pay for it (Irungu, 2007). 
Abdullah and Page (2009) studied the effect of corporate governance on corporate 
performance among the United Kingdom's (UK) 350 listed companies. They found no 
consistent relationship between the governance structure (board and ownership structure) 
and the companies' market book value. Therefore, there was need to consider the effects 
of board's attributes in different contexts such as developing countries like Kenya so as to 
establish the nature of the relationship if any. 
On his part, Waweru (2008) undertook a study on competitive strategy implementation 
and its effects on performance in large private sector firms in Kenya. He concluded that 
there were three strategic groups of cost leadership, differentiators and dual strategists in 
increasing proportions. Dual strategists who may be board members and top management 
teams appeared to outperform those who used single strategies. Therefore, corporation 
boards monitor and evaluate an organization's and CEO's performances and their 
strategies in order to fulfill their obligations of maximizing shareholder wealth and 
minimizing agency cost. 
The study applied financial performance indicators including sales or turnover, 
profitability measures like Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Dividend 
Yield (DY), and Price-Earnings (PE) ratio because they could easily be collected from 
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secondary sources. This is especially so for the companies listed on the stock markets or 
centrally regulated. On the other hand, non-financial qualitative performance indicators 
would be collectable through primary data collection methods and that would take a lot of 
time. 
1.1.5 Nairobi Stock Exchange and the Listed Firms in Kenya 
The current study was carried out in Kenya among the firms listed on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange (NSE). The companies studied are those that were listed in the NSE between 
2006 and 2009. Their rapid developments notwithstanding, many stock exchanges in 
Africa are yet to reach their maturity stage. Apart from South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria 
which are well capitalized, most stock exchanges in Africa are characterized by low 
market capitalization, few listed companies, low liquidity, few stocks and information 
and disclosure deficiencies, among others (Kumo, 2008).The Nairobi Stock Exchange 
(NSE) is the fourth largest in Africa in terms of market capitalization. 
The Capital Markets Authority (CMA), a body corporate with perpetual succession 
within the Ministry of Finance, regulates the NSE-listed companies. As a result, it is 
expected that the listed companies comply to the NSE and the CMA regulations for them 
to continue selling shares at the bourse. The Capital Markets (2002) (Securities) (Public 
Offers, Listing and Disclosures) Regulations, prescribes the eligibility requirements for 
companies listed under the different market segments at the NSE. The NSE Handbook 
(2009) shows that NSE is categorized into three segments: the Main Investments Market 
Securities (MIMS), the Alternative Investments Market Securities (AIMS) and the Fixed 
Income Securities Market (FISMS). The MIMS targets mature companies with strong 
dividend streams. The AIMS is more favourable to small and medium-sized companies 
and allows firms to access cheaper, longer-term sources of capital through the capital 
markets. On the other hand, the FISMS allows businesses, financial institutions, and 
governmental and supra-national authorities to raise capital through the issuance of debt 
securities. In 2009, the CMA categorized the listed firms into 47 companies in the MIMS 
segment and eight firms in the AIMS segment (CMA Handbook, 2010). 
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Over a four-year period (2006-2009), the number of companies listed has risen from 51 
to 55. There have been two de-listings, over the same period. Table 1.1 gives a summary 
of key statistics in the Nairobi Stock Exchange on the volumes and values of shares 
traded over the period. The year 2006, stands out as one of the best years at the NSE as 
the bull run was at its peak. There were nine Initial Public Offers (IPOs) between 2006 
and 2009. Five of the IPOs were issued in 2006 alone while two companies issued in the 
next two years. The IPOs among the public sector firms were the sale of Kengen Ltd 
shares in 2006, Kenya Re-Insurance Company in 2007 and Safaricom Ltd in 2008. The 
rest were in the private sector. In most cases, the share purchases were over-subscribed 
by between 81 percent and 830 percent in Co-operative Bank and Eveready Ltd 
respectively (CMA Bulletin, 2010). This means that there was a lot of confidence on the 
NSE as a vehicle of investment by the public. Many listed companies experienced 
massive price appreciations at the bourse. This was demonstrated by the un-matched 
market capitalization that is about nine times what was witnessed in the subsequent three 
years. 
Table 1.1: The Main Investments Market Segment of the NSE at a Glance 
Indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 
NSE 20 Share Index 5,646 5,444 3,521 3,247 
Total Volume Traded (million) 1,455 1,938 5,856 3,160 
Total Number of Transactions 598,301 973,548 890,542 402,169 
Number of Listed Companies- All 51 54 55 55 
Number of Listed Companies - Main 
Investments Market Segment 
46 46 47 47 
Average Market Capitalization (Kshs Billion) 7,926 851 854 832 
Equity Turnover (Kshs Billion) 95 89 98 38 
Source; NSE, Capital Markets Authority (2010) 
In order to identify the specific influence of board attributes on firm performance, the 
effect of firm size and age of listed firms required assessment. Bathula (2008) suggested 
that internal governance structures are substitutable and the firms can choose appropriate 
governance options based on what is right for them. The firms listed in the NSE are 
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targeted for study as they represent the key sectors of Kenya's economy. They are also 
required by stock exchange and other legal requirements to keep proper records through 
published annual accounts where they prepare summaries of board members' 
demographic characteristics such as age and gender. Consistency in the reporting of 
financial accounts of the publicly quoted companies affords us two advantages; ability to 
compare various companies over several years, and comparison across the sectors and 
industries. 
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem 
Interest in the subject of board of directors' attributes the involvement of boards in 
strategic decision-making and their relationship with corporate performance is global. A 
large body of knowledge currently available addresses this phenomenon from the 
perspective of the United States, Europe and other developed countries. The knowledge 
base about this phenomenon in developing countries appears to be limited, though it is 
growing,-
Review of relevant extant literature reveals existence of a large number of studies on the 
role of boards of directors in strategic decision-making and corporate performance. Most 
of the literature has focused on directors' independence and power to explain their 
involvement in strategic decision-making and organizational behaviour. Boards of 
directors have unique individual characteristics or attributes that may determine their 
decision-making tendencies. These attributes include members' age, experience, skills 
and educational backgrounds. Thus far, research on boards of directors has been limited 
in terms of scale and scope and it is considered to be at an early stage of development 
(Judge et al, 2003; Melyoki, 2005; Kajola, 2008). The influence of board demographic 
characteristics and board composition on strategic decision-making among boards of 
listed companies requires an assessment to establish the relationship with firm 
performance. There was therefore need to carry out more rigorous studies in this area. 
No attempt had been made to study the relationship between board of directors' 
attributes, strategic decision-making and corporate performance with a specific focus on 
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developing countries. Available studies on the role of boards of directors in strategic 
decision-making in Africa are limited and mainly found in major economies such as 
Nigeria and South Africa. Kajola (2008) in a study conducted in Nigeria of 20 listed 
firms concluded that there was a positive and significant relationship between return on 
equity (ROE) and board size. He, however, recommended a larger sample size and more 
corporate governance variables, particularly the inclusion of board characteristics. The 
current study addresses these two issues among others. 
Although the extent to which the need for strategic decision-making (SDM) practices and 
organizational performance were aligned is well established in the literature, little 
research has been published on their relationship and the influence of board attributes 
(Roberto, 2003; Elbanna, 2006). Recent studies conducted in Kenya on organizational 
performance of listed firms have mainly focused on top management teams, and board 
effectiveness (Irungu, 2007; Ongore, 2008). In his study, Irungu (2007) assessed the 
effects of characteristics of top management teams (TMTs) on the performance of 
publicly quoted companies in Kenya. He concluded that the TMTs play a significant role 
in decision-making processes and organizational performance at individual member level 
but an insignificant role at team level. However, the study by Irungu (2007) did not 
assess the role of boards and their contribution in strategic decision-making and 
organizational performance. 
On his part, Ongore (2008) conducted a study on the effects of the ownership structure, 
board effectiveness and managerial discretion on corporate performance among the listed 
firms in Kenya. He concluded that there was no statistically significant relationship 
between board effectiveness and firm performance. The respondents were mainly Chief 
Executive Officers, Top Management Teams and Line Management who were 
purposively selected from listed firms. Ongore (2008) recommended that a study 
covering data for more years of operations would give a better picture. The study by 
Ongore (2008) did not assess the relationship between the strategic decision-making role 
of the boards and their various attributes to firm performance. In both studies (Irungu 
2007 and Ongore, 2008) the respondents were mainly top management teams. 
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Despite the presumed importance of the directors' demographic characteristics and 
composition as board attributes, very little rigorous research had examined the extent to 
which independent and outside board members actually monitor and advise top 
management teams (TMTs) in strategic decision-making processes (Tricker, 2009). The 
degree to which board independence or multiple appointments play a role in monitoring 
and advising the management team towards sustainable corporate performance requires 
examination (Carpenter and Westphal, 1999). 
Some scholars have observed that the relationship between the board structure (as 
opposed to board processes) and company performance has been the most-studied aspect 
among all board investigations (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Bhagat and Black, 2002). It has 
often been assumed that a company's financial performance was determined by board 
characteristics or attributes. Pfeffer (1983) argued that it was not necessary to understand 
board processes as directors' performance could be inferred from their demographic 
characteristics. Other scholars have suggested that future research studies on the actual 
mechanisms and benefits brought by women on boards of directors and board 
composition would be fruitful extensions of their work (Hillman and Cannella, 2007; 
Bathula, 2008). Such an assumption requires data-supported justification. Indeed the 
analysis of the board composition is important as quantification of board structure and 
company performance is much easier than that of incorporating board attributes, 
processes and firm performance. This study extends the frontiers of knowledge by 
increasing the understanding of, and recommending enhancements in Board of Directors' 
composition, this research will help to improve the country's corporate governance thus 
attracting foreign investments, as well as encouraging local entrepreneurs to invest. 
The study sought to answer the following research questions. Is there a relationship 
between Board of Directors' attributes, board involvement in strategic decision-making 
and corporate performance? Do board's operating environment and firm's characteristics 
influence organizational performance? 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
The overall objective of the current study was to examine the relationships between board 
of directors' attributes, strategic decision-making processes and corporate performance of 
firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. 
The specific objectives of the study were to: 
i. assess the extent to which board of directors' attributes determine their (board) 
involvement in strategic decision-making; 
ii. establish the effect of board attributes on corporate performance; 
iii. ascertain the moderating effect of board of directors' involvement in strategic 
decision-making and the relationships between board of directors' attributes and 
corporate performance; 
iv. determine the effect of board of directors' operating environment on 
organizational performance, and 
v. assess the influence of firm characteristics on corporate performance. 
1.4 Justification of the Study 
The current study contributes to the body of knowledge in several ways. First, results 
from this research were expected to provide a better understanding of the relationship 
between boards of directors' attributes strategic decision-making and firm performance. 
The results of the study brought out the importance of gender diversity, age, industry 
experience, educational gjjd professional background and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
duality in the Kenyan corporate governance scene. Acquiring such evidence was 
expected to enable scholars to relate corporate boards and industry performance. As the 
costs of meeting governance requirements are considerable, the outcome of this study has 
the potential to benefit the businesses, shareholders, policy makers, professional bodies, 
and the wider community to rationalize their agency costs. 
Secondly, while boards are the main tools of internal governance mechanism, their 
efficacy may vary depending on board characteristics. With pressures for conforming to 
prescriptive characteristics based on codes and best practices, board members may find 
optimal choices difficult to make due to internal challenges. Bathula (2008) asserts that 
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inadequacy of appropriate board and governance processes is one of the main reasons for 
low shareholder wealth and lagging economic development. Overall, the findings of the 
study were expected to guide firms to make appropriate policy decisions regarding 
composition and appointment of the board of directors. 
Third, the study assesses the environment in which the board operates. This includes the 
board's culture, information access and the formal independence of the board members, 
which are of great importance in strategic decision-making. It was anticipated that the 
study would enable firms to appreciate the politico-legal, social and economic 
environment and establish how to leverage on them to make effective strategic decisions. 
Fourth, the study empirically examined the relationship between various board of 
directors' attributes as independent variables and corporate performance as dependent 
variable. In particular, the current study enhances our understanding of the boards by 
examining the effect of moderating and control variables on the involvement of the board 
in strategic decision-making processes of firms. 
Finally, the results of the study are useful to practitioners as they design the corporate 
boards in terms of size and skills mix of the board members. Practitioners shall be able to 
ensure that boards have an optimum number of the board members with a balance of 
skills and demographic characteristics to add value to the decision-making processes. The 
results were anticipated to enable the practitioners to distinguish between boards, which 
were partly prescribed by Acts of Parliament, and those that are fully private. 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter one gives the background of the study 
while stating the need for the study. It also outlines the objectives of the study and 
discusses the justification of the study. 
Chapter two presents a detailed review of relevant literature. It first gives the theoretical 
perspectives of Board of Directors' attributes followed by the empirical analysis of 
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related studies. The board's operating environment and its influence on performance is 
also brought out. The chapter further discusses the literature related to board attributes, 
board involvement in strategic decision-making and corporate performance. Finally, the 
chapter presents the knowledge gaps identified from the literature and proposes a 
conceptual framework and corresponding hypothesis. 
Chapter three provides the methodology adopted for this research along with the research 
philosophy, design and population of the study. Other aspects include data collection 
methods, measurement of research variables studied and data analysis tools used. 
Chapter four gives the data analysis regarding board of directors' attributes and relates it 
to corporate performance. The scale reliability tests are also covered. Tests of hypotheses 
on the relationship are also provided. 
Chapter Five provides data analyzed to establish the relationship between board 
involvement in strategic decision-making processes and corporate performance. These 
are the moderating variables of the study. Tests of hypotheses on the relationship were 
also provided. 
Chapter six deals with the effect of board of directors' operating environment and Firm 
characteristics on corporate performance. These are the intervening variables of the 
study. Tests of hypotheses on the relationship among all the variables is also provided. 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis by summarizing the main Findings and the 
conclusions. The chapter also gives the implications of the study with regard to 
theoretical, practical and methodological underpinnings. Finally, the chapter identifies the 
limitations of the study and closes with recommendations for further study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter reviews literature relating to corporate governance mechanisms focusing on 
board of directors' attributes. Aspects such as strategic decision-making and firm 
performance were also evaluated. The theoretical foundations upon which the board 
attributes are based, and the strategic decisions made by the boards of directors and their 
effect on organizational performance are provided. Empirical studies on board of 
directors' attributes are also presented. The chapter concludes with a tabulation of a 
summary of related studies and the conceptual framework to address knowledge gaps that 
the study sought to fill. Corresponding hypotheses are outlined. 
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives of Board Attributes 
Various scholars spanning a period of about thirty years have developed a number of 
theories on corporate governance with respect to boards of directors. The theories that 
were integrated included agency, stewardship, resource dependency, and stakeholder 
theories. The theories form the foundation of the role and effectiveness of boards of 
directors in strategic decision-making. Below is a brief explanation of each of the 
relevant theories. 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
The agency theory is based on the principal-agent framework. Jehnsen and Meckling 
(1976) who viewed organizations as sets of explicit and implicit contracts with associated 
rights. Separation between ownership and control of corporations characterizes the 
existence of agency relationship between the board who represent the shareholders and 
the management who represent the board and other stakeholders. Agyris (1964) argues 
that agency theory looks at an employee or people as an economic being, which 
suppresses an individual's own aspiration. 
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In the context of corporations and issues of corporate control, agency theory views 
corporate governance mechanisms, especially the board of directors, as being an essential 
monitoring device to try to ensure that problems that may be brought about by the 
principal-agent relationships are minimized (Moldoveanu and Martin, 2001; Malin, 
2007). According to Blair (1996), managers as agents must be monitored and institutional 
arrangements made to assure checks and balances are in place to avoid abuse of power. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) developed a decision-management model involving four steps 
based on the assumption that there is a conflict of interest between the professional 
managers of business entities and their board, which had a fiduciary role. The theory was 
used to model the relationship between the board of directors and the firm managers, the 
shareholders and the board of directors and the shareholders and the firm managers. 
The theory finally suggests that boards should consist of outside and independent 
directors, also that the position of Chairman and CEO should be separate (Daily and 
Dalton, 1994; Balta, 2008). When the separation of those two roles is violated mainly 
when the Chairman is under the influence of the CEO, the agency cost becomes great and 
the firm will suffer in the financial and control market (Johnson, Ellstrand, Dalton and 
Dalton, 2005; Balta, 2008). 
2.2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
jm 
The stakeholder theory takes account of a wider group of constituents rather than 
focusing on shareholders (Malin, 2007). It examines the firm in the context of a wider 
range of implicit and explicit stakeholders having legitimate expectations, urgent claims, 
and/or power regarding the firm (Jones, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; Jones et al. 1999). 
Stakeholder theorists suggest that managers in organizations have a network of 
relationships to serve that include the suppliers, employees and business partners 
(Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). 
Freeman (1984) contends that the network of relationships with many groups can affect 
decision-making processes as stakeholder theory is concerned with the nature of the 
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relationships in terms of both processes and outcomes for the firm and its stakeholders. 
This theory focuses on managerial or strategic decision-making and suggests that the 
interests of all stakeholders have intrinsic value, and no sets of interests are assumed to 
dominate others (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). 
Resource dependency theory also views outside directors as a critical link to the external 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The theory predicts a relationship between the 
extent of uncertainty and dependence and the composition of the board with respect to 
boards' size and proportion of outside board members. 
2.2.3 Stewardship Theory 
According to stewardship theory, Directors are regarded as the stewards of the company 
assets and are pre-disposed to act in the best interest of the shareholders (Malin, 2007). 
The stewardship theory has its roots from psychology and sociology. According to 
Abdulla and Valentine (2009), stewards are company executives and managers working 
for the shareholders, protect and make profits for shareholders and are satisfied and 
motivated when organizational success was attained. 
From the stewardship theory perspective, superior performance of the firm was linked to 
having a majority of the inside (executive) directors on the board since these inside 
directors (managers) better understand the business, and are better placed to govern than 
outside directors, and carTtherefore make superior decisions (Bathula, 2008). Stewardship 
theory argues that the effective control held by professional managers empowers them to 
maximize firm performance and corporate profits. Consequently, insider-dominated 
boards are favoured for their depth of knowledge, access to current operating 
information, technical expertise and commitment to the firm. 
Stewardship theorists contend that superior corporate performance is associated with the 
majority of inside directors because; first, they ensure more effective and efficient 
decision- making and second, they contribute to maximise profits for shareholders (Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2003). Regarding the leadership structure, stewards maximise their utility 
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because they achieve organisational rather than self-serving objectives (Davis et al., 
1997; Balta, 2008). 
2.2.4 Resource Dependency Theory 
Proponents of resource dependency theory (Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald Salancik) 
attempted to explain organisations in terms of their interdependence with the 
environment (Pugh and Hickson, 1997, p. 62; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Some scholars 
have argued that the provision of resources enhances organizational functioning, a firm's 
performance and its survival (Daily et al, 2003). This theory concentrates on the role of 
Board of Directors in providing access to resources needed by the firm (Abdullah and 
Valentine, 2009). Hillman et al (2000) contend that resource dependency theory focuses 
on the role that directors play in providing or securing essential resources to an 
organization through their linkages to their external environment. 
This theory states that organizations are interdependent with their environment and or 
other organizations for their survival since they are not self-dependent (Pugh and 
Hickson, 1997). The theory thus proposes that corporate board is a mechanism for 
managing external dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), reducing environmental 
uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972) and environmental interdependency. 
According to resource dependency theory, directors act as a linkage between the firm and 
the external environment which generate uncertainty and external dependencies (Balta, 
2008). Organisations are requested to comply with uncertainty as well as with different 
environmental changes in order to survive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). 
Resource dependency theory also views outside directors as a critical link to the external 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The theory predicts a relationship between the 
extent of uncertainty and dependence and the composition of the board with respect to 
boards' size and proportion of outside board members. 
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2.2.5 Integration of the Fundamental Theories of Corporate Governance 
The foregoing theories of corporate governance that affect boards of directors roles were 
summarized in Table 2.1 below. 
Dimension Agency theory Stewardship Stakeholders Resource 
dependence 
Board role Control and 
supervision 
Service and 
advice 
Uphold 
interest of all 
stakeholders 
Links the firm 
to the 
resources 
required to 
maximize 
performance 
Theoretical 
basis 
Economics and 
finance 
Sociology and 
psychology 
Management Organizational 
theory and 
sociology 
Effective 
Boards 
Independent 
(outsider 
dominated board, 
no social, personal, 
or professional ties 
between board and 
CEO/management) 
Separate CEO -
Chairperson 
Insider 
dominated 
board. 
Joint CEO-
Chairperson 
(duality) 
CEO- board 
social ties 
Maximizing 
the 
shareholder 
returns is not 
the sole 
objective. 
Interests of all 
stakeholders 
should be 
equally 
honoured 
Large board 
Board member 
diversity 
External 
networks 
among board 
members and 
others firms. 
Representative 
studies 
Fama and Jensen, 
1983; p i and 
Snell, 1988; 
Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990; 
Baysinger, Kosnik 
and Turk, 1991; 
Donaldson, 
1990; 
Donaldson 
and Davis, 
1991,1994; 
Davis et 
al.,1997 
Freeman 
,1984; 
Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995 
Pfeffer, 1973; 
Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; 
Hillman et 
al.,2000; 
Source: Adapted from Castro, C.B.. De La Concha, M.D., Gravel, J.V., & Periflan, MM. V. (2009). Does the Team 
Leverage the Board's Decisions? Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 17, Issue No.6, p. 746. 
The foremost theoretical perspective for examining board role in corporate governance 
has been agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Stewardship theory relates to the 
board's task of providing support and advice to management (Davis, 1991). Resource 
dependence theorists (Hendry and Kiel, 2004) argue the board is a co-optative 
mechanism to extract vital resources to company performance, through its members' 
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networks with other organizations and by linking the firm to its overall environment 
(Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Hillman et al., 2000). 
Stakeholder theory recognizes that many groups have connections with the firm and are 
affected by its decision-making (Freeman, 1984). Hendry and Kiel (2004) explain that the 
choice of a particular theoretical perspective depends on 'contextual factors' such as 
board power, environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry. To gain a greater 
understanding of the board's role in strategic decision-making, there is need to integrate 
different theories rather than consider a single theory alone. All the theories assume that 
the board and management formulate strategy through a partnership approach (Hendry 
and Kiel, 2004). These perspectives arise from the three main roles identified by the 
literature within boards of directors - control, service, and resource dependence (Johnson 
et al., 1996). 
2.3 Empirical Studies on Board of Directors' Attributes 
Corporate governance issues gained a worldwide attention in 2001 with the spectacular 
collapse of Enron, when the boards of directors of many under-performing firms were 
reluctantly thrust into the spotlight (Tricker, 2009). In the context of corporations and 
issues of corporate control, corporate governance components with regard to boards of 
directors' attributes, are seen as an essential monitoring pillar to direct and control 
organizations towards achievement of intended objectives. Board attributes that were 
examined for their influence on strategic decision-making and firm performance have 
been identified in the conceptual framework in Figure 2.1. These attributes were board 
composition and board demographic characteristics. Under board composition, attributes 
such as inside versus outside board members, board size, executive versus non-executive 
directors, interlocking directors and CEO duality or leadership structure were assessed. 
The board of directors' demographic characteristics in the current study included age, 
gender diversity, directors' education and professional specializations also known as 
functional backgrounds. 
The composition and demographic characteristics of the board had been examined in 
numerous studies as the key attributes of the board of directors (Pettigrew, 1992; 
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Westphal, 1999). Board composition subsumes the individual director's potential to solve 
the various tasks (Daily, Johnson and Dalton, 1999) and has generally been analyzed by 
examining the demographic characteristics of the board (Rindova, 1999). Board size and 
board composition have long been regarded as important components of the governance 
processes for firms in business as they define the affiliation of each director as either 
inside or outside board member (Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999; Boone et al, 2007; 
Tricker, 2009). They play a significant role in the performance of the firms. 
2.3.1 Board Composition 
Recent studies on board attributes focus on board size which is considered to be a major 
component of board structure and can range from very small (5 or 6) to very large (30 
plus) and the average being 12 to 14 (Chaganti et al., 1985; Daily and Dalton, 1992; 
Goodstein et al. 1994). As board size increases, both expertise and critical resources of 
the firm also increase. However, Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Cain (2009) argue that as 
board size increases it becomes difficult for an additional director to increase value. 
A larger board negatively affects the amount of time available at typical board meetings 
and has a negative impact on group dynamics by leading to greater formality and less 
frankness and openness in strategic discussion (Pfeffer, 1973). On the other hand, smaller 
boards have the ability to adopt and exercise a controlling role (Chaganti et al., 1985). 
Yermack (2006) found out that board smallness was associated with higher market 
performance such as return on assets and return on sales. 
In some organizations, executive directors hold both a board position and a senior 
management or executive position within the company (Fleming, 2003; Balta, 2008). 
Owing to this dual role, executive directors have the potential to .make a valuable 
contribution to the board, as they are able to bring firm-specific knowledge to board 
deliberations. Notwithstanding the benefits of executive directors, their independence from 
management may be impaired (Fleming, 2003). Other scholars have studied the board-
performance relationship with contradictory findings (Daily et al., 2003). It is noteworthy 
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that there is need for clear independence of non-executive and independent directors to 
enable proper monitoring of the executive top management teams. 
Independent directors are defined as all non-management members of the board (Johnson 
et al., 1996). Affiliated directors are the outside directors that are affiliated through their 
professions who may have been co-opted by management through business ties (Hillman 
et al., 2000). Independent directors are likely to be more effective in monitoring 
management and thus reduce the agency costs that arise as a result of separation of 
ownership (shareholders) and management (control) in day today company management 
(Balta, 2008). 
Empirical findings demonstrate that outside independent directors on the board improve 
firm's performance (Baysigner and Butler 1985; Lorsch and Clark, 2008). However, 
other studies have shown zero effect on corporate performance (Germalin and Weisbach, 
1991) or negative effect (Beaty and Zajac, 1994). Consequently, agency theory shows a 
negative effect of affiliated directors on firm performance. 
Interlocking directors are board of directors who are members of more than one board. 
Resource dependency theory suggests that boards with interlocking directorships are 
intended to link the companies with the external environment and resources to maximize 
their performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Balta, 2008). Some 
researchers believe that interlocking directors serve as a source of information on 
business (Useem, 1982; Davis, 1991). 
The theory of interlocking directorates suggests that interlocks exist for class integration 
and high strategic interdependence of organizations (Penning, 1981; Useem, 1982). 
Researchers have found contradictory results regarding the impact of interlocking 
directors on firm performance. In Kenya, a number of corporate board members sit on the 
boards of more than one listed company (CMA Bulletin, 2010). In some cases, one board 
member is a director of up to five listed firms and chairing two of them. 
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A notable important indicator of inappropriate corporate governance practice is the 
existence of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality. This is where the CEO also doubles 
up as the corporation chairperson (Lam and Lee, 2008). Agency theorists argue against 
the practice to protect the shareholders' interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983). They assert 
that while the CEO is a full-time position and has responsibility for day-to-day running of 
the office by formulating and implementing corporate strategy, the chairperson should be 
a part-time position whose main duty is to ensure board effectiveness and evaluate CEO 
performance (Balta, 2008). 
However, the approaches that have been developed with respect to CEO duality have 
yielded inconsistent results and there is no clear direction and magnitude of CEO duality-
board vigilance and firm performance (Rechner and Dalton, 1989; Daily and Dalton, 
1992, Dalton et al., 1998; Balta, 2008). It is noteworthy that the best practice is the 
separation of the holders of the positions. 
2.3.2 Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics 
Numerous studies (Balta, 2008; Kajola, 2008) have revealed significant association 
between the Board of Directors' demographic characteristics and strategic decision-
making. According to Pfeffer (1983) demography refers to the composition in terms of 
basic attributes such as age, educational level, race, length of service and social entity. In 
the current study, the key demographic characteristics were average age, educational and 
professional qualifications, gender and industry experience or tenure of the board 
members. 
Age has been considered as an indicator of experience and a signal of a person's 
propensity for risk-taking and change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992, Guthrie and Data, 
1997). Younger executives tend to pursue risky strategies (Child, 1972). In contrast, older 
executives tend to be more conservative and have trouble in adopting new ideas 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Age is associated with the capacity for information 
processing and analysis, and, therefore, older managers have less information processing 
ability compared to younger ones due to their physical and mental stamina (Child, 1974). 
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In Kenya, a few board members were beyond seventy years old and often chaired more 
than one board perhaps due to their experience and size of their shareholding. 
Executive tenure was seen in a variety of ways namely: tenure in the position (Hambrick 
and Fukutomi, 1991); tenure in the organization (Thomas et al., 1991) and tenure in the 
industry (Hambrick et al. 1993). Industry tenure refers to the number of years that the 
executive has worked for a particular industry. Noburn and Birley (1988) assert that the 
number of companies an executive has worked for had positively related to growth and 
financial performance of the company. 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) assert that executives with short tenures tend to have 
fresh ideas and are risk takers while those with longer term tenures have restricted 
perceptions and risk avoiders. Noburn and Birley (1988) found a positive association 
between executive's tenure and company performance (growth and profitability) in stable 
industries but negative association in turbulent industries. Executives with long position 
tenure are familiar with decision process, task knowledge, expertise and experience along 
with increased power within an organization. 
Recent corporate reforms encourage women participation in corporate governance 
practices. The aim is to promote gender diversity in the boards. Firms have been 
pressured by institutional investors, shareholder activists and interest groups to appoint 
directors with different ethnic and gender backgrounds as well as bases of expertise to 
their boards (Van der Walt et al., 2006). 
The underlying assumption is that greater diversity should lead to less insular decision-
making processes and greater recognition of change (Westphal and Milton, 2000; 
Bathula, 2008). Bilimoria (1995) argued that women executives bring fresh and well-
informed views related to market, environment and ethical issues and have an impact on 
the decision-making process of corporations and that boards with more than one female 
director have a greater influence over strategic decisions. 
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Educational background of board of directors is an indicator of executives' knowledge, 
cognitive orientation and skill base (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). Scholars have shown 
that educated managers have greater cognitive complexity and ability to adapt to new 
ideas and accept innovations (Hitt and Tyler; Wally and Baum, 1994). High level 
education has been equated with greater capacity to process information, innovate and 
take risks (Guthrie et al., 1991). Executives with higher educational background are 
expected to develop problem-solving skills and international diversification (Hitt and 
Tyler, 1991). 
The type of education of the board members also matters in strategic decision-making. 
Focusing on business education and more specifically MBA programs, executives are 
risk averse and resistant to innovation (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). On the other 
hand, executives with technical education in science and engineering have a complete 
understanding in technology and innovation and likely to see opportunities and not 
threats in the external environment (Tyler and Steensma, 1998). Education in general and 
professional management education in particular focuses more on application of 
analytical techniques rather than risk-prone idiosyncratic judgments of self-made 
executives (Balta, 2008). 
Scholars have identified systematic relationships between managers' functional 
experience and firm's strategy. Hambrick and Mason (1984) distinguished functional 
background into two broad categories namely: the output and the throughput functions. 
The output functions include marketing, sales, Research and Development (R&D) and 
entrepreneurship and emphasize growth and such of new opportunities and monitoring of 
the products. The throughput functions include operations and finance that aim at 
improving efficiency in the transformation process (Balta, 2008). 
2.3.3 Meta-Analysis of Board Attributes and Financial Performance 
We reviewed previous studies on board characteristics and financial performance with 
the help of meta-analysis. According to a study by Andres, Azofra and Lopez, F. (2005) 
Board of Directors attributes varied from country to country. Their sample consisted the 
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following ten members of the Organization for the Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD): Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, 
Switzerland, the UK and the USA. Andres et al (2005) obtained the data from Spencer 
Stuart Board Index, a publication of Spencer Stuart Consulting. Although the index had 
been published in the USA annually since 1990, it was not until 1996 that it was available 
for the other countries. Thus, we examined cross-sectional data regarding the board of 
directors of large companies from ten developed countries for 1996. After eliminating 
Financial and insurance companies, and those companies with too much missing data and 
outliers, our sample was reduced to 450 companies (Andres et al, 2005). 
As Table 2.2 shows, there are big differences in terms of size and number of companies 
by country. In addition, all the companies have a unitary board with the exception of 
Germany and Holland, where companies were obliged by law to have a two-tier board 
system with a Supervisory Board and a Management Board. 
In as far as the differences among countries are concerned, the size of the board was 
useful for dividing the entire sample into three different groups: Firms with large boards 
(German Firms have 15 directors on average), Firms with small boards (Swiss and Italian 
Firms have 9 directors on average), and Firms with a medium-sized board (American, 
British, Canadian, Spanish, French and Belgian companies have 12-13 directors on 
average) (Andres et al, 2005). 
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Table 2.2: Selected Attributes on Corporate Boards in OECD Countries 
Country Statistical 
Measures 
ROA Board 
Size 
Outside 
Directors 
Inside 
Directors 
Meetings 
per year 
Sales 
Turnover 
Leverage 
Belgium (12) Mean 0.08 13.17 0.76 0.24 6.00 3658 0.17 
Median 0.12 11.50 0.81 0.19 6.00 1383 0.14 
Canada(79) Mean 0.02 12.34 0.74 0.26 6.61 3048 0.30 
Median 0.10 12.00 0.79 0.21 6.00 1552 0.27 
Switzerland 
(17) 
Mean 0.08 9.12 0.90 0.10 5.38 5749 0.16 
Median 0.08 9.00 0.90 0.10 5.00 1637 0.16 
Germany 
(33) 
Mean 0.11 15.06 0.60 0.40 3.91 12261 0.12 
Median 0.12 16.00 0.58 0.42 4.00 2462 0.12 
Spain (28) Mean 0.12 12.29 0.75 0.25 8.57 930 0.13 
Median 0.09 11.00 0.80 0.20 9.00 312 0.12 
France (42) Mean 0.10 12.93 0.81 0.14 4.52 11130 0.15 
Median 0.11 13.00 0.82 0.10 4.00 6243 0.13 
United 
Kingdom 
(66) 
Mean 0.22 12.03 0.48 0.52 7.32 9849 0.18 
Median 0.19 12.00 0.50 0.50 9.00 6230 017 
Italy (56) Mean 0.05 9.23 0.74 0.26 5.25 4425 0.18 
Median 0.06 9.00 0.81 0.19 5.00 518 0.14 
Netherlands 
(37) 
Mean 0.20 6.84 6.00 6164 0.14 
Median 0.16 7.00 6.00 2635 0.13 
United States 
of America 
(80) 
Mean 0.20 12.74 0.79 0.21 8.93 25536 0.31 
Median 0.19 
m 
13.00 0.81 0.19 8.50 14502 0.31 
Sample size 
(450) 
Mean 0.05 11.67 0.70 0.28 6.60 12771 0.21 
Median 0.04 12.00 0.75 0.24 6.00 3226 0.18 
Max. 0.82 26 1 1 19 269036 0.92 
Min. -0.42 3 0 0 0 2.13 0.00 
Source: Andres, P., Azofra, V. and Lopez, F. (2005). Corporate Boards in OECD Countries: size, 
composition, functioning and effectiveness, Corporate Boards in OECD, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 197-
210. 
The basic descriptive statistics were sorted by country. In brackets is the number of firms 
from each country in the sample. Sales are in millions of US dollars. ROA is the return 
on assets, Board Size is the average number of directors per company, Outside Directors 
is the proportion of Non-Executive Directors, Inside Directors is the proportion of 
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executive directors, Meetings held every year, Leverage and Sales are informative about 
the size of the firm. 
In a study that examined the effect of corporate governance on the performance of firms 
in Africa by using both market and accounting, based performance measures Kyereboah-
Coleman (2007) analyzed data from 103 listed firms. The firms were drawn from Ghana, 
South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya covering the five year period 1997-2001 was used and 
analysis done within the dynamic panel data framework. The findings show that large and 
independent boards enhance firm value and that combining the positions of CEO and 
board chair has a negative impact on corporate performance. 
In a study conducted by Kyereboah-Coleman (2007) and whose findings were 
summarized, Table 2.3 presents accounting based performance measures of selected 
board attributes among four countries in Africa. While the mean value of ROA was 0.13, 
indicating an average return on assets of 13%, expectedly, firms in South Africa with a 
relatively developed corporate governance structure are ahead of the others in terms of 
performance. Using ROA, Nigeria appears to match the performance of South Africa. 
Whiles, all the countries are relatively matched using Tobin's q, Kenya recorded the 
lowest mean value of 6% on ROA. Again, the sector jointly dominates performance using 
ROA with the agricultural sector. 
Table 2.3: Country Specific Board Characteristics in Selected Countries in Africa 
Variable 
Country 
South 
Africa 
Ghana Nigeria Kenya 
Board Size (Mean) 14.32 8.39 8.88 7.79 
Independence 0.59 0.24 0.68 0.20 
CEO duality 0 0.39 0.16 0.17 
Frequency of Board meetings 12 10.34 9.83 10.72 
Organizational age 46.11 35.72 30.24 
Firm Size (Employees) 56279 918 1862 3111 
Organizational performance - Return on Assets 
_(ROA]_ 
0.18 0.13 0.17 0.06 
Source: Kyereboah-Coleman, A. (2007). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Africa: 
A Dynamic Panel Data Analysis, A Paper Prepared for the "International Conference on Corporate 
Governance in Emerging Markets" 
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Further, Table 2.3 shows that regarding board attributes, the mean board size is nine (9) 
with a maximum of 23 directors. The standard deviation of 3.41 suggests that there is 
rather a wide dispersion. South Africa appears to have the largest mean board size of 
about 14. Ghana has a mean board size of eight (8), Nigeria, about nine (9) and Kenya, 
about eight (8). While, the maximum Board size is 23 in South Africa, it is 14 in Nigeria 
and 13 each in Ghana and Kenya. The results also show that most of the mining firms in 
the sample have the largest mean board size of about 14 with the services sector having 
the lowest mean board size of about 7 (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). 
Finally, Table 2.3 points out that in the overall sample boards were relatively less 
independent as they were mostly dominated by executive directors (John and Senbet, 
1998). The mean value of 0.42 for board independence suggests that on the average about 
58% of these boards were made up of executive directors. This situation was driven 
mostly by the Ghana and Kenya samples with a mean board independence of 24% and 
20% for Ghana and Kenya respectively. However, some of these boards could be said to 
be highly independent with 85% of their membership being constituted of non-executive 
directors. The study shows however that corporate boards in South Africa and Nigeria are 
largely dependent constituted mostly by NEDs. Again, apart from the mining and the 
agriculture sectors, which had relatively independent boards, the rest of the sectors 
generally had less independent boards (Kyereboah-Coleman, 2007). 
2.4 The Role of the Board of Directors in Strategic Decision-Making 
From the foregoing theories and demographic characteristics, it can be concluded that 
boards of directors provide leadership, control and direction to the organization that they 
govern. The board is responsible for determining the company's overall aims and 
strategies, plans and policies those aims (Malin, 2007: 124). They are regarded as an 
important mechanism-entity within the company that creates a link between the 
shareholders and managers and therefore plays an important role in corporate governance 
system (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Monks and Minow, 2008). 
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Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) asserted that the Boards of Directors have the fiduciary duty 
to monitor management performance and protect shareholders' interests. The other roles 
of the boards are institutional, strategy, ethical, disciplinary, figurehead, auditing and 
class hegemony (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). These roles can be summarized as linking, co-
ordinating, control, strategic, maintenance and support of firms' resources and 
management teams. The main roles of boards of directors are: to link the organization to 
the critical resources in the external environment; play administrative and internal control 
roles in addition to the formulation of policy and monitoring of management (Pfeffer, 
1972; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Ongore, 2008). 
Early research on board roles embraced a managerial dominance perspective and that 
boards are ineffective governing structures because incumbent managers control them 
(Mace, 1986; Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). However, recent financial scandals have led to 
corporate collapse in the developed world resulting in huge losses to the shareholders. 
These events have raised questions as to the role played by the boards of directors of such 
companies in strategic decision-making and performance (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; 
Balta, 2008; Ongore, 2008). Since boards of directors are key pillars of corporate 
governance in the running of organizations, an understanding of the effect of their 
attributes on firm performance are necessary (Balta, 2008). This necessity is driven by 
the acceptance of the strategic role played by the boards in decision-making. 
The primary research of agency theory argued that boards are an efficient mechanism for 
monitoring a firm's managers (Eisenhardt, 1989). Both groups - TMT and boards have a 
direct responsibility for the decision-making process, which has prompted a significant 
body of research (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). This stage of 
synthesis defends an active board of directors (Westphal, 1999) and relies on stewardship 
(Donaldson, 1990), agency (Eisenhardt, 1989), and resource dependence (Pfeffer, 1973) 
theories. This line of argument understands that the board is a valuable resource (Bathula, 
2008; Macus, 2008), which should be exploited when the firm needs to make important 
decisions such as a change in strategy (Ginsberg, 1994; Rindova, 1999). The board of 
directors is therefore part of a collective unit together with the top management, which 
should work together, for the sake of improving the organization's performance (Bathula, 
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2008; Tricker, 2009).The boards therefore play a pivotal role in the success or otherwise 
of the organizations that they lead. 
Board involvement in decision-making describes the overall level of participation of board 
members in making decisions that affect the long-term performance of an organization (Judge 
and Zeithaml, 1992). Previous studies have identified four main functions of the board of 
directors: the agency/control function of supervising management; the strategic decision 
and policy support role; the resource acquirer role (Lasfer, 2006); and maintenance of 
firm legitimacy and reputation (Filatochev et al., 2006; Abdullah and Page, 2009). 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) on upper echelons concluded that executives' characteristics 
provide filter and distillation of information in a three step process: experiences, values 
and personalities in a way that affect the vision, perception and interpretation of 
information processing. Other scholars have attempted to explore the effects of 
executives' characteristics on information processing and in most of the cases the 
contradictory findings are arrived at (Hambrick, 2007; Irungu, 2007; Ongore, 2008; 
Balta, 2008). The executives in this case include both the board of directors and the Top 
Management Teams. 
Pearce and Zahra (1991) pointed out that powerful boards provide useful links between 
the organization and the external environment, which lead to the protection of 
shareholders' rights andt rea te corporate identity. There are prescriptive and descriptive 
writings regarding Boards of Directors, their composition (inside/outside or 
executive/non-executive, independent/affiliated directors) their demographic 
characteristics and their leadership structures (Pfeffer, 1972; Baysigner and Butler, 1985; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991). 
Boards of Directors have been known to influence the strategy of their firms in two main 
ways: through "decision control" activities. Such activities included evaluating past 
decisions made by top management, performing high-level reviews of strategic plans, and 
monitoring executive and firm performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and through 
decision management" activities such as ratifying strategic proposals, asking probing 
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questions about important issues, and helping to formulate, assess, and decide upon 
strategic alternatives (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). 
Decision control is the board's most fundamental responsibility, but decision 
management is not traditionally considered a necessary board role (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). Indeed, the results of past surveys of corporate directors affirm that while most 
boards review strategy and executive performance (Harrison, 1987), few boards play a 
significant role in strategic decisions (Mace, 1986). However, as relatively few studies 
have targeted board strategic involvement, our awareness of its antecedents and 
consequences is limited (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). This is also applicable in a 
turbulent business environment where change is the norm rather than an exception. 
2.4.1 Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Strategic decision-making processes have received increased attention among scholars 
and business practitioners (Cutting and Kouzmin, 2002; Ireland and Miller, 2004). Many 
scholars have described strategic decision-making as a sequence of phases (Fredrickson, 
1984; Hart, 1992), a set of different characteristics/dimensions (Stein, 1980; Hart, 1992) 
and the effects of these dimensions on organizational outcomes (Papadikis, 1998; Cutting 
and Kouzmin, 2002).Thus, strategic management models describe how executives make 
the strategic decisions that are intended to facilitate organization-environment co-
alignment (Balta, 2008). 
* 
As a result, strategic decision-making has been distinguished into two broad categories in 
research: content and process. Content category deals with issues of strategy content 
(Cutting and Kouzmin, 2002; Elbanna, 2006; Balta, 2008). Process category research on 
the other hand, deals with the process by which a strategic decision is made and 
implemented (Elbanna, 2006). The two perspectives of strategic decision-making 
complement each other (Hickson et al. 1986; Balta, 2008). The strategic decision-making 
processes include but not limited to agenda setting to prioritize what is strategic, the use 
of board committees to recommend making 'minor' decisions and only referring key 
issues to full board and the incorporation of task forces to hasten decision-making. The 
board chairperson, the CEO and or the company secretary were tasked with the 
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responsibility of ensuring that there is proper documentation of the proceedings of the 
various meetings and the respective resolutions reached. 
Board Committees: The OECD (2004) guidelines provide that there is need for board 
committees in organizations. The board should establish relevant committees and 
delegate specific mandates to such committees as may be necessary especially the audit 
and nominating committee (CMA Act, 2002). A non-executive director should head 
every board committee. Such committees although they may vary from company to 
company, the most common ones include audit and governance; nomination and 
remuneration; finance and investment. They must have clear terms of reference as set out 
in the OECD (2004) and CMA (2002) guidelines that indicate their respective mandates. 
2.5 Board of Directors' Operating Environment and Strategic Decision-Making 
The environments in which the board members operate influence business decisions. Van 
den Berghe and Baelden (2005) categorize board environment into three types. These are 
board culture, information access and formal independence of the board members. In 
order for corporations to survive and thrive, their boards need to be able to change and 
adapt in order to meet the demands and opportunities within its environment (Robbins et 
al., 2003). 
Many scholars have analyzed the fit between the firm strategy and the external 
environment (Hambrick, 1988; Wiersema and Bantel, 1993). Others such as (Chandler, 
1962 and Rumelt, 1974) have investigated the fit between organizational structure and 
the external environment. Environmental dynamism refers to the extent to which a firm's 
competitive environment is complex, uncertain, and prone to strategic change (Kibera, 
1996; Aosa, 2000). Such changes are key determinants of the particular strategic issues 
facing a firm and its strategic leadership and top management (Wiersema and Bantel, 
1993). 
Board members require relevant information on a timely basis in order to support their 
decision-making (OECD, 2004). Non-executive board members do not typically have the 
same access to information as key managers within the company. The contributions of 
3 4 
non-executive board members to the company can be enhanced by providing access to 
certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary 
and the internal auditor, and recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the 
company. In order to fulfill their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they 
obtain accurate, relevant and timely information. 
Research has shown the impact of environment to organizational success as structure 
(Chandler, 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), strategy (Pearce and Robinson, 2007), 
organizational processes (Rajagopalan and Finkelstein, 1992), administrative systems 
(Lorange and Vancil, 1977) and managerial characteristics (Gupta and Govindarajan, 
1984). Hunter (2002) describes the factors that affect the design of the organizations as 
contextual elements. Business leaders have to continuously scan the environment for 
opportunities that can be exploited. 
Environments vary on the extent to which they are characterized by unpredictability and 
unexpected change (Mintzberg, 1987). Researchers such as Tan and Litschert (1994) 
have observed two dominant perspectives in organizational environment research. These 
two perspectives are information uncertainty and resource dependence. The one on 
information uncertainty considers the environment as the source of information 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967 and Tung, 1982). Other researchers (March and Simon, 
1958; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) assert that the second perspective on resource 
dependence relates to the'scarcity of resources that companies compete for. 
The process of perceiving and interpreting information from environmental sources is 
both complex and uncertain (Schwenk, 1988). A decision-maker's cognitions and 
individual background greatly impact upon the way an organization is likely to adapt and, 
ultimately, determine its future strategic posture (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; Wiersema 
and Bantel, 1993). Thus the co-alignment between environmental dimensions and 
strategic orientation contribute to an outstanding organizational performance. 
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
LiaKKft t 
3 5 
2.6 Firm Characteristics 
We identified firm characteristics as intervening variables of the study. The firm 
characteristics included firm age, firm size and firm sector. Firm size and age have been 
found to co-vary with many board characteristics and other governance variables (Kiel 
and Nicholson, 2003; Irungu, 2007). Firm sector classification was based on certain 
criteria such as that of the stock exchange. 
2.6.1 Firm Size 
Booth et al. (2002) and Peasnell et al. (2003) as cited by Bathula (2008) have suggested 
that internal governance structures are identical and the firms can choose appropriate 
governance options based on what is right for them. For example, as the complexity of 
the firm increases, board size may increase due to need for advice and environment 
monitoring (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In that case, CEO 
duality may be dropped as a trade-off in favour of director/insider ownership to ensure 
firm performance through alignment of interests between shareholders and directors. 
Further, separation of CEO and Chair positions would allow Chair to serve as a sounding 
board for the CEO or become source of confidential counsel to CEO. As the firm 
complexity changes, the board characteristics also may vary. Boone et al. (2007) found 
that as firms become larger and more diversified, the size of the board increases. Firm 
size is, therefore, taken as a proxy for the complexity of the firm and the need for higher 
amount of advice to the fx>ard (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Bathula, 2008). 
Large size of the firm is often associated with complex operations of the firm as it seeks 
to perform its strategic role more actively. Dalton et al. (1998) found that small firms 
have better impact of board size than large firms. Similarly, Lehn et al. (2004) found that 
board size is positively related to firm size but negatively related to growth opportunities. 
The scale and complexity of large firm would cloud any relationship between board 
attributes and firm performance. As the firm size increases, the agency costs are expected 
to increase since a large span allows for greater managerial discretion and opportunism, 
resulting in increased monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). On the other hand, as 
firms grow, they increase the investment in internal control mechanisms for planning and 
control (accounting and information systems). This may reduce not only the monitoring 
intensity but also need for alignment of interests through director ownership. 
These changes in the firm size are likely to affect different board attributes. Hence the 
firm size will be included as a moderating variable in this study to examine the effect of 
board characteristics on firm performance. Two of the most widely used substitutes for 
firm size are sales revenue and number of employees (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). For 
the current study, sales revenue was used as a proxy for firm size. Sales revenue is 
calculated as sum of turnover, interest, and other income. Firm size was measured by the 
natural logarithm of sales revenue. 
2.6.2 Firm Age 
Firm age refers to the number of years for which a firm has been in operation. Firm age 
has been linked to many decisions of the firm (Boone et al., 2007; Bathula, 2008). Berger 
and Udell (1998) and Gregory et al. (2005) demonstrate that firms go through financial 
growth cycle and their capital structures vary with the age. Boone et al. (2007) found that 
as firms grow, boards also grow in response to the increasing needs and benefits of 
monitoring and specialization by board members. However, the magnitude of these 
relationships may differ. For example, board size and composition reflects a trade-off 
between specific benefits of monitoring a»d costs of such monitoring (Bathula, 2008). 
Newer firms are expected to have smaller earnings than older ones because they have less 
experience in the market, are still building their market position, and normally have a 
higher costs structure (Bathula, 2008). On the other hand, older firms may be reaching 
the end of their product life cycle. Further, Boone et al. (2007) also suggest that 
complexity increases with firm age. In view of the uncertain relationships of firm age on 
board characteristics as well as firm performance, it is decided to control for firm age. 
Firm age is measured by the number of years from the time the firm was incorporated. 
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2.7 Corporate Performance 
Corporate performance has been perceived as the integration of three broad dimensions: 
efficiency, effectiveness and adaptability in the delivery of business results of 
organizations (Moseng and Bredrup, 1993) as cited by Irungu (2007). Firm performance 
is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon in strategic management literature 
(Venkatraman and Ramanujan, 1986; Balta, 2008). Many studies attempt to identify 
attributes of the Board of Directors (BoDs) that lead to improved corporate governance, 
increased shareholder value, and responsible corporate performance (Maharaj, 2009). 
Two major methods are used to measure performance of companies. The methods are 
quantitative and qualitative techniques. According to Imoisili (1978) economic indicators 
and non-economic indicators usually measure performance of corporate organizations. 
Economic or quantitative indicators consist of return on investments (ROI), productivity 
of assets, sales margin and net operating margin. On the other hand, non-economic or 
qualitative indicators of performance consist of employee turnover, company reputation, 
ability to retain management talents and competitiveness of compensation schemes. 
Some scholars have attempted to combine both quantitative and qualitative approaches in 
the measurement of firm performance. Kaplan and Norton (1992) developed a four-
perspective model of assessing organizational performance namely customer, internal 
business processes, learning and growth and financial perspectives. According to Ongore 
(2008), firm performance can be measured using three main approaches, namely return 
on assets (ROA), return on investments (ROI) and dividend yields (DY). Bathula (2008) 
recommends the use of ROA as it is all inclusive. The current study used return on assets 
(ROA), return on investments (ROI), dividend yields (DY) and price-earnings (PE) ratio 
to be more comprehensive. 
Another approach to measure performance is market based. As suggested by Morck et al. 
(1988), in a market based approach for measuring the performance Tobin's Q can be used. 
The 
reason for using Tobin's Q is the idea that it reflects the "value added" by intangible 
factors, such as factors of governance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The study used 
Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Investments (ROI) and Dividend Yields (DY) to 
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measure performance as they were assumed to be more objective and could be used for 
comparisons between firms and for different years for the same company. 
2.8 Summary of the Literature and Knowledge Gaps 
Arising from the foregoing review, various knowledge gaps have been identified. Table 
2.2 summarizes the gaps and how they was addressed in the study. 
Table 2.4: Summary of the Literature and Knowledge Gaps 
Researcher(s) Findings Knowledge C a p Action 
Smith, Carson 
and Alexander 
(1984) 
Studied the impact of effective leaders on 
organizational performance. 
Established that effective leaders added 
significantly in the prediction of an 
organization's performance. 
Need to establish the 
kind of leaders (TMT 
or BoD) and their roles 
in decision-making. 
Being addressed 
by objective one 
of the current 
study 
Roberto, M.A. 
(2003) 
The study was about how senior executives 
made strategic decisions. 
The study found that senior executives 
interacted regularly, and performed some 
collective work in most organizations. 
Stable teams of senior executives in typical 
organizations spent a great deal of time 
monitoring and controlling organizational 
processes and performance; hence strategy 
formulation occupied less of their time. 
This study did not 
address the issue of 
board attributes and 
impact on 
performance. 
Being addressed 
by objectives 
one and two of 
the current 
study 
Melyoki, L.L. 
(2005) 
The research focused on determinants of 
effective Corporate Governance among 
industrial corporations in Tanzania(a 
developing country) using four case studies 
of listed firms companies 
Suggested that future 
research should focus 
on corporations 
operating in other 
sectors such as the 
financial sector. 
Being addressed 
by the study 
using the 
Kenyan context 
with four sectors 
and a larger 
sample (47 listed 
firms). 
Hillman, A. J 
and Cannella, 
A.A. (2007) 
The study was about women sitting in 
corporate boards and found that 
organizational size, industry type, firm 
diversification strategy, and network effects 
(linkages to other boards with women 
directors) significantly impact the likelihood 
of female representation on boards of 
directors. 
They suggested that 
future research studies 
on the actual 
mechanisms and 
benefits brought by 
women on boards of 
directors and board 
cognition would be 
other fruitful 
extensions of their 
work. 
Being addressed 
by objectives 
one and three of 
the current 
study 
Irungu, S.M. 
(2007) 
Studied the Top Management Teams (TMTs) 
and concluded that they influenced decision-
making and performance of listed firms to a 
very large extent (100% for CEOs and over 
90% for other TMTs). 
The study did not 
cover the role of the 
boards of directors in 
decision-making. 
Being addressed 
by objective 
three of the 
current study 
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Researcher(s) Findings Knowledge G a p Action 
Bath u la, H. 
(2008) 
Studied board characteristics such as women 
in boards, directors with PhDs, director 
ownership and CEO duality and their effect 
on performance in New Zealand listed 
companies for four years. 
Study did not focus on 
board members with a 
bias in management. 
A related study on 
more board attributes 
needs to be done in a 
developing country to 
compare results. 
Being addressed 
by the study 
using the 
Kenyan context 
with a larger 
sample (47 listed 
firms). 
Kajola, S.O. 
(2008) 
The study examined the relationship between 
four corporate governance mechanisms 
(board size, board composition, chief 
executive status, and audit committee) and 
two firm performance measures namely 
return on equity (ROE), and profit margin 
(PM) of a sample of twenty Nigerian listed 
firms between 2000 and 2006. 
The researcher 
suggested that future 
research should focus 
on increasing the 
sample size and other 
corporate governance 
variables such as 
separation of Chairman 
and CEO positions. 
Being addressed 
by the study 
using the 
Kenyan context 
with a larger 
sample (47 listed 
firms). 
Balta, M.E. 
(2008) 
The study on impact of business 
environment and strategic-decisions process 
was done in Greece, a country in Europe. 
A related study needs 
to be done in a 
developing country in 
Africa to compare 
results. 
Being addressed 
by this study 
using the 
Kenyan context 
Waweru, 
M.A.S (2008) 
Studied Competitive Strategy 
Implementation and its Effects on 
Performance in Large Private Sector Firms 
in Kenya. Concluded that there were three 
strategic groups of cost leadership, 
differentiators and dual strategists in 
increasing proportions. Dual strategists 
appeared to outperform those who use single 
strategies. 
Demographic 
characteristics of the 
strategists were not 
studied 
Being addressed 
by objective one 
and three of the 
current study 
Ongore, V.O. 
(2008) 
Studied the ownership structure and board 
effectiveness. The study was cross-sectional 
using one firm-year. He suggested a study of 
more years. 
The study focused on 
four years and the 
results are expected to 
be compared over the 
period. 
This study 
analyzed board 
attributes and 
firm 
performance 
over a 4 year 
period 
Lorsch, J.W. 
and Clark, 
R.C.(2008) 
The role of the independent directors is to 
ensure compliance of regulations and 
appease shareholders. The focus was on 
short term results and corporate governance 
compliance to Sarbanes-Oxley act. 
There is need to 
continuously improve 
both short and long 
term corporate 
governance practices. 
Being addressed 
by the study 
using the 
Kenyan context 
with a larger 
sample (47 listed 
firms). 
Abdullah and 
Page (2009) 
Studied effect of corporate governance on 
corporate performance in the United 
Kingdom's (UK) 350 listed companies. This 
research found no consistent relationship 
between governance structure (board and 
ownership structure) and companies' market 
book value, accounting performance, stock 
return. 
There is need to 
consider the effects of 
board's operating 
environment. 
Being addressed 
by this study 
using the 
Kenyan context 
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2.9 Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
2.9.1 Conceptual Framework 
The framework for studying board of directors' attributes presumed a direct relationship 
between board composition and board of directors' demographic characteristics on the 
one hand (independent variables) and corporate performance (dependent) on the other. In 
addition, board involvement in strategic decision-making process was hypothesized as a 
moderating variable of the board attributes and performance while board operating 
environment and firm characteristics were seen as intervening variables between 
attributes and firm performance. 
The theoretical framework of the study is based on the integration of the main theories of 
corporate governance with regard to Boards of Directors. The theories that include 
agency, stewardship, stakeholders and resource dependence as presented in the literature 
review affect the role of boards of directors in strategic decision-making. The variables 
that had been identified and described in the literature review highlighting the 
relationships among them were incorporated in formulating the conceptual framework 
presented in figure 2.1. 
Boards of Directors (BoD) have attributes that were presumed to influence the decision-
making processes. The BoD attributes were identified as demographic characteristics and 
board composition and Wfcre presented on the left hand sideof the conceptual framework 
as independent variables. The BoD attributes relating to board composition include board 
size, the type of board members such as whether they are executive, non-executive or 
independent. Other attributes of board composition are interlocking directors or those that 
sit on more than one board. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality, where a board 
chairperson also doubles up as a CEO either in practice or in implied duties was also 
assessed. On the part of Board of Directors' demographic characteristics, the board 
members' age, gender, educational and professional qualifications, and industry 
experience were also considered as independent variables of the study. 
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Boards of directors' are involved in strategic decision-making processes such as strategic 
planning, monitoring senior executives by evaluating their performance, defining 
corporate strategy and linking the company to the external environment. The processes of 
involvement in strategic decision-making include the number of board meetings held per 
year to discuss strategic issues of the company, board committees and board agenda. 
Board committees are also considered as vehicles of strategic decision-making used by 
the boards to deliberate on specific mandates of the organization with a view to speeding 
the process of making decisions that are acceptable to the entire board. The board agenda 
usually determines the length of meetings and the resolutions reached influences the 
strategic direction of the firm. All these processes constitute the intervening variables of 
the conceptual framework. 
The board's operating environment and firm characteristics were identified as intervening 
variables. The firm characteristics that were studied included the sector, age and size of 
the listed companies. According to Irungu (2007), organizational characteristics affect 
decision-making processes and firm performance. We assumed that since older firms 
have built their reputation, they may be well known in the sector and have grown in size 
over time. Board operating environment on the other hand relate to board culture, degree 
of independence of board members and access to information that they use to make 
strategic decisions. We also assumed that both the board of directors' operating 
environment and firm characteristics affected board involvement in strategic decision-
making processes and corporate performance. 
As evident from the literature review, corporate performance is the dependent variable 
and was presented on the right hand side of the conceptual framework. Corporate 
performance was measured in financial terms using dividend yields, return on investment 
and return on assets. Based on the research objectives and the literature review 
summarized here above the conceptual framework was presented. Thus, the study was 
based on various relationships as diagrammatically presented in Figure 2.1. 
4 2 
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework 
HI (A and B) 
Board of Directors' 
Attributes 
Board 
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Board Size 
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Interlocking 
Directors 
Leadership Structure 
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Appointment of 
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Board of Directors' 
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Educational 
Background 
Professional 
specialization 
H2 
Board 's Operating 
Environment 
Formal independence 
• Declaration of Conflict 
of interest 
• Independent directors 
Operating Environment: 
• Board culture 
• Directors' access to 
information 
Board Involvement 
in Strategic 
Decision- Making 
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Board Meetings 
Board Committees 
Board Agenda 
Firm 
Characteristics 
Firm Age 
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Firm Size 
H4 
H5 
Corporate 
Performance 
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Dividend 
Yield (DY) 
Return on 
Equity (RoE) 
Return on 
Assets (RoA) 
Price-Earnings 
(P/E) Ratio 
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2.9.2 Research Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were derived from the conceptual framework. 
Hypothesis la: There is a relationship between board composition and corporate 
performance. 
lb: There is a relationship between board of directors' demographic 
characteristics and corporate performance. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between board of directors' attributes and board 
involvement in strategic decision-making processes 
Hypothesis 3: There is a moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-
making on the relationship between board of directors' attributes and 
corporate performance 
Hypothesis 4: The Board of Directors' operating environment is related to corporate 
performance 
Hypothesis 5: Firm characteristics are related to corporate performance 
2.10 Chapter Summary 
The chapter has reviewed the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on Board of 
Directors' attributes, strategic decision-making processes, board operating environment, 
firm characteristics and corporate performance. The theoretical perspectives of corporate 
governance in general and boards in particular such as agency, resource dependence, and 
stakeholder and stewardship theories were critically reviewed. 
The chapter introduced the concept of boards of directors, examined its conceptual 
elements, and provided the theoretical platform of the research carried out and 
documented in this thesis. The main body of the literature review focuses on boards of 
directors' attributes, board's operating environment, board's demographic characteristics, 
and involvement in strategic decision-making, the strategic decision-making processes 
and corporate performance. A conceptual framework between the factors that influence 
strategic decisions and the hypothesized relationships were developed and presented in 
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Figure 2:1 showing the hypothesized relationships between the factors that influence 
strategic decisions. 
Relevant selected empirical studies on board attributes, strategic decision-making and 
corporate performance were reviewed, synthesized and presented. The review also 
identified the appropriate knowledge gaps that the study sought to address. The identified 
knowledge gaps were tabulated for ease of reference. 
The chapter closes with the presentation of the conceptual framework, which defined the 
relationships among the variables of study. This was then followed by summary broad 
hypotheses of the study. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents aspects of research methodology used in the study. Specifically, it 
comprises the research philosophy and design, population, methods of data collection, 
tests of reliability and validity of the data collection instrument, operationalization of 
research variables and data analysis of the research findings. 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
Scholars in social sciences posit that empirical research is dominated by two prime 
methodologies namely positivism and the phenomenology. Positivism is a philosophical 
approach that is dominated by the process of hypothesis testing, with the intent of either 
rejecting or accepting the null hypothesis (Bryman and Bell, 2003). Other scholars assert 
that positivism allows for the operationalization of various hypothetical concepts as well 
as generalization of the results. Positivism maintains that knowledge should be based on 
real facts, objective methods and not abstractions. Knowledge is predicated on 
observations and experiment (Comte and Bridges, 1865; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Lowe, 1999). Positivistic research is research that seeks to explain and predict causal 
relationship between constituent parts of a phenomenon (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It 
seeks to provide an explanation in terms of what causes what. 
According to Balta (2008) positivism is also known as hypothetico-deductive method and 
follows a specific sequence. First, a formally expressed general statement which attempts 
to test theory; second, the purpose of the theory is to generate hypotheses that can be 
tested and allows explanations of laws to be assessed (deductive principal); third, a 
careful operationalization of constructs; fourth, measurement of constructs; fifth, 
hypotheses testing and finally, verification of the theory. Positivism is considered as link 
between the theory and the research and attempts to test theory in order to increase 
predictive understanding of phenomena. 
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On its part, phenomenological philosophy concerns the researcher's perception and relies 
on experience and avoids generalization based on an existing theory (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). The phenomenological approach does not begin from an established theory, and 
then proceed to collect data to either accept or reject the theory. The approach typically 
seeks to obtain data, analyze it, and then make conclusions regarding the nature and 
strength of the relationships among the variables based on empirical evidence (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1999). Non-positivism reflects an inquiry process of 
understanding a social or human problem based on building a complex, holistic picture, 
formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants and conducted in a natural setting 
in order to gain insights about a phenomenon (Hollis, 2000). 
The study on board of directors' attributes, strategic decision-making processes and 
corporate performance essentially sought to establish possible relationships among the 
identified variables and the strength of the relationship if they indeed existed. Scholars 
posit that this approach is based on objectivity, neutrality, measurement and validity of 
results (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 1999; Bryman and Bell, 2003). Thus, the 
current study applied positivistic philosophy. The study involved objective testing of 
empirical hypotheses that were formulated as predictions of objectively observed 
phenomena. Hypothesis testing was undertaken with the intent of either rejecting or 
failing to reject the null hypotheses. 
3.3 Research Design 
The research design constitutes a logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a 
study's initial research questions and ultimately to its conclusions (Yin, 1994). It consists 
of two different, but related, sets of activities: the first set of activities is concerned with 
the question to be answered in the research in order to reach the research goal. The 
second set of activities is related to how one is going to collect relevant data to answer 
the research question specified in the first part (Melyoki, 2005). 
According to Bryman and Bell (2003), the research design includes a range of 
dimensions of the research process such as expression of inter-relationships between 
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variables, generalization to a larger group of individuals than those who actually 
participate in the investigation, understanding behaviour and the meaning of behaviour in 
a specific social context and a temporal appreciation of social phenomena and their 
interconnections. The current study adopted this strategy. 
The main purpose of the current study was to examine the relationship between Board of 
Directors' attributes and corporate performance of Kenyan firms listed on the Nairobi 
Stock Exchange. The study targeted all the listed firms at the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
under the Main Investments Market Segment (MIMS). A composite score of each of the 
four measures of corporate performance (ROE, ROA, DY and PE ratio) for all the listed 
companies over a period of four years was analyzed, as did Bathula (2008) when 
conducting a similar study. 
The study also sought to establish whether board operating environment and firm 
characteristics influence the performance attained. A cross-sectional survey was therefore 
appropriate to collect data across different firms and test this relationship. A cross-
sectional survey was applicable as it captured the population's characteristics and made it 
possible to test hypotheses quantitatively. Although the data was for a four-year period, it 
was collected at one point in time i.e. it was a snapshot across the various firms, hence 
the appropriateness of cross-sectional survey in order to arrive at objective conclusions 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2003). Other scholars (Aosa, 1992; Irungu, 2007; Ongore, 2008) 
among others used this type of design to test hypotheses and drew acceptable 
conclusions. 
The study also applied descriptive research design. This was because the variables under 
study were measured as they naturally occurred and were not manipulated or controlled. 
According to Cooper and Schindler (2003) if the research was concerned with finding out 
what, when, and how much of phenomena, descriptive research design was found to be 
appropriate. A description of the indicants of attributes of boards of directors and their 
influence on strategic decision-making processes and corporate performance was 
conducted. Several studies in Kenya have used correlation descriptive research designs 
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(Irungu, 2007; Ongore, 2008).The current researcher considered descriptive research 
design appropriate because of the purpose and scope of the study, researcher 
involvement, time period over which the data was to be collected and the type of analyses 
that were to be undertaken. The study applied a variety of designs because of the breath 
and diversity of the attributes and variables. 
3.4 Population of the Study 
The population of the study consisted of firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
(NSE)at the end of 2010. According to the NSE Handbook (2010), there were fifty-five 
(55) listed firms at the time. The listed companies were selected because they were 
leading firms in Kenya in terms of market capitalization and in terms of compliance to 
statutory requirements for listing by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA). Consistency 
in the reporting requirement for publicly traded firms offers the advantage of comparison 
and evaluation against, across and within the same industry and across different 
industries (Irungu, 2007). Being listed firms in the country, they were likely to possess 
the greatest potential to attract skilled and competent individuals on their boards of 
directors leading to a composition of well-constructed boards. These firms have good 
access to capital and other resources necessary not only for survival but also for 
improving their performance and competitive position. 
The listed firms also represent large companies in the major sectors of the economy. The 
other reason of selecting the listed firms was availability of relatively more objective and 
reliable data on organizational financial performance and board members' profiles over a 
period of time as they appear in the published audited accounts. Other scholars used 
similar populations (listed firms) to conduct studies on performance of publicly quoted 
companies in various countries (Irungu, 2007; Bathula, 2008; Kajola, 2008; Ongore, 
2008). Data on corporate financial performance was readily available in the Nairobi 
Stock Exchange (NSE) annual publication, the NSE Handbook (2009). 
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3.5 Data Collection 
The undertaken study was characterized as quantitative survey research and used a cross-
sectional research design. The aim was to gather information regarding Boards of 
Directors in Kenya listed firms on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) and then examine 
the collected data to discover patterns of interrelationship between the variables (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). Data sources were divided into two categories: primary and secondary. 
The information gathered for the research was primary and secondary data. 
The pertinent data was derived from both primary and secondary sources. The primary 
data was collected by a semi-structured questionnaire. The target respondents were the 
corporation secretaries and in their absence, one key board member such as the 
Chairperson. The chairperson and the corporation secretary are usually the custodians of 
board agenda and resolutions respectively. 
The study aimed at revealing the relationship between Board of Directors' attributes and 
performance of Kenyan firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. For this purpose, a 
survey questionnaire was developed based on the issues drawn upon the extant literature 
and discussions based on semi-structured interviews with representative directors and in 
most cases the corporation secretaries. 
The empirical context of the current study was taken from companies listed on the 
Nairobi (Kenya) Stock Exchange (NSE) between 2006 and 2009. This sample was 
chosen because of the requirement of the companies to publish data regarding their 
boards and their firm performance, which provided the information required for this 
study. We began with the 55 companies listed in the year 2010. The study then settled on 
the firms listed on the NSE under the Main Investments Market Segment (MIMS) that 
were in operation for four years between 2006 and 2009. The total firms under MIMS in 
December 2010 were forty-seven (47). This study did not consider companies listed on 
the Alternative Investments Market Segment in survey because they have different listing 
requirements. Two firms in the Main Investment Market Segment namely Uchumi 
Supermarkets and Hutchings Biemer were excluded from research as they were on 
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suspension from trading on the NSE during the period under study. This left 45 
companies as eligible for study. Five firms declined to respond. Thus, forty companies 
responded to the questionnaire. The results presented in this chapter are therefore based 
on responses of 40 firms representing 85 per cent response rate. This response rate is 
comparable to other studies (Ongore, 2008) on boards of directors. 
From these companies, the data was 'cleaned' by taking into account potential changes in 
the stock market and the initial date of their market entry, in order to compile all the 
required information within the selected period. The final sample comprised 40 firms, 
with data covering four years. Secondary sources of information included the annual 
reports that were obtained from each company. In order to add any missing data and to 
verify the information obtained, we checked against the Nairobi Stock Exchange and The 
Capital Markets Authority databases. Using these sources, we verified the composition of 
the governance structures of each company - the management team and the board of 
directors - for each year of our study. 
Prior to the current study, a pilot survey was carried out to identify key board of directors 
attributes necessary for decision-making among the listed companies. In this process, 
interviews were carried out with the vice-chairman of the Nairobi Stock Exchange and 
one corporation secretary from each sector. Among other things, the Board Secretaries 
were asked to state what were some of the factors influencing the effectiveness of the 
board decision-making. The result was quite interesting and significant in the 
construction of the final sample questionnaire for this study. 
After a further sifting of the data by annual comparison, it was possible to identify the 
directors on the board who remained on the firm's board year after year (directors' 
tenure), the size of both governance mechanisms (taking into account potential departures 
or appointments each year), as well as identifying those directors on the management 
team and managers on the board. 
51 
We interviewed either the Board Chairmen or the Corporation Secretaries. The Capital 
Markets Authority (CMA) Act (2002), requires them to be the custodians of best 
practices for corporate governance with respect to agenda setting and resolutions. The 
need to examine the relationship between firm performance measures when Boards of 
Directors make strategic decisions made the outcome of the research more robust. The 
study was based on a survey of at least forty-seven (47) companies listed in Kenya. 
A number of methods were used to collect data. The methods included contacting and 
gaining access to the organizations from the target population from which data on board 
of directors' attributes and their decision-making processes can be obtained; the target 
respondents will either complete the questionnaire by themselves and/or in the presence 
of the researcher (where any clarification was made if necessary). To enhance 
cooperation from the respondents, the researcher submitted in advance a letter of 
introduction to each company stating the purpose of the study and assuring them of 
confidentiality of the responses. 
The research instrument was divided into seven (7) sections that enabled collection of 
relevant data from the published accounts of the listed companies. The seven sections 
were Section A: Company's Background; Section B: Board Composition; Section C: 
Demographic Characteristics of the Board; Section D: Operating and Board 
Environment; Section E: The Board's Involvement in the Strategic Decision-Making 
Processes; Section F: Strategic Decision-making Processes and Section G: Company 
Financial Performance. Balta (2008) carried out a study on the impact of business 
environment and boards of directors on strategic decision-making of firms in Greece 
using a similar instrument. The instrument was adapted and contextualized. 
For research purposes, secondary data was collected from "documentary-based secondary 
data that refer to information collected from previous similar researchers which have also 
included primary data and have already been analysed for their original purpose" 
(Saunders et al., 2003). Secondary data can be gathered by various sources such as: 
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books, periodicals, government sources, regional publications, companies' annual report, 
media and commercial sources (Zikmund, 2003). 
Secondary data relating to financial performance for the current study was obtained from 
the listed companies' published audited accounts, Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) four 
year (2006-2009) manual, and Capital Markets Authority yearly reports. The financial 
(indicators) data obtained included total net assets, profit/loss per year, earnings per 
• -
share, dividends per share, gross sales, dividend yield, net assets value per share and price%/ 
to earnings ratios. Out of these, four different measures of performance were computed 
consisting of all the financial measures collected. Other pieces of information that was 
collected from the annual reports include the firms' compliance on corporate governance 
practices and brief profiles of directors reported in accordance with the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) and instituted by the Capital Markets Authority 
(CMA). 
3.6 Operationalization of Research Variables 
Different variables were measured using different approaches. Table 3.1 outlines the 
relevant measures and corresponding operational definitions. The five-point Likert type 
scale questionnaire was used to collect data. The advantage with Likert type 
questionnaire is that questions used are usually easy to understand and so may lead to 
consistent answers. However, the disadvantages with this measurement are that only a 
few (up to five) options were offered, with which respondents may not fully agree or 
people may become influenced by the way they have answered previous questions with a 
given pattern. 
The patterning process was broken up by asking reversal questions. Other researchers 
(Irungu, 2007 and Waweru, 2008) used a similar scale to conduct their studies. The 
current study measured the degree of agreement or disagreement in various areas of 
interest on boards of directors' attributes and changing the pattern of asking questions. 
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The scale properties were nominal, ordinal, interval or ratio. Table 3.1 gives definitions 
of the various constructs and variables used in the study. 
Table 3.1: Operational Definition of the Variables 
Construct Operationalization of the construct Hypothesis Measure 
Board of Directors demographic characteristics 
Board member's 
individual age 
Age in years HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Educational levels Highest level of academic qualification HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Professional specialization HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Area of experience Functional experience HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Gender Male/female of individual member HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Board of Directors composition 
Inside/Outside Number of outside (independent) board 
members 
HI, H2, H3 Direct 
measure 
Number of inside or affiliated (executive) 
board members. These are top management 
team (TMT) members who double up as 
board members 
HI, H2,H3 Direct 
measure 
Executive/Non-
Executive/ 
Independent 
Directors 
Executive Members hold both a board and a 
senior management position 
HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Non-Executive Members refers to number of 
board members not in full time employment 
of the company in question 
HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Board size Total number of individuals in the board HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Leadership structure Chief Executive Officer (CEO) doubles up as 
chairman 
HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Interlocking directors Board of Directors who are members in more 
than one company 
HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Board appointment Methods of selection and appointment of 
board members 
HI, H2 Direct 
measure 
Board Operating Environment 
Culture Empowerment of board members through 
listening to divergent views 
H3 Likert 
type scale 
Access to Information Access to timely and accurate information for 
decision-making 
H3 Likert 
type scale 
Formal independence Critical thinking, with an independent mind 
and able to exercise an objective judgment on 
corporate affairs 
H3 Likert 
type scale 
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Construct Operationalization of the construct Hypothesis Measure 
Strategic Decisions 
Strategic Planning Involvement of Top Management Teams in 
strategy formulation. Board Minutes and 
distribution of responsibilities 
H5 Direct 
Measure 
Performance 
Evaluation 
Monitoring and Evaluation of Performance. H5 Direct 
Measure 
Firm Characteristics 
Firm Size In turnover terms in Kenya Currency H4 Direct 
Measure 
Firm Age Number of years in existence since 
incorporation 
H4 Direct 
Measure 
Firm Sector Sector as classified by NSE H4 Direct 
Measure 
Decision-making processes (Agenda) 
Frequency of Board 
meetings 
Number of meetings in a year H5 Direct 
Measure 
Board Agenda Type of agenda as prioritized H5 Direct 
Measure 
Length of board 
meetings 
Duration of meetings H5 Direct 
Measure 
Long Range Planning Written down procedures of planning H5 Likert 
type scale 
Capital Allocation Steps used in the measure of financial 
reporting that include budgeting, financial 
statement analysis, cost analysis 
H5 Likert 
type scale 
Manpower Planning 
and Development 
Thoae who participate in strategic decision-
making 
H5 Likert 
type scale 
Corporate Performance 
Composite Measure 
of Corporate 
performance 
Gross profits, net profits, net assets, Return 
on Investments, Return on Assets, Dividends 
Yield, Price-Earnings Ratio 
HI, H5 Direct 
Measure 
Source: Current Researcher (2011) 
Independent variables for current study were board of directors' attributes consisting of 
board composition and the demographic characteristics of the board members of Kenya's 
listed companies. Data on board demographic characteristics such as age was computed 
as an average of all the board members in a company. All of the data on board 
composition and demographic characteristics was measured directly. 
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The dependent variables were the average corporate performance over a period of four 
years (2006-2009). Performance variables included financial measures such as return on 
investment (ROI), return on assets (ROA), dividend yields (DY) per share and price-
earnings (PE) ratio. Financial performance measurement is necessary for both strategic 
and diagnostic purposes. Accounting measures of performance such as absolute annual 
sales, profits, dividends per share, return on assets, return on investments and return on 
equity was assessed. The multiple methods applied provided an advantage in reducing 
method variance. Scholars assert that non-sampling measurement errors typically exceed 
sampling errors and should therefore receive special attention (Irungu, 2007; Bathula, 
2008). This provided assurance of reliability of the findings. 
Moderating variables refer to extraneous factors that might greatly affect the intended 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. Board of Directors' 
involvement in Strategic Decision-making was the moderating variables in the study. The 
strategic decision-making processes of the board studied included the board agenda, the 
role of board committees' decision-making and the number of board meetings held in a 
financial year. Board processes refer mainly to the decision-making activities of directors 
of companies. The decision-making processes were measured using both a Likert-type 
scale and direct measure to establish their extent of influencing corporate performance. 
Intervening variables describe how the independent variables (Board of Directors' 
attributes) and moderating variables (Board of Directors' involvement in strategic 
decision-making processes) affect the dependent variables (Corporate Performance). The 
effect of such variables cannot be seen or manipulated but can only be inferred (Irungu, 
2007). In the current study, the intervening variable were identified as firm size, type of 
sector and firm age. They were included as intervening variables in order to examine 
their effect on board attributes and firm performance. Two of the most widely used 
proxies for firm size are sales revenue and number of employees (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998). In the current study, sales revenue was used as a proxy for firm size. Firm size was 
measured by the natural logarithm of sales revenue. Thus, the variables were measured 
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directly. On the other hand, data on board environment (another intervening variable) was 
measured using a five-point Likert-type scale so as to obtain the degree of agreement or 
disagreement on their influence on firm performance. 
3.6.1 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument 
Key indicators of the quality of a measuring data collection instrument are the reliability 
and validity of the measures. The process of developing and validating an instrument is in 
large part focused on reducing error in the measurement process. Validity is concerned 
with whether the research findings are really about what they appear to be about (Balta, 
2008). Dillman (2000) suggested that the expected respondents were taken through a 
pilot study to ensure clarity and proper interpretation of the questionnaire. Three general 
categories of instrument validity namely content-related evidence (also known as face 
validity); criterion-related evidence and construct-related evidence exist. The content-
related validity is measured by the instrument to judge the appropriateness of the items on 
the instrument in breath and format. 
/ 
To test for the validity of the instrument, the researcher conducted a pilot study. The pilot 
involved pre-testing the questionnaire with selected board members of the listed firms. 
The data collection instrument was administered to conveniently selected respondents of 
at least five companies that represent all the sectors in a pilot study. The feedback (data) 
collected during the pilot survey or pre-testing stage was used to adjust or modify the 
questionnaire accordingly in order to improve the level of its clarity. 
Reliability of the instrument refers to the extent to which results are consistent over time. 
An accurate representation of the total population under study is referred to as reliability. 
If the results of a study can be reproduced under a similar methodology, then the research 
instrument is considered to be reliable (Balta, 2008). Three types of tests of reliability 
involving quantitative research have been identified and include the degree to which a 
measurement, given repeatedly, remains the same; the stability of a measurement over 
time and the similarity of measurements within a given time period. 
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The Cronbach alpha coefficient was used to assess the reliability of the constructs and to 
validate the questionnaire. Nunnally (1967) argued that an alpha coefficient of .50 or 
greater is adequate to accept presence of internal consistency. Kline (1999) noted that 
acceptable value for Cronbach's alpha is between .7 and .9. Ongore (2008) applied 
Cronbach alpha to test the reliability in the studyon board stewardship, monitoring and 
reporting and found them to be .7. The study sought to either accept or reject the 
reliability with regard to board involvement in strategic decision-making processes. 
3.6.2 Summary of Cronbach Alpha Test Results 
The reliability coefficients for each of the scales used in board strategic decision-making 
processes and board attributes were calculated. This was shown on Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: A Summary of Cronbach's Alpha Scale Reliability Statistics Results 
Variable Cronbach 
Alpha 
Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-making .898 
Board Operating Environment .886 
Tests of reliability of the current study were done using Cronbach's Alpha Scale. 
Nunnally (1978), suggested that Cronbach Alpha greater than 0.70 was acceptable as an 
indicator of reliability of the instrument. Table 3.2 shows that Cronbach's reliability 
coefficients for the current study ranged from 0.886 to 0.898. Since both alpha 
coefficients were greater the (f70 the acceptable figure, all items under each scale were 
applied. Therefore, the reliability tests for two of the items namely board involvement in 
strategic decision-making processes and board-operating environment are applicable. 
3.7 Data Analysis 
The current study applied multi-variate regression, correlation analysis and descriptive 
analyses. Descriptive analysis is a uni-variate analysis which consists of frequency tables, 
diagrams, measures of central tendency (arithmetic mean, median, and mode) and 
measures of dispersion (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
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It examines the relationships between variables describing the direction and degree of 
association between them. A correlation matrix includes the values of the correlation 
coefficients for the variables involved (Robson, 2002; Balta, 2008). A correlation is very 
low if the coefficient has a value under 0.20, low between 0.21 and 0.40, moderate 
between 0.41 and 0.70, high between 0.71 and0.91 and very high if it is over 0.91 
(Pfeifer, 2000). Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was used in order to 
examine the strength of a correlation and whether is appropriate to proceed toward 
subsequent analysis. 
Regression analysis and descriptive statistics were used to analyze the data to establish 
the relationship between the board of directors' attributes and firm performance. 
Descriptive statistics was used to profile the Board of Directors of listed firms in Kenya. 
Similar studies have used the same approach to establish characteristics of top 
management teams (TMTs) (Hambrick et al., 1986; Bryman and Bell, 2003; Irungu 
2007). Multivariate statistical analyses were used to determine the influence of the boards 
of directors on strategic decision-making and performance of the firms. This included 
testing the various hypotheses with correlation co-efficient and multi-variate linear 
regression analyses. The Pearson correlation coefficients show the strength of the linear 
relationships between the variables in the regression and help determine whether any of 
the independent variables in the regression are highly correlated. 
The data analysis used a sample of 160 observations for 40 NSE listed firms between 
2006 and 2009. That included four observations for each company. All the primary data 
of the sample were collected by sending questionnaires between April and June 2011, and 
details of secondary data were obtained from the databases of NSE and Capital Markets 
Authority (CMA) archival records. 
The study was restricted to listed firms because of the assumption that listed firms 
adhered to the norms and standards set by the regulatory bodies (NSE and CMA) in the 
course of their business activities. Also, listed firms are expected to prepare and publish 
their financial information in compliance with the accounting practice and the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). 
After the data collection, the data was coded to enable further data analysis and 
interpretation of results using SPSS and Excel worksheets. The following is how this was 
effected. Table 3.3 gives the way data coding was done indicating the abbreviation of the 
variable, full variable label and the description of the measurement being undertaken. 
Table 3.3: Independent Variable Description 
Full variable label Description/measurement 
Board Size Count of total number of current directors 
Interlocking directors Count of number of interlocking directors 
Number of Executive 
Directors Count of number of Executive Directors including CEO 
If CEO acts as Chairman 
Assigned the value 1 for the case where CEO acts as 
chairman as well and 2 for otherwise 
Number of Non- Executive 
Directors who are 
independent 
Count of number of Non- Executive Directors who are 
independent 
Natural log of cumulative 
age Natural log of cumulative age of directors 
Proportion of Female Board 
Members 
Computed as Number of female directors divided by total 
number of board members 
Education level 
Computed as the weighted sum of education levels of the 
directors 
Board member area of study 
specialization * 
Computed as count of the number of specialization areas 
with at least one board member 
Board member area of work 
specialization 
Computed as count of the number of work specialization 
areas with at least one board member 
Board Involvement Mean of five indicators of board involvement 
Table 3.3 provides a list of variables and the way they were operationalized through 
coding of the data after collection. After the questionnaire was coded, data was captured 
in a manner that made it easy to analyze and interpret the outcome. These variables were 
selected because board members and their individual attributes were presumed to 
influence the decisions they made. 
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Multi-collinearity was checked in the model by examining the Variance-Inflation Factor 
(VIF) for each independent variable. The use of VIF to regress board attributes and 
strategic decision-making processes gave an indication as to whether the variables are 
closely correlated if they screen one another. As a rule of thumb, if the VIF of a variable 
exceeds 10, that variable is said to be highly collinear(Hair et al., 1998). This was found 
to be okay in the current study. 
A financial year unit of analysis was used to examine the influence of board attributes on 
firm performance. With four firm-year records, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Random-
Effects models were applied to test the hypotheses due to the important assumptions of 
homoscedasticity and no serial correlation in pooled data. An OLS regression was 
suitable since it corrects for omitted variable bias, and presence of auto-correlation and 
heteroskedasticity in pooled time series data. This methodology allows researchers to 
examine variations among cross-sectional units simultaneously with variations within 
individual units over time (Bathula, 2008). It assumes that regression parameters do not 
change over time and do not differ between various cross-sectional units, enhancing the 
reliability of the coefficient estimates. An important assumption for choosing random-
effect estimation is that the unobserved heterogeneity should not be correlated with the 
independent variables. 
Regression analysis was .used to examine the relationship between variables especially 
the extent to which a dependent variable is a function of one or several independent 
variables (Hair et al., 1998; Saunders et al., 2007:442). Before performing the regression 
analyses, the variables were tested for multi-colleniarity following the procedure in Hair 
et al., (1998). The method was appropriate for the study because it had one independent 
variable (board attributes) and one dependent variable (financial performance). Other 
scholars have used similar methods in their studies on corporate governance and 
performance. Those scholars had developed a system of simultaneous equations where 
performance measured by Tobin's Q and is related to corporate governance practices 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Mak and Li, 2001 and Bathula, 2008). In the current 
research, firm performance is regressed on board attributes' variables as below: 
6 1 
Firm Performance ^  = + /? 7 boardattr ibuteS | t + /^boardinvolvementinstrategicdecision-
makingi( + /^firmcharacteristics^ + /^outside-directorsoperatingenvironment^ + eit 
Equation 1 
The general form of the regression model to be used in the analysis is in the form of: 
Where:FP = Firm Performance (dependent/response variable) 
P P2 Ps (Beta coefficients) represent the independent/predictor variables of interest 
(board attributes, board involvement in strategic decision-making, operating board 
environment and firm characteristics), 
e = Error, a i n t e rcep t or constant 
- — J 
Table 3.4 gives a summary of the objectives, hypotheses types of data analysis and 
interpretation of the results. The various hypotheses were tested at 95 confidence level (a 
= 0.05). 
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Table 3.4: Objectives, Hypotheses, Types of Analysis and Interpretation of Results 
No Objectives Hypothesis Type of 
Analysis 
Interpretation of 
Results 
( 
I 
To assess the extent to 
which board of directors' 
attributes determine their 
(board) involvement in 
strategic decision-making 
H2:There is a 
relationship between 
board of directors' 
attributes and their 
involvement in 
strategic decision-
making processes 
Multi-variate 
Regression 
analysis, 
Correlation 
analysis and 
Descriptive 
statistics 
P-value tests used 
f Establish the effect of board of directors' 
attributes on corporate 
performance 
H1A&B: There is a 
relationship between 
board of directors' 
attributes and 
corporate performance. 
H5: There is a 
relationship between 
board involvement in 
strategic decision-
making and corporate 
performance 
Multi-variate 
Regression 
analysis 
Correlation 
analysis 
P-value tests. 
If P-value is < 
0.05 shows a 
statistical 
significance 
relationship 
3 To establish the 
relationship between board 
of directors' involvement 
in strategic decision-
making, board operating 
environment, firm 
characteristics and 
corporate performance 
H3: There is a 
relationship between 
board involvement in 
strategic decision-
making and firm 
performance 
Multi-variate 
regression 
analysis 
Correlation 
analysis 
Regression 
analysis 
If R squared is 
greater than 0.7, it 
indicates a very 
strong linear 
relationship that it 
is significant. 
ANOVA F-Test 
4 To determine the effect of 
board environment on 
organizational performance 
H4:The board's 
operating environment 
is related to corporate 
performance 
Multi-variate 
Regression 
analysis 
Correlation 
analysis 
t-value tests. 
If t-value is >2.5 
shows a statistical 
significance 
5 To assess the influence of 
firm characteristics on 
corporate performance 
H5:Firm 
characteristics are 
related to corporate 
performance 
Regression 
analysis 
Correlation 
analysis 
Multi-collinearity 
tests 
If VIF values<10 
it shows a 
statistical 
significance. 
As a rule of 
thumb, if the VIF 
of a variable 
exceeds 10 that 
variable is said to 
be highly collinear 
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3.8. Chapter Summary 
The chapter describes the research methodology used in the study. The population of the 
study is also provided. Research variables were also defined and a summary of 
operationalization of the variables given. The chapter also explains the method used for 
data collection. Tests of reliability of the current study was done using Cronbach's Alpha 
Scale. The data analysis procedures used in this research are provided. 
Thus, the chapter presents the research philosophy, design and the operationalization of 
the research variables. Two research philosophies namely positivism and phenomenology 
are explained. The justification for adopting positivism research philosophy is provided. 
The chapter also presents the research design as census survey and a descriptive statistics. 
This was then followed by a tabulated summary of the objectives corresponding 
hypotheses, types of analysis and how the results were interpreted. 
The current chapter has discussed the variables used for the construction of the 
hypotheses about board of directors' attributes, strategic decision-making and firm 
performance. The chapter also discusses the method used for the data collection and the 
justification for it. In addition, methods of data analysis used for hypothesis testing and 
role of the variables in relation to board attributes is highlighted. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS' ATTRIBUTES AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
The broad objective of this study was to examine the relationships between Board of 
Directors' attributes, strategic decision-making processes and corporate performance of 
firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The research findings of the study were 
presented in three chapters. The interpretation of the results was also given in all the 
threes chapters. 
This chapter presents the findings and discussions on the relationships between board of 
directors' attributes and corporate performance. In this chapter, the first two hypotheses 
Hla and Hlb, tested the direct relationships between board attributes (board composition 
and board of directors' demographic characteristics) and corporate performance. 
4.2 Organizational Characteristics 
Organizational characteristics consist of firm age and size as well as type of sector. Firm 
size was represented by average turnover. The firms that were listed on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange during the sty^ly represented four major sectors of the economy. These were 
Agriculture, Commercial Services, Finance and Investments and Industrial and Allied 
sectors. We sent a set of questionnaire to each of all the eligible companies to collect data 
on some aspects of board of directors' characteristics and how they affect corporate 
performance. 
In terms of firm age, the results show that the oldest company among the listed firms was 
114 years while the youngest was only four years old when the study was conducted. All 
the companies were listed in different times after being in operation for some time. 
6 5 
Table 4.1: Age of Company since Incorporation and listing 
Company age Age since incorporation Duration since listing 
Age bracket in Number of Per Number of Per 
years companies cent companies cent 
1- 10 1 2.5 10 25.0 
11-20 3 7.5 15 37.5 
21-30 1 2.5 3 7.5 
31-40 4 10.0 3 7.5 
41-50 12 30.0 6 15.0 
Over 51 19 47.5 3 7.5 
Total 40 100 40 100 
Source: Research Data 
Table 4.1 shows that with regard to the ages of the companies, most of them (47.5 per 
cent) were incorporated over fifty years earlier. Another 30 percent were incorporated 
over forty but less than fifty years before. This means that firms that have been in 
existence for long were stable enough and had survived cyclical life cycles of businesses. 
It was noteworthy that most (37.5 per cent) companies were listed between 11 to 20 years 
ago. Another 25 per cent were listed between one to three years prior to 2006 being the 
base year of the current jstudy. This means that most of the listed firms have been in the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange for a shorter time although they have been incorporated for long. 
It also means that over the last twenty years, many firms have opted to go to the stock 
exchange in order to raise funds to finance their operations. 
4.3 Response Rate 
The data that was analyzed was obtained from 40 (85%) out of the targeted 47 companies 
listed under the Main Investment Market Segments (MIMS), hence becoming an 
effective sample size. The response rate compares well with similar studies on firm 
performance. Irungu (2007) and Ongore (2008) attained a response rate of 74 percent and 
87.5 percent respectively. Similarly, other studies have used smaller sample sizes to draw 
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conclusions on board of directors in relation to corporate performance (Balta, 2008; 
Bathula, 2008). Some scholars have argued for a reasonable response rate. Majority of 
empirical studies in management have adopted a questionnaire survey method (Kumar et 
al., 1993). 
From previous studies, it is well known that questionnaires are associated with low 
response rates. Therefore, the questionnaire should be followed by a detailed cover letter 
and cover page which will provide instructions regarding the research subject, the 
researcher's and supervisor's details, types of questions, necessary time to be completed 
not only to increase the response rate but also to facilitate the procedure for the 
respondents (Balta, 2008). The current study followed a similar process. Mangione 
(1995) provided the following classification of response rate: over 85% excellent, 70-
85% very good, and 60-70% acceptable and below 50% not acceptable. The current study 
therefore falls under the very good range as it attained 85 percent response rate (Table 
4.2). 
Table 4.2: Distribution of Respondents per Sector 
Sector Population Response Percentage 
Agriculture 3 3 7.5 
Commercial Services 12 9 22.5 
Finance and Investment 15 12 30.0 
Industrial and Allied 17 16 40.0 
Total 47 40 100 
Source: Research Data 
As shown on Table 4.2, majority of the respondents were from the industrial and allied 
sector at 40 per cent, followed by finance and investments sector at 30 per cent, closely 
followed by the commercial and services sector at 22.5 per cent and the last one is the 
agricultural sector at 7.5 per cent. 
The high representation of the industrial and allied sector among the listed companies 
was presumed to be due to the nature of their operating environment that requires them to 
raise huge capital for investments in machines and equipment in order improve their 
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productivity and efficiencies. The sector may then sell shares to the public to raise the 
needed capital, hence the need for listing. On the other hand, the low representation of the 
agricultural sector on the NSE may be attributed to the uncertainty of the vagaries of 
weather that makes it unpredictable to remain in business during dry seasons and 
prolonged droughts. This may discourage potential investors in the sector despite the fact 
that Kenya has been said to be an agricultural economy. 
4.4 Preliminary Findings 
The main objective of the study was to analyze the relationships between Board of 
Directors' attributes, strategic decision-making and corporate performance. The specific 
objective that was addressed in this section was to assess the extent to which Board of 
Directors' (BoD) attributes related to corporate performance. The BoD attributes that we 
studied were broadly classified into two namely board composition and Board of 
Directors' demographic characteristics. 
Board members had been assumed to formulate policies and strategies that affect their 
companies. The study sought to examine the extent to which Board of Directors in 
Kenya's listed firms make strategic decisions for the firms. Thus, while the performance 
variables were largely computed based on the firms average four-year financials, most of 
the board of directors' variables were obtained through the administration of a semi-
structured questionnaire^ 
Firms sampled covered industrial and allied, finance and investments, agriculture and 
commercial services sectors. In arriving at the definition of what constitute these sectors, 
we largely depended on the classifications given by the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The 
data covers the period 2006 to 2009. The period was chosen because of availability of 
data and completeness for all the firms. The financial accounts for the four years had 
been audited and copies submitted to the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) library. 
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4.4.1 Board of Directors' Attributes and Corporate Performance Variables 
Board of directors attributes were classified into two namely board composition and 
board of directors' demographic characteristics. The two were presented separately in the 
analysis. Board composition consisted the process of appointment of Board Members, 
board size, executive and non-executive directors, independent directors, interlocking 
directors and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Duality. On the other hand the board of 
directors' demographic characteristics included the age and gender of the board members. 
It also included the educational and professional specialization. Corporate performance 
included the average of four years for dividend yield (DY), returns on equity (ROE), 
return on assets (ROA) and price-earnings (PE) ratio. We used data collected from either 
corporation secretaries or board chairpersons on board of directors' attributes for 
companies listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. Other sources of data included CMA 
library resources. We examined whether corporate boards of directors are subject to 
many of the same organizational dynamics that drive the effectiveness of other teams 
charged with complex tasks. 
This section outlines the research findings on various aspects of the board attributes and 
their (board) involvement in strategic decisions of firms listed on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange. The attributes were related to corporate performance of the listed firms. 
4.4.2 Board Composition 
The current study analyzed board composition in terms of Board of Directors' 
appointments, board size, executive directors, non-executive directors, independent 
directors, interlocking directors and CEO duality. Under gender diversity, women board 
members were considered both as a board composition as well as board demographic 
characteristic issue and was treated as such in the analysis. 
Table 4.3 shows a summary of the board composition variables with number of firms, 
which we sampled. On the first column is the number of companies with each row 
indicating the relationship with the various variables listed on the first row. The other 
rows show percentages of the board composition variables. Table 4.2 points out that the 
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board size ranges from 4 to 12 members. Most of the companies (25 per cent) have 7 
board members followed by those companies (20 per cent) that have 10 members. On 
average, the sampled companies have 9 members. This mean that the board size in Kenya 
among the listed firms consist of an average of 9 board members. In other countries the 
board sizes vary. For example in Zimbabwe, by law, every company should have a 
minimum of two directors. According to a survey conducted by the World Bank, 'most 
companies have six or seven directors (Nganga et al, 2003). In Spain, the board size 
seems to be higher with an average of 11.7 or 12 board members among the listed firms. 
This is according findings of a study by (Castro, La Concha, Gravel, and Perinan, 2009). 
Table 4.3: frequency of Board Attributes (Board Com position) 
Number of 
firms/ 
Board 
Members 
Board 
Size 
Executive 
Directors 
Non-
Executive 
(Outside) 
Directors 
Independent 
Directors 
W o m e n 
on 
Board 
Interlocking 
Directors 
C E O 
Duality 
0 (None) 2.5 15.0 57.5 35.0 95.0 
1 55.0 17.5 25.0 15.0 5.0 
2 35.0 2.5 17.5 15.0 25.0 
3 7.5 2.5 5.0 2.5 10.0 
4 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 
5 7.5 12.5 12.5 5.0 
6 15.0 2.5 
7 25.0 10.0 2.5 
8 5.0 20.0 10.0 
9 17.5 17.5 5.0 
10 20.0 12.5 5.0 
11 12.5 2.5 
12 10.0 
13 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Research Data 
Table 4.3 further indicates that most companies (55 percent) have one executive sitting 
on the board. These were found to be the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Another 35 
percent of the companies had two executive directors sitting on their boards. They were 
mainly the CEOs and the Finance Director or the Chief Finance Officers. In terms of non-
executive independent directors, most companies had either one or two board members 
on average out of the nine board members. This was slightly below the threshold of at 
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least a third (of nine board members) being independent as required to be independent 
board as a best practice according to Capital Markets Authority Act (2002). 
We found out that inter-locking directors or those who sit on more than one boards had 
been practiced in Kenya for long but had gained momentum among Kenya's listed firms 
in the recent years. Although 35 percent of the board members sit on one board, there was 
clear indication that others (25 percent) sat on other boards of listed companies. Indeed at 
least two board members chaired two listed companies each at the time of undertaking 
the current research. Other countries showed varied practices. In Switzerland for 
example, which is rated as among the best in corporate governance practices in the world, 
a number of companies have many inter-locking directors. A dense network of 
interlocking directorates (Ruigrok et al, 2006) characterizes the Swiss context. In Kenya, 
the CMA guidelines allowed board members to sit on multiple boards. However, no 
board member chaired more than two boards of listed firms. Consequently, there was 
possibility of under-utilization of experience of board members. 
It is notable from Table 4.2 that CEO duality or a situation where a board chairperson 
also performed duties of a CEO was not common in Kenya. Of all the surveyed 
companies, most companies (95 per cent) had a Chairman who was separate from CEO. 
The remaining 5 per cent was where the CEO had left the organization but the position 
had not been filled for a lonjj time. Under such circumstances, the chairperson performed 
most of the CEO's duties. In other countries in Europe and America, it was common to 
have both positions held by the same person. In both Australia and the UK, CEO duality 
was less common than in the US where this form of leadership structure was predominant. 
With respect to the chairperson also undertaking CEO role in Australia, there was a notable 
lack of CEO duality (23) (Kiel, 2003). This was closely comparable to the Kenyan scenario 
under the current study. 
4.4.3 Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics 
The analysis further examined data on certain Board of Directors demographic 
characteristics. The demographic characteristics included gender diversity, age of board 
members, educational background and professional experience of board members. Each 
of the selected Board of Directors' demographic characteristics were presented in this 
section. 
On gender diversity perspective and from Table 4.4 most of the companies (57.5 per 
cent) that we surveyed did not have a female board member. Only 25 per cent of the 
firms have one women board member and another 15 percent of the surveyed companies 
have two board members. Thus, on average only 7 percent of all the board members were 
women among the Kenyan listed companies. This is way below the recommended 
threshold of at least a third of either gender to be included in public organizations. 
Table 4.4: Statistics on Boarc of Directors' Demographic Characteristics 
Variables Detail Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Number of women on board Number 1 0.8 0.0 3.0 
Age of board members Years 56.1 14.3 27.0 83.0 
Source: Research Data 
Table 4.4 shows that there was an average of one woman board member per listed 
company. This means that most boards had one or no woman board member at all. 
Therefore, gender parity was an issue of concern among Kenya's listed firms. This 
however was comparable with other countries in the third world that boast of rather low 
composition, especially in the Middle East and North Africa region. For example, Kuwait 
is one of the regional leaders with 2.7 percent of women directors, followed by Oman 2.3 
percent, Bahrain 1 percent, United Arab Emirates (UAE) 0.8 percent, Qatar 0.3 percent, 
and Saudi Arabia 0.1 percent (Shkolnikov, 2011). Only 11 of companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange have 25 or more of their director positions occupied 
by women (Luhabe, 2010). 
From Table 4.4, we observed that the average age of the board members of the firms 
surveyed is 56 years old. We found that the youngest director was 27 years old while the 
oldest was 83 years old. The standard deviation of 14.3 suggests that there is rather a 
7 2 
wide dispersion in terms of age of board members. Although the there is no minimum age 
required to be a board member in Kenya, it was expected that anyone who had attained 
the age of 18 years and had obtained a national identity card and being of sound mind 
qualified to be appointed as a board member. On the other hand, the CMA Act and 
Guidelines (2002) provide that a company may retain any director who attains the age of 
70 years old as a board member if their Memorandum and Articles of Association (MAA) 
allow. The guidelines also provided that the retention of a director who had attained the 
age of 70 years and above had to be ratified or endorsed in every Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) of the company shareholders. 
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics on Board of Directors' Demographic 
Characteristics 
Board Demographic Characteristics Response Scale Descriptive Scale 
Variable Sample 
size 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
a Gender 
Column a scale: 
(1) Female 
(2) Male 
40 7% 93% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 
B Highest 
Educational 
Qualification of 
Board 
Members 
Column a scale: 
(1)High-School 
graduate 
(2)Bachelors 
degree-holder 
(3) Masters degree-
holder 
(4)PhD degree-
holder 
40 30 
% 
37 
% 
29 
% 
4 
% 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 100 
c Area of 
Educational 
Specialization 
of Board 
Members 
Column scale: 
(1) Business 
Administration 
(2) Engineering 
(3) Law/Legal 
(4) Finance and 
Accounting 
(5) HR and other 
Social Sciences 
(6) General 
Management 
(7)Operations and 
ICT 
(8) Other 
40 21% 
m 
8 
% 
13 
% 
22 
% 
10 
% 
10 
% 
7 
% 
11 
% 
N/A N/A 100 
Source: Research Data 
Table 4.5 shows that majority of the board members were male board members at ninety-
three (93) percent while a paltry seven (7) percent were women. This means that the 
women folk did not make serious contributions in the boardroom in Kenya. In terms of 
educational qualifications, Table 4.5 indicates that very few board members, only four 
percent, had PhD qualifications. About one-third or 30 percent had only high-school 
qualification. Most of the board members (37 percent) had at least a Bachelors and those 
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with a Masters degrees were 29 percent. This appeared to be similar to educational 
qualifications held by board members in other countries at Bachelors level while quite 
apart for those with Masters degrees. For example, Greek board members of listed 
organizations had a relatively high level of formal education with 46 percent Masters 
degree holders, followed by those with Bachelor's degree at 35 percent and 15 percent 
hold PhD degrees and only four percent with High School diploma (Balta, 2008). 
From table 4.5, it can be observed that area of educational specialization about one-fifth 
of the board members have specialized in Business Administration (21 percent) and 
Finance and Accounting consist 22 percent. The two options had a combined total of 43 
percent. Board members with Law or Legal specialization make up 13 percent while 
Human Resources and other Social Sciences such as Psychology consist 10 percent as do 
General Management specialization. Operations, Information, and Communication 
Technology (ICT) make up 7 percent. The rest of the specializations summarized as 
'Others' make up 11 percent. These consist of 2 percent each for those who have 
specialized in Marketing, Medical Sciences and Education. Those board members who 
have specialized in Architecture, Mathematics and Field Service make up 1 percent each. 
From the foregoing educational qualifications and areas of specialization, it can be 
deduced that board members who hold business degree specializations are popular among 
many listed companies in Kejjya. This was attributed to the need to formulate relevant 
strategies and give appropriate direction to the management team. Only those with 
business knowledge may make serious contributions unless those with other 
qualifications also pursue business management courses at graduate level. Studies from 
other countries indicate varying results as established in the discussions section. 
4.5 Board of Directors' Attributes and Corporate Performance 
While there are many measures of firm performance such as stakeholder satisfaction 
(Clarkson, 1995), we followed the predominant approach and used four financial 
measures of firm performance, namely return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), 
price-earnings (PE) ratio and dividends yields (DY). Financial measures of firm financial 
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performance fit into two key categories, accounting based measures and market based 
measures. The study also selected variables of board of directors attributes and firm 
specific characteristics. For firm performance variables, the study focused on the measure 
of firm profitability due to availability of data and the choice of statistical analysis. The 
basis of the analysis was on information from annual reports over the four year from 
2006 to 2009. An average of the four years was computed for all the companies. We 
obtained data on performance from listed firms' annual reports as published by the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange. 
Table 4.6: Description of Dependent Variables 
Abbreviation of 
variable Definition Measurement 
ROA 
Return on 
Assets 
measured as the percentage of net income to 
total assets 
ROE 
Return on 
Equity 
measured as a percentage of net income to 
common equity 
DY 
Dividend 
Yield 
measured as dividend per share divided by 
market price per share 
PE Price-Earnings 
measured as the ratio of price per share to 
earnings per share 
Table 4.6 explains the performance measures used in computing the profitability of 
companies. It details what consists of the selected dependent variables used in the current 
study. 
Table.4.7: Statistics indicating Firm Performance Measures 
Performance Indicator 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
Return on Assets (ROA) 39 -5.35 46.05 18.5971 11.18092 
Dividend Yield (DY) 39 0 . 0 0 18.75 3.3692 3.46033 
Return on Equity (ROE) 40 -18.13 41.43 16.4827 10.36776 
Price Earnings (PE) 40 -63.64 99.68 13.2513 20.56788 
Source: Research Data 
From Table 4.7, we observed that the measures of performance such as the return on 
assets (ROA) had a mean of 18.60 and standard deviation of 11.18 for most of the listed 
companies over a four-year period. The standard deviation of 11.18 in ROA suggests that 
there was rather a wide dispersion in terms of Price-Earnings ratio as a means of 
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performance. The dividend yield (DY) had a mean of 3.37 and a standard deviation 3.46 
while the return on equity (ROE) had a mean ofl6.48 standard deviation of 10.37 and 
finally Price-Earnings had a mean ofl3.25 and a standard deviation of 20.57. The 
standard deviation of 20.57 in PE ratio suggests that there is rather a wide dispersion in 
terms of Price-Earnings ratio as a means of performance. On the other hand, the standard 
deviation of 3.46 for DY is relatively narrow dispersion compared to all the measures of 
performance. 
Table 4.8 presents the correlation matrices for ROE, ROA, DY and PE. 
Table 4.8: Correlation Matrix indicating Corporate Performance Measures 
Detail 
ROE ROA DY P/E Ln (sales) 
ROE Pearson Correlation 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 40 
ROA Pearson Correlation .891** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
N 39 39 
DY Pearson Correlation .334* .298 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .038 .069 
N 39 38 39 
P/E Pearson Correlation .110 .162 -.154 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .498 .325 .349 
N 40 39 39 40 
Ln (sales) Pearson Correlation .348* .327* .329" .013 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .030 .045 .044 .937 
N 39 38 38 39 39 
Source: Research Data 
Note: 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*• Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
•* P < 0.05; * * p < 0.01. 
From Table 4.8, the correlation coefficient for ROE and ROA was 0.891, which is 
statistically significant at 5 percent significance level (p < 0.05). This high correlation can 
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be attributed to the fact that both ratios are computed using the same numerator but 
different denominators, hence to the extent to which equity as opposed to debt is used to 
finance assets. The two ratios tend towards being equal. 
The correlation coefficient for ROE and DY was found to be 0.334, which was 
statistically significant at 5 percent significance level (p < 0.05). This indicates a weak 
correlation between ROE and DY. Given that, both ratios use different numerator and 
denominator, the relationship between the two was expected to be weak. The two ratios 
tend towards being equal. Although one measure would have been enough, the 
significance of this correlation was to confirm that the tests were consistent. 
4.6 Hypotheses Testing and Interpretation of Results 
This study had one broad and five specific objectives. We derived six hypotheses derived 
from the objectives. The basis of the hypotheses was that Boards of Directors' attributes 
affect corporate performance whereupon performance was moderated by board 
involvement in strategic decision-making. The intervening variables were board of 
directors' operating environment and firm characteristics. 
The focus of the study specifically in this chapter was on Boards of Directors' attributes 
consisting of two board features or attributes namely board composition and board 
members' demographic ^characteristics. The computations of data obtained from 
interviews with corporation secretaries were generated as average scores per company. In 
total, forty boards were identified and statistical analyses carried out. The various 
hypotheses were tested at either 95 confidence level (a = 0.05) or 99 confidence level (a 
= 0.01). 
4.6.1 Board Composition and Financial Performance 
In the undertaken study, board composition comprised board size, executive directors, 
non-executive directors, independent directors, interlocking directors and CEO duality. 
These attributes were related to the firm performance. For the purpose of the study, 
accounting based measures, namely return on assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), 
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dividend yield and price-earnings (PE) ratios were used to measure performance. These 
measures have been used in many studies to relate board attributes and firm performance 
(Bathula, 2008). 
Results on Table 4.9 show a mean of 8.8 and standard deviation of 2.1 for the board size 
for the entire sample. The standard deviation of 2.1 suggests narrow dispersion of the 
number of board members. Further statistical analysis of the board size reveals that only 
22.5 percent of the firms had an average board size of nine, while 32.5 percent and 45 
percent had below and above the average board size respectively. The firm size in the 
sample was determined as the natural logarithm of turnover or sales has a mean of 15.4 
and standard deviation 1.5. 
The hypotheses to be tested include: 
Hypothesis l a : There is a relationship between board composition and corporate 
performance. 
In order to investigate the impact of board attributes on firm performance, the study used 
a panel data OLS regression model for a sample of 40 firms quoted on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange for the fiscal years 2006 to 2009. The analysis started by estimating the model 
with five board composition variables as identified in the literature. In the model, the 
board composition varial^Jes were estimated against four firm performance variables 
(ROA, ROE, PE and DY) one after the other. The results of the models were significant 
at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels. Relevant results were analyzed based on the two 
variables namely board composition as independent variable and the ROA, ROE, DY and 
PE as dependent variable. 
Table 4.9 shows that the results of estimation in column 1 indicate a positive relationship 
between performance, measured as ROA and board size, executive directors, non-
executive directors and inter-locking directors. The results also show that CEO duality is 
negatively, but not statistically significant in relation to firm performance. The ROE 
results reported similar results as ROA. Using DY as a measure of performance, again 
board size, executive directors and non-executive directors have a positive relationship 
while interlocking directors and CEO duality showed non-significant relationship. Using 
PE, only non-executive and interlocking directors showed a significant relationship to 
performance whereas a non-significant relationship was reported for board size, 
executive directors and CEO duality. Appendices 5, 5a and 5b indicate the model 
summary for board composition and corporate performance based on the return on equity 
(ROE). In addition, appendices 6, 6a and 6b indicate the model summary for board 
composition and corporate performance based on the return on assets (ROA). 
The coefficients of determination indicate that the predictors have moderate explanatory 
power for ROA and ROE (R squared = 0.597 and 0.550 respectively. On the other hand, 
the predictors have a weak explanatory power for PE (R squared = 0.444) and a very 
weak explanatory for DY ( R squared = 0.187). 
Table 4.9: Overall Coefficients Estimate for Board of Directors' Composition and 
Firm Performance 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables ROA DY ROE PE 
Beta (P) P" 
value 
Beta 
(P) 
P" 
value 
Beta (P) P-
value 
Beta (P) P" 
value 
Board Size .099 .921 0.021 0.935 .798 .378 -2.897 .241 
Executive Directors 11.254 .001 1.006 0.219 9.782 .001 -4.303 .563 
Non-Executive Directors 1.998 .760 0.392 0.820 2.616 .613 30.937 .064 
Inter-locking 13.464 .042 -1.000 .547 11.654 .027 2.542 .868 
CEO Duality > ' -13 .611 .089 -1.956 .340 -17.426 .009 -36.075 .066 
R-square .597 .187 .550 .444 
F-ratio 4.686 .728 5.383 2.530 
Source: Research Data 
Table 4.9 indicates that executive directors and inter-locking directors are statistically 
significant in determining firm performance measured using ROA and ROE. CEO duality 
is negatively statistically significant in determining performance using ROE as a measure 
of firm performance. The rest of the board of directors' attributes are not statistically 
significant in determining firm performance (p-values > 0.05). Appendices 5, 5a, 5c, 6, 
6a, 6b, 7, 7a, 7b, 8, 8a, and 8b provide more details on the relevant relationships 
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Further, from Table 4.9, the results of the tests of hypothesis Hla show that there is a 
relationship between board composition (measured by board size, executive director, 
inter-locking directors, non-executive directors and CEO duality) and two indicators of 
corporate performance (multiple r ranges from 0.550 for ROE to 0.597 for ROA). This 
means that there is a moderate relationship between board composition and corporate 
performance. 
The study reports positive effect for the total number of board members, the number of 
Executive Directors sitting on the board, number of inter-locking directors, board 
appointments and Non-Executive Directors. Relatively high positive impact is reported 
for the number of Executive Directors sitting on the board including the CEO 
(Beta=l0.365) (Table 4.9a). Overall, statistically not significant findings are reported for 
the independent effect of board composition attributes on ROA (low t-values, p>0.05) 
(Table 4.9a). From Table 4.9a, we conclude that there is statistically significant 
relationship between the number of Executive Directors sitting on the board and the 
number of inter-locking directors and Return on Assets (ROA). The rest of the board 
composition attributes had no statistically significant relationship with ROA. Appendices 
5, 5a, 5c, 6, 6a, 6b, 7, 7a, 7b, 8, 8a, and 8b provide more details on the relevant 
relationships. 
Table 4.9a: Coefficients Estimate for Board of Directors' Composition and Return 
on Assets (ROA) ^ | :—s 1. jm 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
P-
value 
Sig. Model B Std. Error Beta t 
1 (Constant) -8.030 8.474 -.948 .354 
Total number of the current board members .222 .965 .038 .230 .820 
The number of Executive Directors sitting on the 
Board including the Chief Executive Officer 
10.365 2.982 .550 3.476 .002 
Number of inter-locking directors 1.606 .643 .406 2.496 .021 
Board Appointment 2.152 3.694 .089 .583 .566 
Non-Executive Directors 5.142 5.839 .154 .881 .388 
Source: Research Data 
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The study reports positive effect for the total number of board members, the number of 
executive directors sitting on the board, number of inter-locking directors, board 
appointments and non-executive directors (NEDs). Relatively high positive impact is 
reported for the number of Executive Directors sitting on the board including the CEO 
(Beta=8.719). Overall, statistically significant findings were reported for the relationship 
between the number of executive directors sitting including the CEO and the number of 
inter-locking directors on ROE (low t-values, p>0.05) (Table 4.9b). Appendices 5, 5a, 5c, 
6, 6a, 6b, 7, 7a, 7b, 8, 8a, and 8b provide more details on the relevant relationships. 
Table 4.9b: Coefficients Estimate for Board of Directors' Composition and Return 
on Equity (ROE) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sip. 
1 (Constant) -13.296 7.785 -1.708 .102 
Total number of the current board members .798 .887 .144 .900 .378 
The number of Executive Directors sitting on the 
Board including the Chief Executive Officer 
8.719 2.692 .496 3.238 .004 
Number of inter-locking directors 1.436 .586 .384 2.452 .023 
Board appointments 4.115 3.364 .185 1.223 .234 
Non- Executive Directors 3.892 5.199 .127 .749 .462 
Source: Research Data 
The study reports positive effect for the total number of board members, the number of 
Executive directors sitting on the board, number of inter-locking directors, board 
appointments and while negative effect was reported for Non-executive Directors (Table 
4.9c). Relatively low positive impact was reported for total number of board members 
(Beta =0.009) while a high negative impact was reported for non-executive directors 
(Beta=-1.647). Overall, statistically not significant findings are reported for the 
independent effect of board composition on DY (low t-values, p>0.05) (Table 4.9c). 
From Table 4.9b, we concluded that there was statistically significant relationship 
between the number of executive directors sitting on the board and the number of inter-
locking directors and return on equity (ROE). The rest of the board composition attributes 
had no statistically significant relationship with ROE. Appendices 5, 5a, 5c, 6, 6a, 6b, 7, 
7a, 7b, 8, 8a, and 8b provide more details on the relevant relationships. 
Table 4.9c: Coefficients Estimate for Board of Directors' Composition and 
Dividends Yield (DY) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) .965 3.620 .267 .792 
Total number of the current board members .009 .408 .005 .023 .982 
The number of Executive Directors sitting on the 
Board including the Chief Executive Officer 
1.833 1.247 .316 1.470 .156 
Number of interlocking directors .168 .273 .137 .615 .545 
Board Appointment .927 1.574 .125 .589 .562 
Non-Executive Directors -1.647 2.438 -.160 -.675 .507 
Source: Research Data 
The study reports positive effect for number of inter-locking directors, board 
appointments and Non-Executive Directors and while negative effect is reported for the 
total number of board members, the number of Executive Directors sitting on the board 
including the CEO. Relatively high positive impact is reported for Non-Executive 
Directors (Beta=38.875) while a high negative impact is reported for the number of 
Executive Directors sitting" on the board (Beta = -6.402). Overall, statistically not 
significant findings are reported for the independent effect of board composition 
dimensions on PE Ratio (low t-values, p>0.05) (Table 4.9d). Appendices 7, 7a and 7b 
indicate the model summary for board composition and corporate performance based on 
the Dividend Yield (DY) and appendices 8, 8a and 8b indicate the model summary for 
board composition and corporate performance based on the Price-Earnings (PE) ratio. 
Appendices 5, 5a, 5c, 6, 6a, 6b, 7, 7a, 7b, 8, 8a, and 8b provide more details on the 
relevant relationships. 
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Table 4.9d: Coefficients Estimate Board of Directors' Composition and Price-
Earnings (P/E) Ratio 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sifi. 
1 (Constant) 15.588 20.927 .745 .464 
Total number of the current board members -1.727 2.383 -.143 -.725 .476 
The number of Executive Directors sitting on the 
Board including the Chief Executive Officer 
-6.402 7.238 -.167 -.885 .386 
Number of interlocking directors .042 1.574 .005 .027 .979 
Board Appointment .088 9.043 .002 .010 .992 
Non-Executive Directors 38.875 13.974 .581 2.782 .011 
Source: Research Data 
From Table 4.9d, we conclude that there was statistically significant relationship between 
Non-Executive Directors and Price-Earnings (P/E) Ratio (p>0.05). The rest of the board 
composition attributes had no statistically significant relationship with PE ratio. 
4.6.2 Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and Financial Performance 
We also analyzed board characteristics such as age of board members, women on boards, 
and education levels of directors and areas of specialization and related them to firm 
financial performance. To further investigate the impact of board attributes with specific 
reference to board demographic characteristics on corporate performance we tested the 
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following hypothesis using a similar approach as hypothesis la above. 
Hypothesis lb: There is a relationship between board of directors' demographic 
characteristics and corporate performance. 
Table 4.10 shows that the results of estimation in column 1 indicate a positive 
relationship between performance, measured as ROA and age of board members, women 
on the board, educational qualifications and board member professional specialization. 
When it came to column 2, the results of estimation a positive relationship between 
performance, measured as DY and age of board members and educational qualifications. 
There was no significant relationship between DY and women in the board and board 
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study specialization. Using ROE, there was a positive relationship with age of board 
members and board study specialization and there was no statistical significant 
relationship with the women on board and educational qualifications. In column 4, the 
use of PE as a measure of performance the results estimation shows a positive 
relationship with all the parameters except the level of education. 
Table 4.10: Overall Coefficient for Board of Directors' Demographic 
Characteristics and Firm Performance 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables ROA DY ROE PE 
Beta (P) P- Beta P- Beta (P) P- Beta (P) P" 
value (P) value value value 
Age of Board Members 1.181 .729 .212 .756 1.034 .767 8.357 .158 
Women on Boards 1.185 .966 -1.347 .810 -16.278 .571 46.557 .332 
Educational qualifications 6.774 .255 2.083 .087 -1.768 .769 -7.684 .229 
Area of Specialization 1.596 .382 -.488 .188 1.298 .486 3.752 .443 
R-square .100 .236 .071 .218 
F-ratio .467 1.297 .322 1.171 
Source: Research Data 
The study reports statistically not significant results for the independent effect of Board 
of Directors' demographic characteristics dimensions on firm performance (low t-values, 
p>0.05). From table 4.10, it can be observed that none of the demographic characteristics 
(age of board member, women sitting on boards, educational qualifications of board 
members and area of specialization) was statistically significant in determining ROA, 
ROE, DY and PE ratios (p-values > 0.05). Appendices 9, 9a and 9b give more details on 
ROE while appendices 10, 10a and 10b give more details on ROA. 
The following analysis shows the study findings. The study reports positive effect for age 
of directors and board members' study specialization while negative effect was reported 
for the women on board, educational qualifications. Relatively high negative impact is 
reported for Women Directors on the board (Beta= - 6.329) while a low positive impact is 
reported for the board members' specialization (Beta = 1.019). Overall, statistically not 
significant findings are reported for the independent effect of Board of Directors' 
demographic characteristics on ROE (low t-values, p>0.05)(Table 4.10a). Appendices 9, 
9a and 9b indicate the model summary for Board of Directors' demographic 
characteristics and corporate performance based on the Return on Equity (ROE) while 
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appendices 10, 10a and 10b indicate the model summary for Board of Directors' 
demographic characteristics and corporate performance based on the Return on Assets 
(ROA). 
Table 4.10a: Coefficient Estimates for Board of Directors' Demographic 
Characteristics and Return on Equity i 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients p-value 
Sig. Model B Std. Error Beta t 
1 (Constant) -6.169 44.202 -.140 .890 
Age 1.716 3.141 .112 .547 .590 
Women on Board -6.329 23.492 -.056 -.269 .790 
Educational Qualifications -.188 5.325 -.008 -.035 .972 
Board Study Specialization 1.019 1.635 .137 .623 .539 
Board Specialization -1.265 1.077 -.283 -1.175 .252 
Source: Research Data 
The study reports positive effect for age of directors, educational qualifications and board 
members' study specialization while negative effect was reported for the women on 
board and board functional specialization. Relatively high negative impact is reported for 
Women Directors on the board (Beta= - 6.272) while a high positive impact is reported 
for the board members' educational qualifications (Beta = 6.772). Overall, statistically 
not significant findings are reported for the independent effect of Board of Directors' 
demographic characteristics on ROA (low t-values, p>0.05) (Table 4.10b). 
Table 4.10b: Coefficient Estimates for Board of Directors' Demographic 
Characteristics and Return on Assets 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients p-value 
Sig. Model B Std. Error Beta t 
1 (Constant) -.002 44.650 .000 1.000 
Age .811 3.169 .053 .256 .800 
Women on Board -6.272 25.263 -.053 -.248 .806 
Educational Qualifications 6.772 5.560 .283 1.218 .236 
Board Study Specialization 1.471 1.635 .199 .900 .378 
Board Specialization -1.297 1.113 -.289 -1.165 .256 
Source: Research Data 
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The study reports positive effect for age of directors, the women on board and 
educational qualifications while negative effect was reported for, educational 
qualifications, board members' study specialization, and board specialization post 
qualifications. Relatively high impact is reported for Women Directors on the board 
(Beta=8.727) while a low negative impact is reported for the board members' study 
specialization (Beta = - 1.100). There was a statistically significant negative relationship 
between board study specialization and dividend yield (DY). Although the board member 
educational qualifications were not statistically significant, they tended towards being so 
(p-value was 0.081). However, statistically not significant findings were reported for the 
effect of the rest board of directors' demographic characteristics including age of board 
members and women on board in relation to DY (low t-values, p>0.05)(Table 4.10c). 
Appendices 11, 11a and 1 lb give more details on the statistical significance relationships 
between board of directors' demographic and DY 
Table 4.10c: Coefficient Estimates for Board of Directors' Demographic 
Characteristics and Dividend Yield (DY) 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients p-value 
Sig. Model B Std. Error Beta T 
1 (Constant) -10.239 13.706 -.747 .463 
Age 1.102 .972 .192 1.134 .269 
Women on Board 8.727 7.315 .205 1.193 .245 
Educational Qualifications 3.089 1.690 .331 1.827 .081 
Board Study Specialization -1.100 .509 -.394 -2.159 .042 
Board Specialization -.561 .334 -.330 -1.681 .106 
Source: Research Data 
The study reports positive effect for age of directors and board members' study 
specialization. On the other hand, we reported negative effect for the women on board, 
educational qualifications. Relatively high negative impact is reported for Women 
Directors on the board (Beta= - 6.329) while a low positive impact is reported for the 
board members' specialization (Beta = 1.019). Overall, statistically not significant 
findings were reported for the independent effect of board of directors' demographic 
characteristics on price-earnings (PE) ratio (low t-values, p>0.05) (Table 4. lOd). 
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Appendices 11, 11a and l i b indicate the model summary for board of directors' 
demographic characteristics and corporate performance based on the dividend yield (DY) 
while appendices 12, 12a and 12b indicate the model summary for board of directors' 
demographic characteristics and corporate performance based on the price-earnings (PE) 
ratio. Appendices 12, 12a and 12b provide more details on the relationships between 
board demographic characteristics and PE which is not statistically significant. 
Table 4.10d: Coefficient Estimates Board of Directors' Demographic 
Characteristics and Price-Earnings (P/E) Ratio 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients p-value 
Sis. Model B Std. Error Beta t 
1 (Constant) -83.759 74.365 -1.126 .271 
Age 6.633 5.284 .240 1.255 .221 
Women on Board 19.615 39.523 .096 .496 .624 
Educational Qualifications -9.066 8.958 -.210 -1.012 .322 
Board Study Specialization 3.924 2.751 .294 1.426 .167 
Board Specialization .774 1.812 .096 .427 .673 
Source: Research Data 
There is a relationship between board composition and corporate performance. 
4.7 Discussion 
The following discussion relates the findings of the current study to existing theory and 
reports whether the results conformed to other related empirical studies. The study had 
hypothesized that board of directors' attributes had a relationship with corporate 
performance. The hypothesis was further broken down into two. The first one 
hypothesized that there was a relationship between board composition and corporate 
performance. The second one hypothesized that boards of directors' demographic 
characteristics were related to corporate performance. 
The results of the current study showed mixed results compared to other empirical studies 
that have considered board of directors' attributes as part of the study variables in relation 
to corporate performance. We established earlier from previous studies (Balta, 2008 and 
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Bathula, 2008) that the impact of agency theory on board of directors' attributes that there is 
pre-dominance of studies that examined two key questions namely, how the composition of 
boards of directors affects firm performance and how board of directors' demographic 
characteristics affect corporate performance. 
The current study reported positive effect for age of directors, educational qualifications 
and board members' study specialization while negative effect was reported for the 
women on board and board functional specialization on ROA as a measure of corporate 
performance. These findings were in conformity with the studies carried out in Greece 
and New Zealand. 
From previous studies, stewardship theorists contend that superior corporate performance 
was associated with the majority of inside directors because; first, they ensure more 
effective and efficient decision-making and second, they contribute to maximise profits 
for shareholders (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The findings of the current study do not 
concur with the stewardship theoretical perspective since the proportion of inside 
(executive) directors among Kenya's listed firms were fewer and in most cases only one, 
the Chief Executive Officer sat on the boards. 
From a resource dependency theory perspective, it can similarly be argued that a larger board 
brings greater opportunity for more links and hence access to resources. Resource 
dependence theory maintains that the board is an essential link between the firm and the 
external resources that it needs to maximize performance (Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Zald, 1969). From a stewardship theory perspective, the ratio of inside to 
outside directors was of relevance, since inside directors can bring superior information to the 
board on decisions. In the current study, boards were found to be small at an average of nine 
board members and in some cases fewer. This means that the Kenyan listed firms do not 
derive many benefits from linkages brought about by the large boards as the case may be in 
Greece and New Zealand. 
In the current study, women consist of only seven percent of the total number of board 
members among the listed companies in Kenya. The findings on women as board 
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members compare well with the findings in other countries in the world. In 2010, women 
made up only 12.5 of the members of the corporate boards of FTSE 100 companies in 
The United Kingdom. This was up from 9.4 in 2004 (Davies, 2011). The situation varies 
from one country to another. In Norway, women represent 32 percent of the board 
members whereas in the United States of America (USA) they are 15 percent. In 
Germany, women are 13 per cent on the corporate boards and in India 5 per cent of the 
board members are women (McKinsey and Company, 2010). When this was related to 
corporate performance, Kenyan firms did poorly for not leveraging on the women board 
members who would bring in ideas to the boardroom, as was the case in Norway. 
Australian research into boards of directors is less developed than that in the US and the 
UK (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). The Australian literature on corporate governance has 
been primarily descriptive, with an emphasis on describing the size and composition of 
boards and the extent to which board interlocks occur. Only Stapledon and Lawrence 
(1996), Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) and Muth and Donaldson (1998) have attempted 
to examine the board demographics-firm performance link. 
In terms of board size and from an agency theory perspective, previous studies (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003) claimed that a larger board was more likely to be vigilant for agency 
problems simply because a greater number of people will be reviewing management 
actions. However, agency theorists recognize that there is an upper limit to boards. Jensen 
(1993) suggests this limit at around eight directors, as any greater number will interfere 
with group dynamics and inhibit board performance. Alternatively, it can be argued that 
it is not the size of the board, per se, that is critical, but rather the number of outside 
members on the board (Dalton, et al., 1999). However, we found that the average number 
of nine board members among the listed firms in Kenya is adequate. 
A large proportion of the regulatory changes globally have focused on boards of 
directors. This 
is unsurprising, given the critical functions performed by the board and its 
key committees namely audit, compensation and nominating/governance (Young, 2003). 
In Kenya, the CMA Guidelines (2002) stipulate among others the need for a balance of or 
mix of skills in the composition of the corporate boards. Further, according to CMA Act 
(2002), independent non-executive directors must make up a least one third of corporate 
boards. The boards are required to establish 'appropriate board committees' including an 
audit committee. Directors may not hold more than Five directorships and must regularly 
offer themselves up for re-election at annual general meetings (Nganga, Jain and Artivor, 
2003). The challenge in the Kenyan scenario is the composition in terms of gender and 
age distribution. There are more men on the board (ninety-three percent) compared to 
women who make up a paltry seven percent. In terms of age, the average age of directors 
is fifty-five meaning that the most listed firms in Kenya have not embraced many young 
directors. This may lead to poor succession planning in the future. 
These results were a sharp contrast to those from other developed countries. In a previous 
study conducted by Balta (2008) on the listed firms in Greece, the average age of board 
members of quoted firms on Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) was 45.94. The youngest 
director was 26 years old while the oldest was 72. The mode identified in the age of 
board members was 33 with a standard deviation of 11.81. European and American 
executives seem to be quite a lot older compared to their Greek counterparts. 
Contrary to expectations, the board size had a positive effect on both performance variables. 
While board size was statistically significant to return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE), it was not statistically»significant to dividend yield (DY) and price-earnings (PE) 
ratio. The results however, corroborate the findings of other studies that suggest that having a 
larger board size enhances the performance of a firm because they have a range of expertise 
to help make better decisions, and are harder for a powerful CEO to dominate (Balta, 2008). 
In this context, we could presume that in the wake of privatization, political appointments to 
corporate boards (in some firms) making them large may be waning and that board members 
are largely appointed on the basis of merit and therefore bring their expertise on board to 
enhance firm performance. 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter summarizes the results of the data analysis performed to empirically test 
hypothesis la and lb. The results indicated support or positive relationship between 
board of directors' attributes and such measures of corporate performance as ROA, ROE, 
DY and PE. 
The chapter also considered Board of Directors' attributes and financial performance and 
found out the relationship between them. There was a positive relationship between the 
age of board members, women on the board, educational qualifications and board 
member professional specialization and performance, measured as ROA and ROE. 
The chapter has documented the descriptive and correlation findings from 40 listed 
companies on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. In general, most measures observed a wide 
range of responses. This concluded with a diversity of responses to the same questions. 
Also, it suggests that there was significant variation among these data which represents 
justification in considering correlation and multiple regression analyses on the 
relationships between board composition and firm performance. The analysis also sought 
to establish the relationship between Board of Directors' individual demographic 
characteristics and corporate performance. The results of the bi-variate and multi-variate 
analyses were presented in this chapter followed by extensive discussion of the findings. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS' INVOLVEMENT IN STRATEGIC DECISION-
MAKING AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides research findings and discussions on the effect of Board of 
Directors' involvement in strategic decision-making on corporate performance. This 
chapter presents an in-depth description of the relationship between Board of Directors' 
involvement in strategic decision-making and corporate performance. The interpretation 
of the results based on the analysis is also provided. Our theoretical discussions indicate 
the need to test our predictions regarding the relationship between the board's inclination 
and involvement in strategic decision-making, using multiple regression analysis. 
In the current study, various hypotheses were formulated to test different relationships. 
Hypothesis H3 tested the relationship between board involvements in strategic decision-
making to corporate performance. This was a moderating relationship between board 
involvement in strategic decision-making and corporate performance. This chapter 
addresses this relationship. 
5.2 Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making 
The main objective of-The study was to analyze the relationships between board of 
directors' attributes, strategic decision-making and corporate performance. The specific 
objectives in this section were assessing the extent to which board of directors' attributes 
determine their (board) involvement in strategic decision-making; establishing the effect 
of Board of Directors' attributes on corporate performance and establish the relationship 
between board of directors' involvement in strategic decision-making and corporate 
performance. 
While board members' human capital in terms of background and experience certainly 
influence the outcomes of board decision-making, we were more interested in the 
knowledge, or the perception of knowledge or expertise held by the team, that enables 
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teams to function effectively as groups. We therefore conducted a survey to establish to 
measure the application of board involvement in strategic decision-making. Ruigrok et al 
(2006) developed a seven-point Likert type scale on the levels of board involvement in 
strategic decision-making. We adapted and simplified the Likert-type scale to the context 
of the Kenyan boards using a five-point scale and used in the current study. 
5.2.1 Analysis of the Board of Directors' Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making 
We obtained data on the Board of Directors' involvement in strategic decision-making 
through a questionnaire. The chairmen or corporation secretaries were asked to rate board 
involvement on a five-point scale over the following five features of the strategic 
decision making process: strategic planning decisions, performance evaluation of prior 
strategic decisions, capital allocation, long range-planning and manpower planning. The 
summarized results were presented in Appendix 23. 
Table 5.1 illustrates the distribution of responses scored for the measures of board 
involvement in strategic decision-making process. The respondents had been asked to 
indicate the number of board meetings, which Boards of Directors participated in a year. 
The number of board committees was also sought. The responses were constructed by a 
five-point Likert scale ranging from "strongly disagree " to "strongly agree " and certain 
notable findings were evident. The table shows that the average number of board 
meetings was three while the jjyerage numbers of board committees were at least two per 
company. The average number of board agenda was two. 
Table.5.1: Measures of Board Involvement in Stral tegic Decision-Making 
Variable Number 
of Firms Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Full Board Meetings 33 2.00 4.00 3.00 0.25 
Board Committees 35 1.00 6.00 2.37 1.24 
Board Agenda 37 1.00 4.00 1.75 0.88 
Source: Research Data 
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We then asked the respondents the extent of involvement in strategic decision-making. 
From Table 5.2, most of the respondents (40.4 percent) agreed 'to a great extent' that 
boards members were involved in making strategic plans. Another 22.8 percent agreed 'to 
a very great extent' that their board members were involved in the making of strategic 
planning through either the ratification of submitted plans or in assisting management 
formulate them. 
To ensure that the ratings of board involvement were comparable across companies, 
processes of board involvement were applied, we used the same questionnaire with clear 
explanation. First, the top management team (TMT) designs a proposition, the board 
discusses it, with no significant changes being made, thus it is fully ratified. Second, the 
TMT designs a proposition, the board discusses it, with some changes being made. Third, 
the board first sets guidelines, the TMT designs a proposition, the board discusses it, with 
the result that no important changes are made. Fourth, the board first sets guidelines, the 
TMT designs a proposition, the board discusses it, with the result that important changes 
are made. Fifth, the board designs itself. In the analysis that follows the dependent 
variable 'Strategic Involvement' had been generated, and used the significant principal 
component from a principal component analysis of these five items. 
Table 5.2: Extent of Board of Directors' Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making 
Extent of Directors' 
Involvement in Strategic 
Decisions relating to M 
Sample 
size Very 
great 
extent 
Great 
extent 
Small 
extent 
Not 
at 
all 
Not 
sure 
Total 
Making Strategic Planning 
Decisions 
40 22.8 40.4 20.2 14.0 1.8 100 
Performance Evaluation of 
Prior Strategic Decisions 
40 34.2 37.4 14.2 14.2 0.0 100 
Capital Allocation 40 51.3 27.4 9.6 5.5 6.2 100 
Long Range Planning 40 50.3 28.3 15.8 5.5 0.0 100 
Manpower Planning 40 20.6 21.6 32.3 24.7 0.5 100 
Source: Research Data 
From Table 5.2 which summarizes Appendix 23, regarding performance evaluation of 
prior strategic decisions, at least 34.2 percent and another 37.4 percent of the respondents 
believed that board of directors were involved to a 'very great' and to 'a great extent' 
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respectively. This could be in the form of monitoring the progress of implementation of 
strategic decisions made previously or through asking for additional information for 
clarifications. 
Table 5.2 further points out that most of the respondents (51.3 percent) indicated that 
their boards were involved 'to a very great extent' in the making strategic decisions of 
capital allocation nature. This involved the use of financial discounted methods for 
capital budgets as well as the use of Net Present Value (NPV) to identify worthwhile 
projects to invest in. They also used checklists to identify the projects to pursue. 
Appendix 23 gives more details on this. 
In terms of long-range planning, at least 50.3 percent and 28.3 percent of the respondents 
agreed that their board members were involved 'to a very great extent' and 'to a great 
extent' respectively. Thus, the board members were involved in the formulation of the 
procedures to identify long-term projects and plans through a formal screening process 
and the selection of very clear criteria of decision-making. 
Finally, on manpower planning Table 5.1 indicates that almost a third of the respondents 
reported that board members were involved to a small extent in the strategic planning 
decisions involving human resources planning. The work was purely left to management 
except for the appointment of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and their direct reportees. 
This study uses an integration of agency, stewardship, stakeholders and resourced 
dependence network perspectives in developing and testing the relationship between 
board characteristics and involvement in strategic decision-making. Using primary and 
secondary data, our results suggest that the level of board involvement in strategic 
decision-making is related to a number of governance variables. The study sought to 
assess the extent to which board of directors' attributes determine their (board) 
involvement in strategic decision-making. The board attributes studied focused on board 
composition and board members' demographic characteristics 
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5.3. Board of Directors' Strategic Decision-Making Processes 
Board process refers to decision-making activities; styles of board; the frequency and the 
length of board meetings; the formality of board proceedings and board culture on 
evaluation of director's performance (Wan and Ong, 2005; Kula and Tatoglu, 2006). In 
the current study, board processes refer to the decision-making activities of directors of 
companies. We identified three broad dimensions that are crucial to the study of board 
processes namely: board agenda; board meetings and board committees. These were 
analyzed and presented here below. 
5.3.1 Board Agenda 
The prioritization of board agenda determines the decisions to be made in a board 
meeting. Table 5.3 shows that the most common agenda (28.9 percent) was major capital 
investments, followed by corporate strategy plans and assets and financial viability. Other 
agenda that was also common from the respondents were issues to do with financial 
performance against target, regulatory environment and risk management. However, 
agenda like CEO and Chairman succession were not debated in most board meetings. 
Shareholder relations were also not ranked at the top. Information quality is one construct 
that has received surprisingly little attention in the literature on Boards of Directors. 
Table 5.3: Board Agenda 
Agenda " Frequency Percent Rank 
Major Capital Investments 20 28.9 1 
Corporate Strategy Plans 9 13.0 2 
Assets and Financial Viability 8 11.6 3 
Executive Compensation 5 7.2 4 
Risk Management 5 7.2 5 
Others 12 17.4 6 
Total 69 100 
Source: Research Data 
The findings therefore imply that most companies do major capital investments. This is 
because majority of the respondents were in the industrial and allied sector. This means 
that most of the firms that were surveyed had confidence in the economy as evidenced by 
the type of board agenda that dominate the meetings. 
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5.3.2 Board Meetings 
Board meetings refer to those board sessions in which deliberations are made concerning the 
discharge of the decision rights delegated by shareholders. They constitute events for 
exercising decision control rights (Melyoki, 2005). In the current study, board meetings were 
used as a measure of intensity of board activity and a value relevant board attribute. 
The view that board meetings are a resource was reinforced by the criticism of directors who 
took up multiple directorships and thereby limiting their ability to attend meetings regularly 
to monitor management. As directors spend both limited and intermittent time preparing 
for board meetings, the quality of information provided to board members should have a 
significant impact on decision quality (Bathula, 2008; Scarborough, 2010). It is in board 
meetings that important resolutions as guided by the agenda are made. 
Table 5.4 indicates that most (93.9) main board meetings were held quarterly as per 
statutory requirements. Other committee meetings as well as other ad hoc full board 
meetings are not scheduled and were conducted on a need basis. It has been argued that 
board meetings are viewed as a resource leading to board diligence. They also benefit the 
board by providing more time for directors to confer, set strategy, and monitor management 
effectively. Increasing the number of meetings, compared to changing other board 
characteristics, is relatively an inexpensive way for firms to not only protect shareholder 
value but also improve firm performance (Bathula, 2008). 
Table 5.4: Frequency of Board Meetings per Year 
Details Frequency Percent 
Every six months 1 3 
Quarterly 31 94 
Monthly 1 3 
Total 33 100 
Source: Research Data 
We established that board meetings were held at least four times a year in most the firms. 
We also found out that they were convened as required to deliberate on issues that were 
considered urgent and could not wait for a regular meeting. For the ordinary meetings, a 
notice of the meeting was sent to the directors fourteen days ahead of the meeting. The 
9 8 
preparation for board meetings included dispatching information to members so that they 
could prepare for the meetings. These reports, along with the agenda, were sent to 
directors at least one week before the meeting. The members of the executive committee, 
whose issues are to be included in the agenda, prepare reports which were reviewed by a 
committee consisting of the Board Chairman, the Company Secretary and the CEO to 
ensure the quality of content and presentation. Thus, items for the agenda were obtained 
from members of the executive committee (heads of departments) and from directors, and 
were put together by the Corporation Secretary and discussed with the CEO and the 
Chairman. 
Table 5.5: Duration of Board Meetings 
Details Frequency Percent 
Full day 3 8.6 
Half day 21 60.0 
Two hours 11 31.4 
Total 35 100 
Source: Research Data 
When board members meet and depending on the agenda before them, they spend time to 
ensure that they dispense with all the matters requiring their attention. Table 5.5 shows that 
most boards (60 percent) spent half a day in their board meetings. Another 31.4 percent spent 
an average of two hours in board meetings. This means that the agenda was addressed fully. 
Table 5.6 shows the time taken to circulate minutes after board meetings. 
Table 5.6: Circulation of Minutes after Board Meetings 
Details Frequency Percentage 
Two weeks after the board meetings 12 48.0 
One month after board meeting 2 8.0 
Two months after board meeting 5 20.0 
Aday prior to the next meeting 1 4.0 
During next board meeting 4 16.0 
Two (2) weeks before next meeting 1 4.0 
Total 25 100 
Source: Research Data 
The minutes of a board meeting were expected to be circulated to all the board members 
after board meetings. The board members were required to confirm minutes in the next 
meeting. Table 5.6 points out that most (48 percent) board members receive minutes at 
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least two weeks after the previous board meeting. In other companies (20 percent), the 
minutes were circulated two months after board meeting or one month before the next 
meeting. Another 16 percent circulate the minutes during the meeting. What this means 
is that the group of board members who receive minutes during the next board meeting 
do not get enough time to review the resolutions and establish the level of 
implementations. 
From Table 5.6, we observed that most (48 percent) board members received minutes 
two weeks after a board meeting. Others received the minutes two months after the board 
meetings. This means that those who received minutes within two weeks can make their 
comments when they are still fresh in their minds. 
5.3.3 Board Committees 
In agency theory, effective monitoring of agents requires the co-location of decision rights 
and requisite expertise/knowledge. This co-location was attained through the establishment 
of board committees. Committees were thus related to addressing the issue of information 
asymmetry between managers and directors (Melyoki, 2005). The committees usually 
included a nomination and remuneration committee, Audit, Risk and Governance committee 
and an audit committee among others. Board committees are essential teams in decision-
making. Companies should continue to utilize them in speeding the decision-making 
process. 
Table 5.7: Board Committees 
Type of committee Frequency Percent 
Audit, Risk and Governance 31 36.9 
Finance and Investments 13 15.5 
Nomination, Compensation and Remuneration 25 29.8 
Technical 7 8.3 
Tender and procurement 4 4.5 
Oversight 4 4.5 
[Total 84 100 
Source: Research Data 
We established that the listed companies in Kenya had established and operated Board 
Committees with the aim of ensuring full discussions in the Board of Directors' meetings 
100 
and proper decision-making. From Table 5.7 most (36.9 percent) of the companies had 
Audit, Risk and Governance Committee. The next most common committee is the 
Nomination, Compensation and Remuneration Committee. The two committees were 
requirements of the Capital Markets Authority (CMA). The setting up of committees 
were therefore of necessity more of compliance to laid down regulations than as best 
practice. 
5.4 Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making as a Moderating Variable 
We present the findings of board involvement in strategic decision-making as a 
moderating variable in the relationship between Board of Directors' attributes and 
corporate performance. The main objective of the current study was to analyze the 
relationships between board of directors' attributes, strategic decision-making and 
corporate performance. The specific objective in this section was to determine their 
(board) involvement in strategic decision-making and to establish the relationship 
between board of directors' involvement in strategic decision-making and corporate 
performance. 
To assess the relationship between the two components of board of directors' attributes 
(namely board composition and Board of Directors' demographic characteristics) and the 
board involvement in strategic decision-making processes correlation matrix was used to 
tests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between Board of Directors' attributes and firm 
performance moderated by board involvement in strategic decision-
making processes 
Before examining the extent of moderating effect of the research model, overall model 
test was conducted first. 
Firm Performance= /?fl + /?.Xi + Error Equation 1 
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The general moderating variables are represented by the interaction of the independent 
variable (X) and the moderating factor (M) in explaining the dependent variable (Y). The 
following general regression model was used to test the relationship. 
Y=B+B X + ^ M + C X M+E 
r0 r i i "m I I 
Where the coefficient C measures interaction effect between X and M 
i 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were used to test the extent to which the four 
dependent variables representing corporate performance, ROA, ROE, DY and PE are 
related to the three moderating variables. 
5.4.1 Findings on Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-making 
We tested hypotheses on the relationship between board involvement in strategic 
decision-making and corporate performance using correlation and multivariate regression 
analyses. We investigated for near multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables by 
means of correlation analysis. We tested the following hypothesis using step-wise 
regression method explained below. 
Multicollinearity was checked in all the models by examining the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for each independent variable. As a rule of thumb, if the VIF of a variable 
exceeds 10 that variable is said to be highly collinear (der Walt, 2006). The VIF for each 
of the variables in the nTodels ranged from -108.072 to 3.215, which is well below the 
upper limit of 10, suggesting that multi-collinearity was therefore not an issue in this 
analysis. 
The relationship between board composition and board involvement in strategic decision-
making was tested and the outcomes of the tests were tabulated in Table 5.8. The table 
shows board composition elements that include board size, number of executive 
directors, the number of non-executive directors, inter-locking directors, CEO duality and 
women on boards. In the analysis that follows the dependent variable 'Strategic 
Involvement' has been generated, and use the significant principal component from a 
principal component analysis of these five items. 
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Table 5.8: Correlation Matrix on Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making 
(SDM) t r 
Board 
Size 
Number 
of 
Executive 
Directors 
Non-
Executive 
Independent 
Directors 
Inter -
Locking 
Directors 
CEO 
duality 
Female 
Board 
Member 
Board's 
Involvement 
in Strategic 
Decisions 
Board Size Pearson 
Correlation 
1 
Sig.(2-
tailed) 
N 40 
Number of 
Executive 
Directors 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.117 1 
Sig.(2-
tailed) 
.480 
N 39 39 
Non-
Executive 
Independent 
Directors 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.277 .279 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.107 .105 
N 35 35 35 
Inter -
Locking 
Directors 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.038 -.203 .265 1 
Sig.(2-
tailed) 
.835 .257 .158 
N 33 33 30 33 
CEO 
Duality 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.354' -.194 -.208 -.043 1 
Sig.(2-
tailed) 
.029 .242 .237 .817 
N 38 38 34 32 38 
Female 
Board 
Member 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.280 -.099 .034 .258 -.186 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.080 .548 .846 .146 .264 
N 40 39 35 33 38 40 
Board's 
Involvement 
In Strategic 
Decisions 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.090 „ -.268 -.349' .230 .283 .029 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.592 .104 .043 .198 .089 .863 
N 38 38 34 33 37 38 38 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Source: Research Data 
Table 5.8 presents board composition and the relationship with board involvement in 
strategic decision-making. We found out that that board size and the number of executive 
directors sitting on the board have a non-significant negative relationship with board's 
involvement in strategic decisions. This led us to conclude that the size of the board did 
• not determine the decisions made. We further observed that the number of Non-
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Executive Directors (NEDS) had a significant negative relationship with board's 
involvement in strategic decisions making. 
Appendix 23 indicates how the boards were involved in the strategic decision-making 
processes with regard to strategy formulation, evaluation and review. One of the key 
findings was that the board was usually involved in the monitoring of the progress of 
strategic decisions. 
Appendix 24 shows that the Chief Executive Officer (as an Executive Director) 
participates in strategic decision-making. The CEO is the link between the board and the 
top management teams. 
The moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making on various 
board attributes and corporate performance is discussed here. With respect to moderating 
effect of board attributes, there seems to be an impact on ROE arising from executive 
directors, interlocking directors and board appointment criteria. There is also a 
moderating effect on ROA by board appointment. 
Table 5.8 further indicates that there is positive non-significant relationship between 
inter-locking directors, CEO duality and female board members. This implies that those 
board members who sit on more than one board make are involved in strategic decisions 
of the firms they serve. Women on boards and cases where the same person performs 
Board Chairman and CEOs roles also contribute to some degree of board involvement. 
Previous studies have observed that larger size also increases cognitive diversity, adding 
perspectives available for strategy-making and can increase creativity, indicating new 
alternatives for the future development of the firm (Castro el al, 2009). Board size may 
act as a barrier to change due to the difficulties in coordinating a larger decision-making 
body. However, such barriers may be partly mitigated with subcommittees that may 
improve coordination even in large boards (Goodstein et al., 1994). 
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5.5 Hypothesis Testing for Moderating Relationships 
5.5.1 Hypotheses Testing 
We conducted hypotheses testing to establish the relationship between Board of 
Directors' demographic characteristics and board involvement on Strategic Decision-
Making (SDM). We tabulated the outcomes of the tests in Table 5.9. The table shows 
board of directors' demographic characteristics that include age of board members, 
gender diversity in the board, level of education, board member study specialization. In 
the analysis that follows the dependent variable 'Strategic Involvement' has been 
generated, having used the significant principal component from a principal component 
analysis of the five board attributes. 
From Appendices 13, 13a, 13b, 13c and 13d we show the moderating effect of board 
involvement in strategic decision-making on the relationship between board composition 
and corporate performance with specific reference to return on equity (ROE). Only inter-
locking directors had statistically significant relationship on board involvement in 
strategic decision-making. Appendix 14 shows the histogram of the moderating effect of 
board involvement in strategic decision-making on return on equity (ROE). 
Appendices 14, 14a, 14b, 14c, 14d and 14e show the moderating effect of board 
involvement in strategic decision-making on board composition and corporate 
performance with specific reference to Return on Assets (ROA). We found out that the 
relationship had no moderating effect on the two variables. Appendix 16 shows the 
histogram of the moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making on 
board composition and return on assets (ROA). 
We found out from appendices 15, 15a, 15b, 15c, 15d and 15e that there was no 
moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making on board 
composition and corporate performance with specific reference to dividend yield (DY). 
This was even when the relationship was further subjected to partial correlation analysis. 
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Appendix 15e shows the histogram of the moderating effect of board involvement in 
strategic decision-making on board composition and dividend yield (DY). 
We also established from Appendices 16, 16a, 16b, 16c and 16d that there was no 
moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making on the relationship 
between board composition and corporate performance with specific reference to Price-
Earnings (PE) ratio. Appendix 16e shows the histogram of the moderating effect of 
board involvement in strategic decision-making on board composition and Price-Earnings 
(PE) ratio. 
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Table 5.9: Correlation Matrix of Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics 
and Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making (SDM) 
Board's Involvement in Strategic 
Decisions 
Board's Involvement in Strategic 
Decisions 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
N 38 
Female Board Members Pearson 
Correlation 
.029 
Sig. (2-tailed) .863 
N 38 
Age of board members Pearson 
Correlation 
-.168 
Sig. (2-tailed) .367 
N 31 
Level of Education Pearson 
Correlation 
-.030 
Sig. (2-tailed) oo
 
Ov
 
N 35 
Board Study Specialization Pearson 
Correlation 
-.043 
Sig. (2-tailed) .799 
N 38 
Board Specialization Pearson 
Correlation 
.124 
Sig. (2-tailed) .460 
N 38 
Source: Research Data 
From Table 5.9 it was observed that none of the board of directors' demographic 
characteristics had a significant correlation with board involvement in decision-making 
(for p-value<0.05 for all variables). This prompted further analysis in order to provide a 
better picture of the relationships. 
Hypothesis testing for the relationship between board involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making (SDM) and corporate performance was conducted. The specific objective of the 
study in this section was to determine the relationship between board of directors' 
involvement in strategic decision-making and corporate performance. Regression 
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analysis was used compute tests showing the relationship between board involvement and 
corporate performance. Table 5.10 presents the outcomes for the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-
making on the relationship between board of directors' attributes and 
corporate performance 
From Table 5.10 we deduced that there was a negative relationship between board 
involvement in strategic management and corporate performance using ROE with 
specific reference to board of directors' education, board study area specialization. With 
regard to measure of performance using ROA, there is a positive relationship between 
board involvement in strategic decision-making and board of directors' age, female board 
members, level of educational qualifications and board members' area of study 
specialization. 
Focus was placed on the change in the explanatory power r, or R2 , due to the moderating 
effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making which should also be 
statistically significant (high F-value at p<0.05) on the basis of which the decision to 
confirm or not confirm hypothesis 2 was made. 
Appendix 25 shows the correlation matrix of board of directors' demographic 
characteristics and board involvement in strategic decision-making. We established that 
only board members' specialization was statistically significant in determining the 
relationship between board of directors' demographic characteristics and board 
involvement in strategic decision-making and subsequently firm performance. 
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Table 5.10: Regression Analysis for Moderating Effect of Board Involvement In 
Strategic Decision Making and Corporate Performance 
Dependent Variables 
P/E ROE ROA DY 
Predictors 
Beta Beta Beta Beta 
(Constant) -108.072 3.215 -5.805 -.197 
Board of Directors Age 8.357 1.034 1.181 .212 
Level of Educational Qualification -7.684 -1.768 6.774 2.083 
Board Member Study Specialization 3.752 1.298 1.596 -.488 
Board of Directors' Age 16.266 12.876 13.251 .896 
Board Study Specialization -10.497 -5.621 -5.638 .362 
Female Board Members 100.374 -195.762 -153.264 -4.573 
Board of Directors Age and Board Involvement in SDM -.725 -3.870 -4.367 -.061 
Female Board Members and Board Involvement in SDM -53.449 104.697 91.948 3.879 
Education and Board Involvement in SDM .358 45.725 48.561 4.359 
Board Specialization and Board Involvement in SDM 9.200 2.009 2.170 -.518 
R Square .355 0.455 .469 .566 
Adjusted R Square -.048 0.115 .137 .296 
Source: Research Data 
Table 5.10 further indicates that dividend yield (DY) had a positive relationship between 
board involvement in strategic decision-making and Board of Directors' age, female 
board members, level of educational qualifications and board members' area of study 
specialization. On price-earnings (P/E), ratio there was a positive relationship between 
board of directors' age, female board members, board members' area of study 
specialization. 
A summary of the comparison between the effect of board involvement in strategic 
decision-making on return on equity (ROE) without and with moderating variables is 
presented in Appendix 13, 13a, 13b, 13c and 13d. The results revealed that the 
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moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making increases the 
relationship (multiple r) between the Board of Directors attributes such as who appoints 
the board members, executive directors and inter-locking director as well as the 
explanatory power (R2) of the board composition over ROE. However, change in the 
explanatory power is not statistically significant (low F-values, p>0.05). On the contrary, 
some board composition attributes change the results from significance to insignificance 
(p<0.05 to p>0.05) for the effect of executive directors on ROE. The results support for 
hypothesis 5. 
A summary of the comparison between the effect of board involvement in strategic 
decision-making on Return on Assets (ROA) without and with moderating variables was 
presented in Appendix 14, 14a, 14b, 14c and 14d. The results revealed that the 
moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making increases the 
relationship (multiple r) between the Board of Directors attributes such as CEO duality 
and who appoints the board members as well as the explanatory power (R2) of the board 
composition over ROA. 
However, change in the explanatory power is not statistically significant (low F-values, 
p>0.05). On the contrary, some board composition attributes such as inter-locking 
directors change the results from significance to insignificance (p<0.05 to p>0.05) for the 
effect of board composition attributes on ROA. The results support for hypothesis 3. 
A summary of the comparison between the effect of board involvement in strategic 
decision-making on Dividend Yield (DY) without and with moderating variables is 
presented in Appendix 15, 15a, 15b, 15c and 15d. The results revealed that the 
moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making has no relationship 
(multiple r) between the board of directors' attributes as well as with the explanatory 
power (R2) of the board composition over DY. This is because, change in the explanatory 
power is not statistically significant (low F-values, p>0.05). 
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A summary of the comparison between the effect of board involvement in strategic 
decision-making on Price-Earnings (PE) ratio without and with moderating variables was 
presented in Appendix 16, 16a, 16b, 16c and 16d. The results revealed that the 
moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making increases the 
relationship (multiple r) between the Board of Directors attributes such as CEO duality as 
well as the explanatory power (R2) of the board composition over PE ratio. However, 
change in the explanatory power is not statistically significant (low F-values, p>0.05). 
The results do support hypothesis 3. 
5.6 Board of Directors' Strategic Decision-making Processes and Corporate 
Performance 
The impact of Board of Directors' strategic decision-making processes and mechanisms 
on corporate performance was expected to differ not just according to board-specific 
characteristics but also by the level of involvement in strategic decision-making. This 
was because the role and function of boards differed from firm to firm on the basis of 
memorandum and articles of association and organizational policies. The potential 
problems of different board sizes depended on the specific functions and effectiveness of 
boards according to the institutional mandates. The results of the moderating effect of the 
board involvement in strategic decision-making on corporate performance were presented 
on Table 5.11. 
In the current study, we hacT proposed that the board of directors make strategic decisions 
and this was found to have an important conceptual linkage with corporate performance, 
which subsumed the underlying effects of board of directors' attributes. First, the board 
attributes had a direct linkage with corporate performance and therefore had a direct 
effect on performance. Second, it had moderating linkage between Board of Directors' 
attributes and performance, and therefore had a moderating effect on the relationship 
between board attributes and corporate performance. 
We report from appendices 17, 17a, 17b, 17c and 17d that the moderating effect of board 
involvement in strategic decision-making on the relationship between Board of Directors' 
demographic characteristics as reflected by cumulative age and educational qualifications 
111 
of board members and corporate performance with specific reference to return on equity 
(ROE) is evident. We found out that this relationship was statistically significant. 
Appendix 17e shows the histogram of the moderating effect of board involvement in 
strategic decision-making Board of Directors' demographic characteristics and Return on 
Equity (ROE). 
We found similar findings in appendices 18; 18a, 18b, 18c and 18d show the moderating 
effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making on Board of Directors' 
demographic characteristics (age and educational qualifications of board members) and 
corporate performance with specific reference to return on assets (ROA). Appendix 24 
shows the histogram of the moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-
making on Board of Directors' demographic characteristics and return on assets (ROA). 
From appendices 19, 19a, 19b, 19c and 19d show that there was no the moderating effect 
of board involvement in strategic decision-making on board of directors' demographic 
characteristics and corporate performance with specific reference to dividend yield (DY). 
Appendix 19e shows the histogram of the moderating effect of board involvement in 
strategic decision-making on board of directors' demographic characteristics and dividend 
yield (DY). 
We also found out from appendices 20, 20a, 20b, 20c and 20d that there was no 
moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making on board of 
directors' demographic characteristics and corporate performance with specific reference 
to price-earnings (PE) ratio. Appendix 20e shows the histogram of the moderating effect 
of board involvement in strategic decision-making on board of directors' demographic 
characteristics and price-earnings (PE) ratio. 
Table 5.11: Moderating Effects of Board Involvement in Strategic Decisions on the 
Relationship between Board Attributes and Firm Performance 
Independent 
Board involvement 
as a moderator of 
ROA 
Board involvement 
as a moderator of 
ROE 
Board 
involvement as a 
moderator of DY 
Board involvement 
as a moderator of 
PE 
Beta (P) p-value Beta (P) p-value Beta 
(P) 
p-value Beta (P) p-value 
Board Size and 
Board 
Involvement 
-.938 (0.305) - .749 (0.229) -.513 (0.122) -1.673 (0.559) 
Executive 
Directors and 
Board 
Involvement 
5.575 (0.235) 6.783 (0.043) 2.872 (0.092) -.851 (0.953) 
Non-Executive 
Directors and 
Board 
Involvement 
-9.715 (0.324) -12.408 (0.074) .836 (0.807) 33.673 (0.284) 
Inter-locking 
Directors and 
Board 
Involvement 
14.470 (0.059) 14.512 (0.009) - .532 (0.833) -20.228 (0.378) 
CEO Duality and 
Board 
Involvement 
7.631 (0.206) -1.467 (0.710) - .744 (0.719) 34.615 (0.079) 
Board 
appointment and 
Board 
Involvement 
-17.522 (0.023) -13.733 (0.010) .711 (0.772) 9.104 (0.681) 
R Square 
.597 .714 .187 .444 
Adjusted R 
Square 
.469 .624 -.070 .269 
Source: Research Data 
From Table 5.11, we observed that board involvement in strategic decision-making 
moderated the relationship between board appointment and firm performance using 
return on assets (ROA) measurement. The relationship was statistically significant (at 
p>0.05). When firm performance was measured using return on equity (ROE), we 
observed that executive directors, inter-locking directors as well as board appointment 
had statistically significant relationship with corporate performance. This relationship 
was moderated by board involvement in strategic decision-making. This relationship was 
strong (R square 0.714). 
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However, there was no statistically significant relationship between all the board of 
directors' demographic characteristics and price-earnings (PE) ratio and dividend yield. 
Despite that result, there was a moderating relationship between board involvement in 
strategic decision-making and corporate performance with regard to ROA. 
5.7 Discussion 
The following discussion relates the findings of the current study to existing theory and 
reports whether the results conform with other related empirical studies. We had 
hypothesized that there is a moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-
making on the relationship between board of directors' attributes and corporate 
performance. 
The results of the current are fairly comparable to other empirical studies that have 
considered Board of Directors' involvement in strategic decision-making as part of the 
study variables in relation to corporate performance. Board involvement in strategic 
decision-making moderates the relationship between board appointment and firm 
performance using return on assets (ROA) measurement. When firm performance is 
measured using return on equity (ROE) it was observed that Executive Directors, Inter-
locking directors as well as board appointment had significant influence on board 
involvement in strategic djgcision-making as an intervening variable. 
In the strategic management literature, involvement in the strategic decision-making 
process is based on two theoretical approaches: strategic choice and the agency theory 
(Balta, 2008). According to Ruigrok, Peck and Keller (2006) board involvement 
describes the overall level of participation of board members in making decisions that 
affect the long-term performance of an organization. In their study, two aspects arise. 
First, the will and the ability of directors to critically discuss and if needed to change 
strategic proposals of senior managers (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998). Secondly, the 
engagement of board members in earlier stages of strategy development by setting 
guidelines and by counseling executives. The composition of the board has been 
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examined in numerous studies (Pettigrew, 1992;Westphal, 1999). Board composition 
subsumes the individual director's potential to solve the various tasks (Daily, Johnson, 
and Dalton, 1999) and has generally been analyzed by examining the demographic 
characteristics of the board (Rindova, 1999). 
It was previously argued that the concept of involvement in strategy was difficult to be 
defined. A common distinction was based on the largely accepted view of specific 
strategy decisions as being composed of a formation phase and an evaluation phase 
(Koufopoulos, Lagoudis, Theotokas and Syriopoulos, 2010). According to Balta (2008), 
the vast majority of board members in Greek listed organizations on the Athen Stock 
Exchange (ASE) had scheduled formal meeting once a month as it is required by the 
regulations of Hellenic Capital Market. Boards require quite a long time (more than two 
hours) for their meetings which implies that the board puts great emphasis on monitoring 
and evaluation of their strategic decisions and provides a better judgment about strategic 
choices. 
Previous research on board involvement in strategic decision-making indicates that the 
relationship between certain variables and corporate performance may not necessarily be 
the same for all the firms (Ongore, 2008). While the study aimed at analyzing the 
relationships between board attributes and company performance, there is no consensus 
on what constitutes appropriate measures of company performance (Johnson et al., 1996; 
Daily et al., 2002). 
In the current study, the output of the multiple linear regression analysis was the multiple 
r,or Rz, as well as the significance level values (p-values). The Multiple r - v a l u e shows 
the strength of the relationship between the board involvement in strategic decision-
making variables (combined) and ROE as a measure/indicator of performance. The R2 
value shows the proportion of the performance indicator that is accounted for by the 
combined effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making variables. The F-
value demonstrates the overall statistical significance of the model which predicts the 
effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making on corporate performance at 95 
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c o n f i d e n c e l e v e l ( p = 0 . 0 5 ) . T h e d e c i s i o n t o c o n f i r m h y p o t h e s i s H 3 w a s m a d e a t v a l u e s o f 
F - r a t i o w h e r e p < 0 . 0 5 . A s u m m a r y o f t h e t e s t r e s u l t s f o r h y p o t h e s i s H 3 w a s p r e s e n t e d 
( T a b l e 5 . 1 1 ) . 
According to Melyoki (2005) board audit committees mainly focus on the annual 
financial audit and the evaluation of staff in the accounting and finance sections of 
organizations. This committee is viewed as providing prospects to improve a board's 
ability to gain deeper insights into the company's financial performance. This is 
consistent with the claim that complex organizations require committees that can focus 
on different aspects of the firm's operation since no single director can have expertise in 
all areas of a firm's operation (Tricker, 2009). Audit committees are also viewed as a 
means of enhancing communications between the board and the external auditor, and 
through that benefit from the insights that an external auditor provides about the 
organization. 
Scholars have previously associated board size with level of involvement in the strategic 
decision-making process (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Balta, 2008). From the resource 
dependency theory perspective, a large board can be beneficial for the organisation 
(Judge and Zeithaml, 1992). Large boards consist of a greater number of directors that 
have great expertise and knowledge that they can bring to the organisation (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). 
The frequency of board meetings held as a measure of board involvement in strategic 
decision-making processes, though insignificant, had a negative relationship with ROA but 
very weak positive relationship with Dividends Yield (DY) in the overall sample. The 
negative relationship between frequency of board meetings and ROA in the overall sample 
was largely influenced by the firms in the Commercial and Services sector. Against the 
framework of high board meetings seen from the descriptive statistics, we could postulate 
that such meetings were mainly due to corporate crisis. The results also confirms studies by 
Jensen (1993) who argues that board meetings do not necessarily enhance firm performance 
and that board meeting frequency increases when there are problems. 
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5.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter summarizes the results of the data analysis performed to empirically test 
hypothesis 3.The two hypotheses had stated that there was a relationship between board 
of directors' attributes and board involvement in strategic decision-making processes and 
that there was a relationship between board involvement in strategic decision-making and 
corporate performance respectively. 
The results indicated support or positive relationship between Board of Directors' 
involvement in strategic decision-making and some measures of corporate performance. 
There was a positive significant relationship between board involvement with reference 
to Executive Directors and interlocking board members in strategic decision-making and 
corporate performance with regard to ROA and ROE. 
The chapter established that the relationship between board involvement in strategic 
decision-making moderated the relationship between board appointment and firm 
performance using return on assets (ROA) measurement. We observed that the board 
committees and agenda had a significant statistical relationship with the strategic 
decision-making processes. 
The frequency of board meetings held as a measure of board involvement in strategic 
decision-making processes,though insignificant, had a negative relationship with ROA but 
very weak positive relationship with dividends yield (DY) in the overall sample. The 
negative relationship between frequency of board meetings and ROA in the overall sample 
was largely influenced by the firms in the Commercial and Services sector. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS' OPERATING ENVIRONMENT, FIRM 
CHARACTERISTICS AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents research findings and discussions on the influence of Board of 
Directors' operating environment and firm characteristics on corporate performance. This 
chapter presents an in-depth description of the data collected and analyzed. The chapter 
also provides the interpretation of the results based on the analysis. It sought to establish 
the relationship between board operating environment, firm characteristics and corporate 
performance. 
Two hypotheses, H4 and H5 investigated the influences of board operating environment 
and firm characteristics on firm performance respectively. This chapter addresses these 
relationships. 
6.2 Board of Directors' Operating Environment 
The main objective of the study was to analyze the relationships between Board of 
Directors' attributes, strategic decision-making and corporate performance. The specific 
objectives addressed in this section was to determine the effect of board environment on 
corporate performance. 
Board members are expected to lend credence to the control of managers as fiduciaries of 
stockholders by directors. Other responsibilities of Board of Directors also entail the 
acquisition of resources critical to the firm's success and advising the CEO and top 
management on administrative and other managerial issues. 
In Kenya like many developing markets, the Board of Directors' operating environment is 
dynamic. In the current study the board operating environment was identified to consist 
of board culture, access to information by board members and the board member's 
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independence. The establishment of board committees, board composition and disclosure 
of statement of corporate social responsibility also are other key factors of board 
operating environment. In a survey conducted by CMA in 2009, about 82 percent of 
companies comply with the requirements of establishment of board committees while 
about 90 percent of the companies complying with the need for sufficient board 
composition. 
From Table 6.1, over half the most respondents (54.4) strongly agreed that the board 
culture was conducive for them to participate in strategic decision-making. Another 31.1 
percent agreed that their board culture was acceptable. The board culture took the form of 
a fair Chairman who allowed all members to make their contributions; timely scheduled 
meetings and proper induction of new board members. 
Table 6.1: Board of Directors' Operating Environment 
Directors' 
collective operating 
environment 
Sample 
Size 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Agree 
% 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree % 
Disagree 
% 
Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Total 
% 
Board Culture 40 54.4 31.1 6.6 7.0 0.9 100 
Board Access to 
Information 
40 45.0 25.2 8.6 15.9 5.3 100 
Board Members 
Independence 
40 25.6 16.0 20.3 31.0 7.1 100 
Overall 40 100 
Source: Research Data 
In terms of access to information to board members, 45.0 percent of the respondents 
strongly agreed and another 25.2 percent agreed that the board members got the 
information they wanted. This was attributed mainly to the existence of a clear corporate 
governance structure that spelt how the board members would be informed. These 
included but not limited to regular briefs and a calendar of events for the whole year to 
act as reminders to the board members of their key plans and activities for the whole 
year. 
On board member independence, the respondents gave mixed responses. On one hand, 
31.0 percent disagreed that the board members were independent while on the other hand, 
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25.6 percent agreed that the board members were independent. Yet another 20.3 percent 
neither agreed nor disagreed that their board members were independent. The reasons 
advanced for the position taken by those who said that their board members were not 
independent were that some of the board members had previously worked within the last 
five years in the companies where they were board members at the time of the survey. 
Those who indicated that the board members were independent, cited declaration of 
interests whenever major decisions were made in which the affected board members had 
specific conflicting interests. A detailed analysis of these relationships is provided in 
appendices 21 and 22. 
6.3 Hypotheses Testing for Board Operating Environment and Performance 
The main objective of the study was to analyze the relationships between board of 
directors' attributes, strategic decision-making and corporate performance. The specific 
objective addressed in this chapter was to establish the relationship of the board operating 
environment and corporate performance. We tested the hypotheses using correlation and 
multivariate regression analyses. We investigated for near multi-collinearity among the 
explanatory variables by means of correlation analysis. The following hypothesis was 
tested using step-wise regression. 
Hypothesis 4: The board of directors' operating environment is related to corporate 
performajjpe 
This section presents an analysis for the determination of hierarchical relationship 
between the predictor variable formal board independence and board operating 
environment and financial performance of the firm using ROE, ROE, DY and PE. 
From Table 6.2, we observed that there was no statistically significant relationship 
between Board of Directors' operating environment and corporate performance (at p> 
0.05 for all the variables). This means that all aspects board operating environment 
consisting of board culture, access to information and formal independence do not 
influence firm performance as measured by ROA, ROE, DY and PE ratios. 
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Table 6.2: Board Operating Environment on Corporate Performance 
Predictors 
(Constant), 
formal 
independence, 
Board operating 
environment 
S u m of 
S q u a r e s df 
M e a n 
S q u a r e F 
P-
Value 
o r Sig. R 
R 
S q u a r e 
A d j u s t e d 
R 
S q u a r e 
S td . E r r o r of the 
Es t ima te 
ROE Regress 
ion 370.59 2.00 185.30 1.71 
,197a ,298a 
0.09 0.04 10.42 
Residua 
1 3,803.65 35.00 108.68 
Total 
4,174.24 37.00 
ROA Regress 
ion 509.71 2.00 254.86 2.13 
,134a ,330a 
0.11 0.06 10.93 
Residua 
1 4,184.02 35.00 119.54 
Total 
4,693.73 37.00 
DY Regress 
ion 10.88 2.00 5.44 0.43 
,655a ,155a 
0.02 (0.03) 3.56 
Residua 
1 443.89 35.00 12.68 
Total 
454.77 37.00 
P/E Regress 
ion 1,250.50 2.00 625.25 1.44 
,251a ,276a 
0.08 0.02 20.83 
Residua 
1 
15193.0 
39 
35 434.087 
Total 16443.5 
38 
37 
Source: Research Data 
From Table 6.2a, the study reports both negative effects for board operating environment 
and formal independence. Relatively high negative impact is reported for board operating 
environment (Beta= -3.803) for ROE. Overall, statistically not significant findings are 
reported for the independent effect of environmental dimensions on ROE (low t-values, 
low r-values, p>0.05). 
Table 6.2a: Coefficient Estimates for Board of Directors' operating environment 
and Return on Equity (ROE) 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 25.285 5.600 4.515 .000 
Board Operating Environment -3.808 2.448 -.268 -1.556 .129 
Formal Independence -.699 1.787 -.067 -.391 .698 
Source: Research Data 
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The study reports both negative effects for board operating environment and formal 
independence. Relatively high negative impact is reported for board operating 
environment (Beta= -3.810). However, statistically not significant findings are reported 
for the independent effect of environmental dimensions on ROA (low t-values, p>0.05) 
(Table 6.2b). 
Table 6.2b: Coefficient Estimates for Board of Directors' Operating Environment 
and Return on Assets (ROA) i i 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sifr 
1 (Constant) 29.480 5.873 5.019 .000 
Board Operating Environment -3.810 2.567 -.253 -1.484 .147 
Formal Independence -1.555 1.874 -.141 -.830 .412 
Source: Research Data 
The study reports both negative effects for board operating environment and formal 
independence with respect to dividend yield (DY). Relatively low negative impact is 
reported for board operating environment (Beta= -0.462). Overall, statistically not 
significant findings are reported for the independent effect of environmental dimensions 
on DY (low t-values, p>0.05) (Table 6.2b). 
Table 6.2c: Coefficient Estimates for Board of Directors' operating environment 
and Dividend Yield (DY) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 5.073 1.913 2.652 .012 
Board Operating Environment -.462 .836 -.098 -.553 .584 
Formal Independence -.308 .611 -.090 -.505 .617 
Source: Research Data 
The study reports positive effect for formal independence while negative effect was 
reported for board operating environment. Relatively high positive impact is reported for 
environmental complexity (Beta =3.026) while a high negative impact is reported for 
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board operating environment (Beta=-8.186). Overall, statistically not significant findings 
are reported for the independent effect of environmental dimensions on PE (low t-values, 
p>0.05)(Table 6.2d). 
Table 6.2d: Coefficient Estimates for Board of Directors' operating environment 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 20.540 11.192 1.835 .075 
Board Operating Environment -8.186 4.892 -.290 -1.674 .103 
Formal Independence 3.026 3.572 .147 .847 .403 
Source: Research Data 
From the analysis on board operating environment and the formal independence, it was 
observed that only Price-Earnings ratio had a positive relationship with the board 
operating environment. The rest of the performance measures namely ROA, ROE and 
DY had negative relationship with the board operating environment. However, there were 
no statistically significant relationships between board operating environment and the 
four measures of corporate performance (p>0.05). 
6.4 Firm Characteristics 
The main objective of the current study was to analyze the relationships between board of 
directors' attributes, strategic decision-making and corporate performance. The specific 
objective addressed in this section was the assessment of the relationship between firm 
characteristics and corporate performance. 
Using both descriptive statistics and multi-variate regression analysis, the relevant 
hypotheses were tested. Firm characteristics included age, size and the sector of the 
companies that were surveyed. 
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6.4.1 Firm Age 
As we observed in chapter four of the current study, some companies have been in 
operation in Kenya for many years while others were incorporated a few years ago. The 
oldest company among the listed companies was 114 years while the youngest was only 
four years old when the study was conducted. All the companies were listed in different 
times after being in operation for sometime. 
The approach taken in the current study closely follows that of Bathula (2008). The 
specific econometric regression that we run is as follows: 
Firm Performance (measured using either ROA, ROE, DY or PE) = a + /?1 Firm 
size + pi firm age+ sector dummies + e (1) 
The age of the firm is determined by taking away the incorporation year from the 
observation year, and mean age of the whole sample is 52.3 years. The mix of 
professional experiences varied from 1 to 9 with a mean of 2.9 or approximately 3 
professional skills among the board members. 
Data provided in chapter four show that the average age of the companies since 
incorporation is 52.3 years. This means that most the companies that were listed on the 
stock exchange had survived for many years and therefore were able to attract qualified 
and experienced board members. 
6.4.2 Firm Size 
Another measure of firm characteristics in the current study was firm size. We collected 
the data on firm performance and firm size from the Nairobi Stock Exchange Research 
database. In the sample, all the firms that were listed on Nairobi Stock Exchanges had 
their annual turnover computed as an average over a period of four years. 
For this study, sales revenue we used as a proxy for firm size. Sales revenue was 
calculated in terms of turnover or total sales revenue. We measured firm size by the 
natural logarithm of sales revenue. 
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6.4.3 Firm Sectors 
The Kenya's listed firms were categorized into four sectors. We presented the results on 
financial performance of each aspect under study for the whole sample as well as for each 
sector of the economy as per the NSE classification. The sectors include the Agricultural, 
Finance and Investment, Commercial and Services, and Industrial and Allied sectors. 
To determine how the pattern of corporate performance played out in the four business 
sectors of Agriculture, Finance and Investment, Commercial and Services, and Industrial 
and Allied sectors, the following analyses were done and the results are shown in Table 
6.3. 
Table 6.3: Sectoral Distribution of Firms and their Corporate Performance 
Sectoral Report 
SECTOR ROE ROA DY P/E 
Agriculture Mean 14.657 14.940 2.973 -2.140 
N 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 
Std. Deviation 5.023 5.083 .309 14.189 
Financial and Investment Mean 14.513 18.711 1.606 23.550 
N 12.000 12.000 12.000 12.000 
Std. Deviation 6.650 10.523 1.057 25.695 
Commercial and Services Mean 15.904 18.522 4.021 11.911 
N 9.000 9.000 9.000 9.000 
Std. Deviation 15.090 14.665 5.631 8.221 
Industrial and allied Mean 18.627 19.019 4.271 9.167 
N 16.000 16.000 16.000 16.000 
Std. Deviation 10.647 10.738 3.038 20.043 
Total Mean 16.483 18.509 3.318 13.251 
N 40.000 40.000 40.000 40.000 
Std. Deviation 10.368 11.051 3.431 20.568 
Source: Research Data 
We observed from Table 6.3, that the sectors had a mean score of 16.5 with the Industrial 
and Allied Sector reporting the highest score at 18.6 percent for return on equity (ROE). 
In terms of ROA, three - quarters of the sectors posted an average return of 18 percent 
and above. Only Agriculture sector posted 14.9 percent, which was below the total mean 
average of 18.5 percent. In terms of DY, Industrial and Allied posted the highest payout 
at 4.3 percent closely followed by Commercial and Services sector that posted 4.0 
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percent. Financial and Services sector had 1.1 percent. This means that while the 
Industrial and Allied sector did relatively better than the other sectors when performance 
was measured using ROA and ROA, Financial Services sector did relatively better than 
all the sectors when performance was measured using Price-Earnings Ratio. 
Under the Price-Earnings (PE) ratio, Agriculture Sector indicates a negative of 2.1 
percent while the rest realized a very high positive ratio. The Financial and Investments 
for example attained the highest PE mean of 23.6 percent. This sector was followed by 
Commercial and Services sector with 11.9 percent while Industrial and Allied realized a 
mean of 9.2 percent. The study established that the Industrial and Allied sector performed 
better than finance and investment sector in terms of ROA and ROE. 
6.5 Hypothesis Testing for Firm Characteristics and Corporate Performance 
We examined the firms with respect to the characteristics they took within specific 
industry segments and the results were presented in Table 6.4. Firm characteristics 
include firm age, size and sector. Firm age refers to the number of years for which a firm 
has been in operation. The following hypothesis was tested. 
Hypothesis 5: Firm characteristics are related to corporate performance 
This study assessed the rgjationship between firm characteristics and corporate 
performance. From Table 6.4a to 6.4d we deduced that there was a general negative 
relationship between the age of the company and firm performance. We also reported a 
positive effect for both firm size represented by sales turnover and firm age. These 
relationships were however not statistically significant. From Table 6.4, it is notable that 
there was a weak relationship (represented by r below 0.5) between firm age and firm 
performance 
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Table 6.4: The Relationship between Firm Age and Corporate Per 
Predictors : 
(Constant), In 
Sales, age of 
company 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Squa 
re F 
P-valuc 
(Sig.) K 
R 
Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. 
Error of 
the 
Estimate 
ROE Regr 
essio 
n 
536.01 2.00 268.0 
0 
2.71 
,080a ,358a 
0.13 0.08 9.94 
Resid 
ual 3,656.12 37.00 98.81 
Total 
4,192.13 39.00 
ROA Regr 
essio 
n 
417.07 2.00 208.5 
4 
1.78 
,184a ,296a 
0.09 0.04 10.84 
Resid 
ual 4,345.62 37.00 117.4 
5 
Total 
4,762.69 39.00 
DY Regr 
essio 
n 
57.15 2.00 28.58 2.63 
,085a .353a 
0.12 0.08 3.30 
Resid 
ual 401.95 37.00 10.86 
Total 
459.10 39.00 
P/E Regr 
essio 
n 
6.19 2.00 3.10 0.01 
,993a .019a 
0.00 (0.05) 21.11 
Resid 
ual 16,492.2 
7 
37.00 445.7 
4 
Total 
16,498.4 
7 
39.00 
ormance 
Source: Research Data 
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The study reports positive effect for firm size represented by sales turnover while 
negative effect was reported for firm age. Relatively moderate positive impact is reported 
for firm size in form of sales (beta = 2.709) while a low negative not statistically 
significant impact was reported for age of the companies surveyed (Beta =-0.027, 
p>0.05). Firm size was found to have statistically significant positive relationship with 
ROE (p>0.05) (Table 6.4a). 
Table 6.4a: Coefficient Estimates for Firm Characteristics and Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients P-value 
Sip Model B Std. Error Beta t 
1 (Constant) -23.684 17.567 -1.348 .186 
Age of Company -.027 .064 -.067 -.430 .670 
Ln (sales) 2.709 1.163 .365 2.329 .025 
Source: Research Data 
The study reports positive effect for both firm size represented by sales turnover and firm 
age. Relatively moderate positive impact is reported for firm size in form of sales (Beta = 
2.211) and a very low positive impact is reported for age of the companies surveyed 
(Beta =0.024). Overall, statistically not significant findings are reported for the 
independent effect of firm characteristics on ROA (low t-values, p>0.05) (Table 6.4b). 
There is a statistically significant relationship between firm size (represented by natural 
logarithm of sales) and the Return on Equity (ROE). 
Table 6.4b: Coefficient Estimates for Firm Characteristics and Return on Assets 
(ROA) 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients P" value 
Sif? Model B Std. Error Beta t 
1 (Constant) -16.706 19.152 -.872 .389 
Age of Company .024 .069 .056 .348 .730 
Ln (sales) 2.211 1.268 .280 1.744 .090 
Source: Research Data 
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The study reports positive effect for firm size represented by sales turnover while 
negative effect is reported for firm age. Relatively low positive impact is reported for 
firm size (Beta=0.844) and a low negative impact is reported for firm age (beta=-0.023). 
Firm size was found to have statistically significant positive relationship with DY (low t-
values, p>0.05) (Table 6.4c). 
Table 6.4c: Coefficient Estimates for Firm Characteristics and Dividend Yield 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients P-
value 
Sig Model B Std. Error Beta t 
1 (Constant) -8.423 5.825 -1.446 .157 
Age of Company -.023 .021 -.175 -1.112 .273 
Ln (sales) .844 .386 .344 2.189 .035 
DY) 
Source: Research Data 
The study reports positive effect for firm size while negative effect was reported for firm 
age. Relatively low positive impact is reported for sales turnover (beta =0.288) while a 
low negative impact is reported for firm age (Beta =-0.005). Overall, statistically not 
significant findings are reported for the independent effect of firm characteristics on PE 
ratio (low t-values, p>0.05) (Table 6.4d). There was a statistically significant relationship 
between firm size (represented by natural logarithm of sales) and the dividend yield 
(DY). 
Table 6.4d: Coefficient Estimates for Firm Characteristics and Price-Earnings (PE) 
Ratio 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t 
P" 
value 
Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 9.106 37.310 .244 .809 
Age of Company -.005 .135 -.007 -.040 .968 
Ln (sales) .288 2.471 .020 .117 .908 
Source: Research Data 
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From Table 6.5, we observed that, there is no statistically significant relationship between 
performance and the sector. This implies that the sector in which firms were categorized 
into does not influence firm performance. We had measured corporate performance using 
ROE, ROE, DY and P/E ratio. 
Table 6.5: Analysis of Variation (ANOVA) Table Showing All Sectors and 
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sip. 
ROE Between Groups (Combined) 133.15 3 44.38 .394 .758 
Within Groups 4,058.98 36 112.75 
Total 4,192.13 39 
ROA Between Groups (Combined) 42.86 3 14.29 .109 .954 
Within Groups 4,719.84 36 131.11 
Total 4,762.69 39 
DY Between Groups (Combined) 54.52 3 18.17 1.617 .202 
Within Groups 404.58 36 11.24 
Total 459.10 39 
P/E Between Groups (Combined) 2,266.43 3 755.48 1.911 .145 
Within Groups 14,232.04 36 395.33 
Total 16498.47 39 
Source: Research Data 
From Table 6.5, there is no statistically significant relationship between firm 
characteristics and any of the firm performance measures (at p> 0.05 for all dependent 
variables). This means that the firm characteristics examined (firm size, age and sector) 
have no direct influence on corporate performance. 
6.6 Discussion 
The following discussion relates the findings of the current study to existing theory and 
reports whether the results conformed to other related empirical studies. We had 
hypothesized that board of directors' operating environment had a relationship with 
corporate performance. We had also hypothesized that firm characteristics had a 
relationship with corporate performance. 
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Under firm characteristics, we assessed three of them namely firm age, size and sector. 
Firm age was measured by the number of years from the time the firm was incorporated. 
The firm size was computed as the natural logarithm of the sales turnover. The firm 
sector was identified from the stock market classifications. 
» 
We found that statistically significant relationship existed between firm size (measured 
by sales turnover) and return on assets (ROA) and dividend yield (DY). However, the 
relationship between board of directors' operating environment and firm performance 
was found not to be statistically significant. Although this relationship was reported that 
way, the companies cannot ignore their stated effects. The results show that there is 
correlation between the board environment and the various indicators of performance. 
The results indicate that the higher the correlation (multiple r) between the board 
environment and corporate performance, the larger the proportion of variability (R2) in 
corporate performance that is accounted for by the board environment. 
The results of the current study were comparable to other empirical studies that have 
considered board of directors' operating environment and firm characteristics as part of 
the study variables in relation to corporate performance. Previous studies have found 
contrasting results. Newer firms were expected to have smaller earnings than older ones 
because they have less experience in the market, were still building their market position, 
and normally had a higher costs structure (Lipczinsky and Wilson, 2001). On the other 
hand, older firms may be reaching the end of their product life cycle. Further, Boone et 
al. (2007) also suggest that complexity increases with firm age. In the current study we 
found out that a small proportion of firms that would qualify as new companies in Kenya 
had better performance than older ones. Any company that was less than ten years old 
since incorporation was classified as new. 
In previous studies, firm size and age were found to co-vary with many board 
characteristics and other governance variables (Bathula, 2008). Booth et al. (2002) and 
Peasnell et al. (2003) have suggested that internal governance structures are substitutable 
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a n d t h e f i r m s c a n c h o o s e a p p r o p r i a t e g o v e r n a n c e o p t i o n s b a s e d o n w h a t i s r i g h t f o r t h e m . 
T h e f i n d i n g s o f t h e c u r r e n t s t u d y c o n c u r s w i t h t h e p r e v i o u s s t u d i e s . 
Although previous studies have rarely used firm sector to measure firm performance, the 
current study has used it. The study established that the industrial and allied sector 
performed better than finance and investment sector in ROA and ROE as corporate 
performance measures used. 
Firm age has been linked to many decisions of the firm (Boone et al., 2007; Bathula, 
2008). Boone et al. (2007) found that as firms grow, boards also grow in response to the 
increasing needs and benefits of monitoring and specialization by board members. 
However, the magnitude of these relationships may differ. For example, board size and 
composition reflects a trade-off between specific benefits of monitoring and costs of such 
monitoring (Raheja, 2005). 
Previous studies contend that large size of the firm was often associated with complex 
operations of the firm as it sought to perform its strategic role more actively (Bathula, 
2008). Dalton et al. (1998) found that small firms had better impact of board size than 
large firms. Similarly, Lehn et al. (2004) found that board size was positively related to 
firm size but negatively related to growth opportunities. The scale and complexity of 
large firm would cloudy any relationship between board characteristics and firm 
performance. As the firm size increases, the agency costs were expected to increase since 
a large span allows for greater managerial discretion and opportunism, resulting in 
increased monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bathula). On the other hand, as firms 
grow, they increase the investment in internal control mechanisms for planning and 
control (accounting and information systems). This may reduce not only the monitoring 
intensity but also need for alignment of interests through director ownership (Bathula, 
2008). From the current study, firm size had a positive relationship with firm 
performance, therefore the findings of this study were in tandem with previous studies 
and extends the agency theory of corporate governance. 
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On the board operating environment, the institutional or network perspective assumes 
that corporate actions and executives' decisions are influenced and sometimes 
constrained by relationships to their environment (Ruigrok et al, 2006). In the 
environment where the market for corporate control is weak, internal control mechanisms 
such as the board of directors become more important for corporate governance (Kula 
and Tatoglu, 2006). 
Previous studies have found out that executives operating in complex environments will 
experience difficulty in identifying the key strategic factors and to use valuable resources 
and capabilities (Black and Boal, 1994). Environmental complexity had been also 
operationalized as heterogeneity in the environment (Balta, 2008). Goodstein and Boeker 
(1991) contended that board composition and its control encourage executives to pursue 
specific strategies. As the board participates in the strategic decision-making process 
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1985), any environmental change leading to a corporate 
strategy change might consequently require board composition change. As resource 
dependency theory proposes, Boards of Directors act as a linkage between the firms and 
the external environment and are supposed to manage external dependencies (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978) and reduce environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer, 1972). Environmental 
changes have been associated with alternation in the firm's corporate strategy. Contrary 
to previous results, the current study on the board of directors' operating environment was 
not statistically significant in relations to firm performance. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has documented the results of correlation analyses examining first, the 
influence of external operating environment to boards of directors' attributes as well as 
on firm's characteristics that include firm size, age and sector. All these were then related 
to firm performance. Compelling evidence was provided in support of the hypotheses and 
discussion was given to each of these bi-variate relationships. The results of the study 
have been compared with other studies in the area and the conclusions drawn represent 
the process of strategic decisions among the Kenyan listed companies. 
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Multi-variate regression analysis techniques such as ordinary least squares (OLS) linear 
regression was executed in order to gain an insight into the extent of relationships 
between the variables. The cases when the statistical analyses approaches revealed 
different results were only when in the regression analysis the independent variables were 
categorical, thus it had to be transformed into a binary variables. The purpose of using 
such comprehensive statistical analyses approaches was to provide an insight 
understanding of the robust associations between the variables. 
This chapter has summarized the results of the data analysis pertaining to Board of 
Directors' operating environment and firm characteristics. The results indicated that there 
was no significant statistical support for the relationship between board of directors' 
operating environment and firm characteristics with the measures of corporate 
performance. The firm performance measures are ROE, ROA, DY and PE. 
The following chapter presents the summary, conclusions and recommendations and the 
contributions of this study. It also highlights the implications of the study for academics 
and business practitioners. Avenues for future research are also presented along with the 
areas of most worthy theoretical contributions. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarizes answers to the research questions, findings on the objectives, 
brings out the conclusions and the implications of the study. It also highlights the 
limitations of the study and outlines proposed areas of future research. 
Boards of Directors are considered as social assembly groups which are expected to play 
a more active role in discharging their fiduciary role for improving organisational 
performance. This thesis was set up to investigate the board attributes that shape strategic 
decisions among Kenya listed organisations in an attempt to assist executives to improve 
organisational performance. This study focused on the Boards of Directors of Kenyan 
listed organisations. 
More specifically, it attempted to examine the impact of board composition on firm 
performance; to identify the attributes of board members that have an effect on the 
involvement in strategic-decision making and corporate performance; on the strategic 
decision-making processes; and on the board of directors' operating environment and 
corporate performance. Finally, it investigated the impact of firm characteristics on the 
performance of Kenyan firms. 
7.2 Summary of the Study 
The main objective of the current study was to analyze the relationships between board of 
directors' attributes, strategic decision-making and corporate performance. The specific 
objectives of the study were to assess the extent to which board of directors' attributes 
determine their (board) involvement in strategic decision-making and corporate 
performance and to establish the effect of board attributes on corporate performance. 
Other specific objectives were to determine the effect of board environment on 
organizational performance; assess the influence of firm characteristics on corporate 
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p e r f o r m a n c e a n d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n b o a r d o f d i r e c t o r s ' i n v o l v e m e n t i n 
s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g , b o a r d o p e r a t i n g e n v i r o n m e n t , f i r m c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a n d 
c o r p o r a t e p e r f o r m a n c e . 
From the findings in chapters four to six, numerous governance theories including agency 
theory, stewardship theory, resource dependence theory, and stakeholder theory, were 
more dominant theoretical perspectives of the current study. Table 7.1 presents a 
comprehensive summary of the research objectives, hypotheses, presents detailed 
findings from both statistical analyses. Table 7.1 and those tables and charts in the 
Appendix present the empirical findings that have been derived from regression analysis 
and descriptive statistics throughout chapters four to six of the study undertaken. 
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Table 7.1: Summary of Objectives, Hypot leses and Findings 
Objective Hypothesis Findings with Positive Findings with 
relationship negative relationship 
Objective One : To assess the H2: There is a Findings show that Findings show that 
extent to which board of relationship between Positive relationship exists negative relationship 
directors' attributes board of directors' between: exists between: 
determine their (board) attributes and corporate 
involvement in strategic performance through Return on Assets (ROA) and ROA and ROE and 
decision-making and board involvement in Board size, executive directors. Interlocking directors 
corporate performance strategic decision- non-executive directors and and CEO duality; 
making inter-locking directors; 
Board size, executive 
Board size, executive directors, directors and CEO 
non-executive directors and duality with Price-
inter-locking directors and Earnings (PE) 
Return on Equity (ROE) results 
reported similar results as ROA; 
Board size, executive directors 
and non-executive directors 
have a positive relationship and 
Dividend Yield (DY); 
Non-Executive Directors and 
interlocking directors and Price-
Earnings (PE); 
* There is also a moderating effect 
on ROA by board appointment. 
Objective Two : Establish the Hla & Hlb: There is a Findings show that Positive Findings show that 
effect of board of directors' relationship between relationship exists between: negative relationship 
attributes (board of directors' board composition and exists between: 
demographic characteristics) Board of Directors' ROA and age of board 
on corporate performance demographic members, women on the board. DY and women on the 
characteristics and educational qualifications and board and board study 
corporate performance. board member professional specialization; 
specialization; 
ROE and women on 
DY and age of board members board and educational 
and educational qualifications; qualifications; 
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Objective Hypothesis Findings with Positive 
relationship 
Findings with 
negative relationship 
ROE and age of board members 
and board study specialization; 
PE and age, gender, board 
member study specialization 
PE and the level of 
education 
Objective Three: To establish 
the relationship between 
board of directors' 
involvement in strategic 
decision-making, board 
operating environment, firm 
characteristics and corporate 
performance 
H3: There is a 
relationship between 
board involvement in 
strategic decision-
making and firm 
performance 
Positive relationship exists 
between Board of Directors' 
involvement in strategic 
decision-making and Executive 
Directors and interlocking board 
members in strategic decision-
making and corporate 
performance with regard to 
ROA and ROE 
Board meetings and 
committees, are 
negatively related to 
firm performance. 
Objective Four: To 
determine the influence of 
board environment on 
organizational performance 
H4: The board's 
operating environment is 
related to corporate 
performance 
J0 
Findings show that Positive 
relationship exists between: 
Board environment used as an 
intervening variable for the 
relationship between board 
attributes and firm performance 
Findings show that 
negative relationship 
exists between: 
Board environment 
was used an 
intervening variable 
for the relationship 
between board 
attributes and firm 
performance 
Objective Five: To assess the 
influence of firm 
characteristics on corporate 
performance 
H5: Firm characteristics 
are related corporate 
performance 
Firm size had positive 
relationship with firm 
performance 
Negative relationship 
exists between the 
sector and firm 
performance 
Source: Research Data 
In summary, we concluded that board attributes showed a relationship with firm 
performance. This relationship was moderated by board involvement in strategic 
decision-making and firm characteristics. The context of the firms also played an 
important role in deciding whether a particular characteristic was beneficial to firms in 
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the selection or nomination of board members to provide strategic leadership to the 
organizations. Therefore, the study indicates the critical importance of the constitution of 
boards of directors through appointments for the effective performance of firms. These 
were summarized as follows. 
7.2.1 Board of Directors' Attributes and Corporate Performance 
In the current study, the impact of board attributes namely appointment of directors, 
board size, executive versus non-executive directors as well as independent directors, 
CEO duality, women board members, board member's level of education, board member 
area of specialization were assessed. Sections 11(3) and 12 of the Capital Markets 
Authority Act (the Act) empowers the Capital Markets Authority to make rules and 
regulations to govern capital markets in Kenya. The main objective of these rules is to 
strengthen corporate governance practices in public listed companies in Kenya and to 
promote the standards of self-regulation in order to bring the level of governance in line 
with international standards (Kibuthu, 2005). The boards of directors of companies 
especially the listed ones are therefore the pillars of corporate governance. 
The individual board member attributes or characteristics may in one way or another 
affect the decisions made by the entire board. A board member may bring in their 
experiences elsewhere either to support or affirm his or her views. 
7.2.2 Board of Directors' Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making and Corporate 
Performance 
In the current study, we considered boards of directors as a social construction and that 
board members were understood through their attributes, working styles, and actual board 
task performance and the processes inside the boardroom. Therefore, for the present 
study, an integrative theoretical model was developed by combining the effects of boards 
of directors' involvement in strategic decision-making process together with firm 
characteristics and board operating environment. 
The moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making and the 
processes of board meetings including board committees on other board attributes 
affecting the firm performance were analyzed and reported. Our findings indicate that a 
number of directors chair and sit on several boards. Although this could raise issues of 
influence peddling and insider dealings, the law is clear on the independence of directors. 
A company's Board of Directors is responsible for setting strategic direction of the firm 
and for overseeing and monitoring its businesses and affairs. Directors are accountable to 
shareholders for the company's performance (Balta, 2008). The Board reviews and 
approves the company's strategic and business plans and the formulation of guiding 
policies. Day to day management of the company's affairs and implementation of its 
strategy and policy initiatives are delegated to the chief executive officer and senior 
executives. The board performs its duties through board committees and boar meetings 
that are managed by chairpersons and the documentation of the proceedings kept by a 
Corporation Secretary. The Secretary is usually not counted as a board member when it 
comes to voting to determine or to pass a resolution. 
7.2.3 Effect of Board of Directors' Operating Environment and Firm 
Characteristics on Corporate Performance 
Most companies require that their directors are free from any interest and any business or 
other relationship, which^could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere 
with the Director's ability to act in the best interests of the company. This was termed as 
board member independence. 
The functions of any board include among others oversight of the company including its 
conduct and accountability systems. Board members were presumed to be involved in the 
reviewing and approving of the overall financial goals of the company, approving 
strategies and plans for the company to achieve these goals and approving financial goals 
and annual budgets. 
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The current study follows the line of investigation that stresses the active participation of 
boards and board members in important decisions for their firms, or more specifically, in 
those decisions that are of strategic nature. The empirical examination of the hypotheses 
developed from the conceptual framework presented in this study reveals a mixed set of 
results. 
7.3 Conclusions 
The main objective of the current study was to analyze the relationships between Board 
of Directors' attributes, strategic decision-making and corporate performance of the firms 
listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. This was achieved by first assessing the extent to 
which board of directors' attributes determine their (board) involvement in strategic 
decision-making and corporate performance. Second, we established the effect of board 
of directors' attributes (board of directors' demographic characteristics) on corporate 
performance. Third, we tested the moderating effect of board of directors' involvement in 
strategic decision-making on the relationship between board attributes and corporate 
performance. We then determined the influence of board environment on organizational 
performance and finally we evaluated the influence of firm characteristics on corporate 
performance 
The following are the major conclusions of the study. In terms of board composition 
attributes among the sampled companies had nine (9) board members. This means that 
the board size in Kenya among the listed firms consist of an average of nine (9) board 
members. We also found out that that the average age of the board members of the firms 
surveyed was 56 years old. Majority of the board members were male board members at 
ninety-three (93) percent while women made up only seven (7) percent of the total board 
members. The most common area of educational specialization for most of the board was 
Business Administration (21 percent) and Finance and Accounting consist 22 percent. 
The two options had a combined 43 percent. 
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There was statistically significant relationship between the number of executive directors 
sitting on the board and the number of inter-locking directors and return on assets (ROA). 
In addition, we established that the influence of executive and inter-locking directors 
were statistically significant in determining firm performance measured using ROA and 
ROE. However, we found out that CEO duality was negatively statistically significant in 
determining performance, using ROE as a measure of firm performance. 
From the findings, we conclude that there is statistically significant relationship between 
the number of Executive Directors sitting on the board and the number of inter-locking 
directors and Return on Equity (ROE). We further concluded that there was a statistically 
significant relationship between non-executive directors (NEDS) and Price-Earnings 
(P/E) ratio. The rest of the board composition attributes had no statistically significant 
relationship with PE. 
There was statistically significant negative relationship between board study 
specialization and dividend yield (DY) and that there was a positive but not statistically 
significant relationship between inter-locking directors, CEO duality and female board 
members. Only inter-locking directors had statistically significant relationship with board 
involvement in strategic decision-making. 
We also concluded that there was moderating effect of board involvement in strategic 
decision-making on Board of Directors' demographic characteristics (age and educational 
qualifications of board members) and corporate performance with specific reference to 
Return on Assets (ROA). When firm performance was measured using return on equity 
(ROE), we observed that Executive Directors, Inter-locking directors as well as board 
appointment had statistically significant influence on board involvement in strategic 
decision-making as an intervening variable. 
The results indicated support or positive relationship between Board of Directors' 
involvement in strategic decision-making and some measures of corporate performance. 
There was a positive significant relationship between board involvement with reference 
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to Executive Directors and interlocking board members in strategic decision-making and 
corporate performance with regard to ROA and ROE. There was no statistically 
significant relationship between firm characteristics and firm performance 
In conclusion, the theoretical framework and the findings of this study will encourage 
scholars in strategy, organizational behavior and corporate governance, as well as 
practitioners, to examine the board characteristics from a multiple-theoretical 
perspectives. Researchers should also consider not only the composition and 
demographic characteristic features of the boards, but also other strategic choices of firms 
regarding the processes and dynamics of functioning of internal governance systems such 
as holding board meetings using video or teleconferencing methodologies and increase 
board member participation. It is also necessary to examine how these internal 
governance systems align with the external governance mechanisms to provide for 
effective performance in a turbulent and competitive global environment. These findings 
agree to some extent with other scholars (Bathula, 2008 and Ehikioya, 2009) who 
concluded that some board characteristics do influence firm performance. 
7.4 Implications of the Study 
The research findings of the current study have several practical, theoretical and 
methodological implications. In the following section, specific implications for scholars 
and business practitioners«are underscored. 
7.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
Some theoretical implications emerge from this research. First, the study contributes to 
understanding of board attributes and corporate performance link by examining both the 
traditional variables such as board size, CEO duality, board meetings and other 
organizational attributes such as gender diversity and competence variables represented by 
women and degree holders, respectively. These attributes were linked to the agency, 
stakeholder, stewardship and resource dependency theories of corporate governance. 
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Second, to the best of the current researcher's knowledge, this is the first study to 
examine the impact of board of directors' attributes on firm performance in Kenya. The 
findings also provide evidence that gender diversity in Kenyan boards is yet to contribute 
to firm performance, as they are still minority on the board at only seven percent of the 
total board membership of all the listed firms. Perhaps women directors can bring their 
view points more effectively in a smaller board, thereby making effective contribution, 
rather than in a larger board. It seems that in larger boards, women are inhibited or made 
ineffective by members of other gender. This may be explained by the fact that in larger 
boards, it is likely that there is variety of skills which the women folk making their 
contributions like anyone else not be recognized. 
7.4.2 Implications for Practitioners 
The findings of the study have implications for large shareholders and institutional 
investors. As the results reveal that a governance-improving firm is associated with a 
lower cost of equity capital and higher valuation, large investors may be able to achieve a 
higher valuation for their assets by removing certain governance deficiencies, such as 
absence from board meetings, unfettered executive power and opacity of top executives' 
remuneration. 
The study also highlights that the extent of board participation in strategic decision-
making processes was mainly influenced by the duration of board meetings and the 
number of board committees a member attends. Another important factor is the number 
of board meetings held in a year and in which board members attend. The need to hold 
meetings should be informed by the importance of the agenda and the urgency of 
dispensing with it. 
The moderating effect of board involvement in strategic decision-making on relationship 
between each of the independent variables and the dependent variable were analyzed and 
conclusions made. We found out that board involvement in strategic decision-making as a 
moderating variable affects other board attributes so long as support to the contingency view 
regarding the context of the boardroom dynamics was in place. 
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The establishment of a desirable board climate is of necessity, while having a keen focus 
on access to information. Sticking to fiduciary responsibility and application of 
performance evaluations are also indispensable attributes of high performance 
companies. These attributes all combined seem to culminate in effective board process. 
Finally, this study should serve as a foundation for future research concerning these 
intermediate links and encourage other researchers to explore other possible intermediate 
links to firm performance. 
7.4.3 Methodological Implications 
The application of cross-sectional research design, multi-variate regression analysis and 
correlation analysis as statistical approaches had great impact on the statistical 
relationships reported in the current study. Given that the focus of the study was largely 
testing the statistical significance of the effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable, the choice of the prop-value has implications for the statistical 
significance of the results. Therefore, statistically not significant results may turn out to 
be statistically significant if the prop-value changes. 
The study also implies that the information obtained from longitudinal corporate 
governance disclosures may pievide more information than that gained from cross-
sectional absolute governance rankings in evaluating a firm's performance. By carefully 
choosing the firms with boards that are balanced overtime, investors may have greater 
opportunities to earn higher portfolio returns. It points to the need for identifying the 
importance of relevant skill sets appropriate for respective boards. 
7.5 Limitations of the Study 
Notwithstanding the above findings, the study had some limitations. The limitations 
reported in this study refer to general limitations of theoretical or conceptual issues as 
well as research design approach. This research addresses only some elements of 
corporate governance and is restricted to listed firms in Kenya. Some of the limitations of 
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this study are presented here. First, the main limitation of the study is that the data was 
collected through publicly available data sources such as annual reports and other 
databases. If there were any problems relating to data disclosures or professional 
accounting practices, then that would limit the validity of the findings. 
Second, the entire population comprised of only 47 firms, which is relatively small. Due 
to data problems, the final set comprised of 160 firm-year observations for 40 firms. 
Nonetheless, the size of the sample was limited by the number of firms listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange by year 2010. Also the external validity of the current study may 
be in question, since the data belongs to only Kenyan firms which are few compared to 
those listed in other stock exchanges in the world. 
Third, it is possible for the observed firm performance to be highly affected by the 
government regulations rather than because of board attributes or its effectiveness. For 
example, Ehikioya (2009) excluded highly regulated banking sector in a study he undertook. 
However, in the current study, no firms were excluded on this basis and so the results have a 
caution on this ground. 
In measuring corporate performance, we used accounting based measures of 
performance. Developed as a reporting mechanism, the measures represent the impact of 
many factors including the past successes of advice given from the board to the 
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management team and are the traditional mainstay of corporate performance measures. 
Examples used in the governance literature include return on assets (Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003), earnings per share (Pearce and Zahra, 1991), and return on equity (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985). In general, the major concern with accounting measures is that they are 
historical and so lag the actual actions that bring about the results. ROA, ROE, PE and 
DY were included as measures of corporate performance as this is a common measure 
used in the literature. 
The study assessed the effect of board composition and corporate performance and the 
influence of individual board of directors' demographic characteristics on performance 
separately. We did not assess the joint effect of the independent variables on corporate 
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performance. Further, in measuring performance, the study had proposed to use four 
financial measures of performance namely return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), dividend yield (DY) and price-earnings (PE) ratio. The study established that the 
most applicable measures of performance are the Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on 
Equity (ROE). 
7.6 Recommendations for Future Research Directions 
Future research should address the limitations of this study. Several extensions to this 
study are possible. First, the study focused only on certain set of board attributes for their 
impact on firm performance. The starting point is to consider the board as an active 
participant in corporate governance, and we suggest there is a need for further 
investigation into the relationships between the different agents involved in the direction 
of the company, namely the top management teams (TMT) and the board. 
Secondly, future board researchers could build on this study's findings on directors' 
functional area knowledge and plunge deeper into the role of international exposures as it 
applies to boards of directors. The researchers should explore antecedents of board 
decision quality including functional area knowledge, cognitive conflict, and information 
quality. The relationships between board culture, directors' cohesion, and cognitive 
conflict should also be explored. 
Third, women representation sitting on the boards of the listed firms in Kenya was found 
to be low compared to other developed countries. It appears that the Kenyan firms may 
not leverage on gender diversity on their boards for more skills base. Future research 
should consider the role of women on boards and dynamics of their presence on the 
board, which requires an observational and qualitative study. 
Fourth, board meetings were found to be beneficial in large firms but not so in the small 
firms. Board responsibilities take place not only in meetings but also in committees and 
informally before and after these meetings (Bathula, 2008). It is beneficial to examine 
various aspects of committees: how the committees were constituted, if they are 
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substitutes for board meetings, formal and informal functions of committees. Findings 
from such studies will improve future scholars' understanding of linkages between board 
diligence and firm performance. 
Fifth, board members composition is changed for a variety of reasons such as member's 
resignations, infusion of new skills through insiders and outsiders and board diversity. 
Further, the Capital Markets Authority released Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
Practices by Listed Companies in Kenya in 2002 (CMA, 2002). After a passage of nine to 
ten years, it is about time to examine the effect of these principles on firms adhering to 
those principles compared to those which ignore them. 
The current study did not examine the joint effect board composition and board of 
directors' demographic characteristics on corporate performance. We recommend that 
future researchers carry out studies to establish the relationship among either listed firms 
or other organizations in different contexts 
Finally, the study has examined the impact of board variables on firm performance, as 
measured by return on assets, return on equity, dividend yield and Price-Earnings. It may 
be useful to re-examine this further using other market based performance variables such 
as Tobin's Q and compare the relationship (Bathula, 2008). This may be particularly 
useful in fluctuating markets and how firms change the board characteristics in response 
to changes in firm performance. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix la: Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) Listing of Firms in the Main 
Investment Market Segment 
Agricultural Commercial and 
Services 
Finance and 
Investments 
Industrial and 
Allied 
1 Rea Vipingo Car and General (K) Barclays Bank Athi River Mining 
2 Kakuzi CMC Holdings CFC Bank BOC Kenya 
3 Sasini Tea & 
Coffee 
Kenya Airways Diamond Trust 
Bank (K) 
Bamburi Cement 
4 Marshalls E.A. Housing Finance 
Co. 
Carbacid 
Investments 
5 Nation Media Group Jubilee Insurance 
Co. 
Crown Berger 
6 TPS Serena Kenya Commercial 
Bank (K) 
Kengen Ltd 
7 Uchumi 
Supermarkets 
(Suspended) 
National Bank E.A. Cables 
8 Hutchings Biemer 
(Suspended) 
NIC Bank E.A. Portland 
Cement 
9 Access Kenya Group Standard Chartered 
Bank 
E.A. Breweries 
10 ScanGroup Ltd Pan Africa 
Insurance Holdings 
Firestone 
E.A./Sameer Africa 
11 Safaricom Ltd Centum 
Investment 
Kenya 
Oil/KenolKobil 
12 Olympia Capital Mumias Sugar Co. 
13 Co-operative Bank 
Ltd 
Kenya Power & 
Lighting Co 
14 Kenya Re-
Insurance 
Total Kenya Ltd 
15 Equity Bank Unga Group 
16 British American 
Tobacco 
17 Eveready East 
Africa Ltd 
Source: Listed Companies (accessed April 9, 2010); available from 
http://www.nse.co.ke/ListedCompanies.htm. 
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Append ix lb: Sampled (NSE) Listed Firms 
1 Access Kenya Ltd 
2 Athi River Mining 
3 Bamburi Cement 
4 Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd 
5 BAT Kenya Ltd 
6 BOC Gases 
7 Car & General 
8 Carbacid Investments 
9 Centum Investments 
10 CfC Stanbic Bank 
11 CMC Motors 
12 Co-operative Bank 
13 Crown Berger 
14 EA Cables Ltd 
15 East African Breweries Ltd 
16 East African Portland Cement Company 
17 Equity Bank 
18 Eveready Ltd 
19 Housing Finance 
20 Kakuzi limited 
21 Kenya Commercial Bank 
22 Kengen Ltd 
23 Kenya Airways 
24 Kenya Re-Insurance 
25 Kenya Power Ltd 
26 Marshalls EA 
27 Mumias Sugar Co. Ltd 
28 Nation Media Group 
29 National Bank ofKenya 
30 NIC Bank 
31 Olympia Capital 
32 Pan Africa Insurance 
33 Rea Vipingo 
34 Safaricom Ltd 
35 Sameer Africa 
36 Sasini Ltd 
37 Scan Group 
38 Total Kenya 
39 TPS Serena 
40 Unga Limited 
Source: Current Researcher (2011) 
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Appendix 2a: University Introductory Letter 
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES 
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS 
Tele*: 22095 Varsity 
18th April, 2011 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
INTRODUCTORY LETTER FOR RESEARCH 
NICHOLAS K. LETTING - REGISTRATION NO. D80/8548/2006 
The above named is a bona fide PhD student in the School of Business, University of 
Nairobi. 
In partial fulfilment of the requirements of the PhD Degree he is conducting research on 
"The Board of Directors' Attributes, Strategic Decision-Making and Corporate 
Performance of Firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange". 
We request your organisation to assist the student with necessary data which forms an 
integral part of the research project. The information and data required is needed for 
academic purposes only and will be treated in Strict-Confidence. A copy of the 
research project will be made available to your organization/firm upon request. 
Your co-operation will be highly appreciated. 
Telephone: 4184160-5 Ext 215 
Telegrams: "Varsity" Nairobi 
P.O. Box 30197 
Nairobi, KENYA 
Thank you. 
ASSOCIATE DEAN, SCHOOL OF BUSINESS 
EA/rm 
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Appendix 2b: Researcher's Introductory Letter 
To Whom It May Concern 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
RE: BOARD OF DIRECTORS' ATTRIBUTES, STRATEGIC DECISION-
MAKING AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS LISTED IN THE 
NAIROBI STOCK EXCHANGE 
I am a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) candidate in the Department of Business 
Administration, School of Business, University of Nairobi. As part of the requirement for 
the award of the degree, I am expected to undertake a research study on an identified 
contemporary topic. I am asking for your participation in a study that examines Board of 
Directors' attributes of companies listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The purpose of 
the study is to assess how the Board of Directors' attributes determine strategic decisions 
of the companies they lead. The Board's operating environments, Board involvement in 
strategic decision-making and firm characteristics and their influence on corporate 
performance over a period of four years (2006-2009) will also be reviewed. 
The attached questionnaire will take about twenty minutes only to complete. Kindly 
answer all the questions as completely as possible. The research results will be used for 
academic purposes only and will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Only summary 
results will be made public. No one, except the institution will have access to these 
records. 
Should you require the summary, kindly indicate so at the end of the questionnaire. A self 
-addressed envelope is provided for your reply. Your co-operation was appreciated. 
Yours sincerely, 
Nicholas Kibiwott Letting' 
Doctoral Candidate 
E-mail: nletting@kim.ac.ke or nicletting@yahoo.com or nletting@gmail.com 
Mobile No. +254 722 284 133. 
P.O. Box 43706-00100, NAIROBI 
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Appendix 2c: NCST Research Authorization 
REPUBLIC OF KENYA 
NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
Telef runs: "SCIENCETECH", Nairobi 
Telephone: 254-020-241349. 2213 102 
254-020-310571.2213123. P.O.Box 30«23-00l00 
Fax: 254-020-22132 IS, 318245,319249 NAIROBI-KENYA 
When replying please quote Webiile: www.ncit.|o.ke 
O u r Ref. D a l e ; 
NCST/RRI/12/1/SS-011/551/4 4th May, 2011 
Nicholas Kibiwott Lclling' 
University of Nairobi 
P. O. Box 30197-00100 
NAIROBI 
RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION 
Following your application for authority to carry out research on "The 
board of directors' attributes, strategic decision-making & corporate 
performance of firms listed in the Nairobi Stock Exchange" I am 
pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake 
research in Nairobi Province for a period ending 3(/'' June, 2011. 
You are advised to report to all the Corporation Secretaries/Chief 
Executive Officers/Chairmen of the selected firms in Nairobi 
Province before embarking on the research project. 
On completion of the research, you are expected to submit one hard 
copy and one soft copy of the research report/thesis to our office. 
P. N. NYAKUNDI 
FOR: SECRETARY/CEO 
Copy t0:r 
The Corporation Secretaries/Chief Executive Secretaries 
Selected Firms listed in the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
The Chairmen 
Selected Firms which are listed in the Nairobi Stock Exchange 
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Appendix 2d: Research Clearance Permit 
PACE 2 PAGE 3 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT: 
Pro ( . /Dr . /MryMr S . /Ml s S . .NICHOHS.KIBIWOTT 
L E T T I N G 
of (Address). UNIVERSITY,OF...NAIROBI 
?.OX..M.I.?.7..MI?.Qbi.,.. 
has been permitted to conduct research In 
Location, 
NAI.K<?.?I District, 
NM.Rff.BJ Province, 
on the 
A T T R I B U T E S S T R A T E G I C D E C I S I O N -
MAKING & C O R P 0 RATE PERFORMAfJCE 
O F . . F I . R M S . . L I S T E D I N THE.,NAI.ROB.I 
STOCK EXCHANGE, 
for a period ending 2 0 1 1 
N C S T / R R I / 1 2 / 1 / S S - 0 H / 5 7 9 
Research Permit No „i 
Date o. issue...!/1?/2011 
FeereceivedKSHS.-.lOOO. 
Applicant's 
Signature 
'Secretary 
National Council fur 
Science and Technology 
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Appendix 3: Research Questionnaire 
This questionnaire was designed to collect data from companies that are listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange. The data was analyzed to establish Board of Directors' 
Attributes, Strategic Decision-Making and Corporate Performance of Firms Listed 
on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. The data shall be used for academic purposes only, and 
will be treated with strict confidence. Your participation in facilitating the study is highly 
appreciated. All information in this questionnaire will remain absolutely confidential and 
will be seen only by academic researchers involved in this study. 
Name of Organization: (Optional) 
Address and Location: 
SECTION A: COMPANY'S BACKGROUND (Questions 1-5) 
Q l : How many full-time employees are in your company? 
Q2: When was your company established? 
Q3: When was your company listed in the Nairobi Stock Exchange? 
Q4: In what sector of economic activity is your firm engaged? (Tick only one) 
a) Agriculture d.) Commercial and Services 
b) Financial and Investments e.) Industrial and Allied 
c) Alternative Investment Market Segment 
f.) Others (please specify) 
Q5: Please fill in the table below by indicating your firm's annual sales turnover and the 
annual sales domestically in Kenya Shillings (KShs) and by indicating the annual sales 
turnover per market segment domestically and internationally approximately: 
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Annual sales turnover 
(KShs) 
Domestic sales turnover 
(KShs) 
Domestic sales () 
International sales () 
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SECTION B: BOARD COMPOSITION (Questions 6 - 12) 
Q6: What is the total number of the current board members? 
Q7: What is the number of Executive Directors sitting on the Board including the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO)? 
Q8: How many of the Non-Executive Directors are independent? 
Q9: A) Who appoints Board Members? a) Nominating Committee b) Shareholders 
c) Annual General Meeting (AGM) d) Others Specify 
B) Are Board members given Letters of Appointment spelling out clearly what their 
role is including their terms and conditions of engagement? Yes () No () 
C) What considerations are used in the appointment of Board members? Tick the 
appropriate 
a.) Skills b.) Experience c.) Qualifications d.) Others Specify 
D) What is the period of service of directors? 
a Three years c Five years E Others Specify 
b Four years d Six years F Others Specify 
E) Upon expiry of their first term are directors eligible for appointment? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) 
If yes, for how many more terms? a) One b) two c) three d) indefinite 
Q10: a.) Does the Board observe gender parity in appointment of Board members? 
Yes ( ) No ( ) 
b.) Please, indicate the ratio of male to female board members 
Q11: How many board members in your company are interlocking directors? 
(Interlocking are Board members that sit on more than two boards of listed firms) 
Q12: Are the Positions of CEO and Chairman held by the same person? 
• Y E S • NO 
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SECTION C: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
BOARD (Questions 13 - 16) ( P l e a s e p r o v i d e u s w i t h s o m e i n f o r m a t i o n r e g a r d i n g 
b o a r d m e m b e r s ' p e r s o n a l d e m o g r a p h i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) 
Q13: a) Please, specify the age of the oldest directors in your company 
b) Please, specify the age of the youngest director in your company 
c) Please, indicate in the fo lowing table number of directors in each age bracket 
Age Number of board members 
Below 30 years 
30 to 35 years 
35 to 40 years 
40 to 50 years 
51 to 60 years 
61 to 70 years 
Over 70 years 
Q14: Please indicate how many board members have the following as the highest level 
of educational level? 
a. High-school graduate ' 
b. Bachelor's Degree (Or its equivalent such as Higher National Diploma) 
c. Masters 
d. PhD (Doctorate) 
Q15: Please, indicate how many board members have the following area of study at 
tertiary level of education. 
Area of study Number of 
board 
members 
Area of study Number of 
board 
members 
Architecture Law 
Business Administration Marketing 
Education Medical science 
Engineering Social Science 
Others (Specify) 
Q16: From the following list please, indicate the number of board members in each 
category of specialization. 
Specialization Number of board 
members 
Specialization Number of board 
members 
Finance Information systems 
Human Resources Operations 
Public Affairs General Management 
Marketing Accounting 
Legal Field Service 
Others (Specify) Others (Specify) 
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SECTION D: OPERATING AND BOARD ENVIRONMENT 
Q17: Please, indicate the extent to which you agree with statement that your firm board 
members operate under the following circumstances (1= strongly disagree, 5=strongly 
agree). 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
D
is
ag
re
e 
D
is
ag
re
e 
N
ei
th
er
 
A
gr
ee
 
nn
r 
A
gr
ee
 
St
ro
ng
ly
 
A
gr
ee
 
> Board Culture 
a. In our Board meetings we respect other 
Members' views ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
b. The Chairman allows all members equal 
opportunities to contribute to 
discussions ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
c. Most meetings are held in a timely () () () () () 
manner 
d. New members undergo an induction on 
procedures and rules of the Board () () () () () 
e. Board members are punctual in full board 
and in committee meetings ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
f . The chairman dominates the meeting () () () () () 
> Access to Information 
a. Board members receive the annual 
calendar of events * ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
b. Board members are briefed monthly by 
management on issues of strategic importance 
and company performance ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
c. Our company has a Corporate Governance 
Structure ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
d. Board members access the company 
database when they want ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
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Formal independence 
a. Board members have not been employed 
by the company within the last five years () 
b. Board members declare conflict of interest 
where there is a possibility of such an 
occurrence ( ) 
c. Non-Executive Directors have a 
fixed term office () 
J* 
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18) BOARD OF DIRECTORS' OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
T o w h a t e x t e n t d o y o u t h i n k t h e f o l l o w i n g a s p e c t s o r f e a t u r e s o f b o a r d o p e r a t i n g 
e n v i r o n m e n t a p p l y t o y o u r f i r m ? 
<L> 
> a H 
m ™ <L y <U O , t * H O t t 
a S 
E 
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E- W 
<3 
E 
" c 
« W 
O X 
H W 
cd 
ea 
o 
z 
a. Frequent exit of board members per year( ) 
b. Board disagreements () 
c. Erratic board meetings () 
d. Political interference () 
e. Technology usage by board members to 
obtain information on firms in the same 
industry is high () 
f. 
g-
J-
k. 
The Board discourages group thinking () 
The Board encourages contrarian views 
by members () 
Ineffective participation of Board members 
at board meetings () 
Control of management by board () 
jm 
Control of board by management () 
Failure of the Board to follow up on previous 
resolutions ( ) 
1. The Board evaluates individual Director's 
Performance quarterly () 
1 7 3 
SECTION E: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS' INVOLVEMENT IN 
THE STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
Q19: Please, indicate the extent to which you believe that the board of directors 
participates in the formulation and the evaluation of your company's strategic decision. 
Circle only one choice. 
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I. Strategic Planning Decisions 
a. The Board usually ratifies strategic proposals 
from top management teams (TMTs) () ( ) 0 () () 
b. The Board usually assists top management in 
the formulation of strategic decisions within 
and between board meetings () ( ) 0 0 0 
c. The Board does not usually involve the 
management in the formulation of strategic 
decisions. ( ) () () () () 
II. Performance Evaluation of Prior Strategic Decisions 
a. The Board is usually involved in the 
implementation of the strategic decisions () () () ( ) 0 
b. 
c. 
The Board is usually involved with the 
monitoring of the progress of 
strategic decisions 0 
The Board usually determines the timing 
of the evaluation and seeks more details () 
() () 
() () 
() 
() 
() 
() 
The Board usually determines the criteria of the 
evaluation and requests additional information 
from the top management team(TMT) () () () () () 
The Board usually independently assesses 
and ascertains the progress of the strategic 
decisions ( ) ( ) 0 () () 
1 7 4 
Q 2 0 : P l e a s e , i n d i c a t e t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h y o u b e l i e v e t h a t y o u r f i r m p u r s u e s t h e 
f o l l o w i n g a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n t h e b o a r d a g e n d a 
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d. Pre-determined criteria for strategic decision 
evaluation () 
3 C/3 •«-» 
O 
I. Capital Allocation 
a. Use of financial discounting methods 
For capital budgeting () () () () () 
b. Use of payback period for 
capital investments () () () () () 
c. Use of Net Present Value (NPV) 
Technique in identifying worthy 
projects 0 () () () () 
d. Use of checklists to identify projects 
To invest in () () () () () 
II. Lone Ranee-Plannine 
a. Formal procedures to identify alternative 
Ways of action () () () 0 () 
b. 
Formal screening procedures () () () () () 
Formal documents guiding the final decision() () () () () 
() () () () 
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Q 2 1 : P l e a s e , i n d i c a t e t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e f o l l o w i n g i n d i v i d u a l s / g r o u p s o r d e p a r t m e n t s 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s i n y o u r f i r m 
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I. Manpower Planning 
a. Owner/Shareholders 
b. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
c. First level directors (Immediately below 
CEO) 
d. Middle level management 
e. Lower level management 
f. Finance-Accounting department 
g. Production department 
h. Human resources department 
i. Purchasing department 
j. Management consulting firms 
1 7 6 
SECTION F: STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES 
(Questions 22 — 2 7 ) . I n t h i s s e c t i o n , w e s e e k i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e a c t i v i t i e s w h i c h y o u r 
B o a r d o f D i r e c t o r s p u r s u e s i n t h e s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s . 
Q22: Please, indicate how often the Board meetings are held in a year (Tick only one 
choice): 
a Once a year c Quarterly e Every two weeks 
b Every six months d Monthly f Weekly 
Q23: Please, indicate the average duration in hours per board meeting (Circle only one): 
a Full day c Two hours e 30 minutes 
b Half day d One hour f Less than 30 minutes 
Q24: Please, indicate if you have the following Board committees. Tick as many as you 
have and add the ones you have but not listed. 
a Audit, Risk 
Management and 
Governance 
c Nomination, 
Compensation and 
Remuneration 
e Others, 
specify 
b Finance and Investments d Others, 
specify 
f Others, 
specify 
Q25: How often does the management provide information to the Board (Circle only 
one): 
a Monthly c Every six months e Others, Specify 
b Quarterly " d Once a year 
Q26: When are the minutes of previous board meeting circulated (Circle only one): 
a Two weeks after the 
board meeting 
c Two months after the 
board meeting 
e A day prior to the next 
board meeting 
b One month after the 
board meeting 
d Three months after the 
board meeting 
f During the next board 
meeting 
g Two weeks before the 
next meeting 
1 7 7 
Q 2 7 a ) : W i t h i n t h e l a s t t w e l v e m o n t h s , w h i c h o f t h e f o l l o w i n g ( A g e n d a ) t o p i c s h a s 
( h a v e ) o c c u p i e d m o s t o f t h e b o a r d ' s t i m e ? ( R a n k t h e m i n o r d e r o f f r e q u e n c y t h e f i r s t o n e 
b e i n g t h e m o s t c o m m o n a g e n d a ) 
Agenda Rank 
Major Capital Investments 
Corporate Strategy Plans 
Assets and Financial Viability 
Executive Compensation 
Risk Management 
Shareholder Relations 
CEO Performance 
Directors' Appointments 
Succession Planning for Top Management Teams 
Succession Planning for Retiring Board Members 
Filling the Chairman's position 
Others, Specify 
Q27 b.): What areas do you think that your firm needs to improve to enhance Corporate 
Governance? Tick the main ones only. 
Area Tick 
Management of Strategic Change/Ability to improve change Management 
Board Composition 
Appointment of Board Members 
Commitment and Engagement of Individual Directors 
Willingness to address Board Performance 
Skills mix of Board members 
Gender Parity 
Leadership Structure 
Others, Specify 
1 7 8 
SECTION G: COMPANY'S FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (Question 
2 8 ) . I n t h i s s e c t i o n , w e s e e k i n f o r m a t i o n o n y o u r f i r m ' s p e r f o r m a n c e d u r i n g t h e l a s t 
F O U R y e a r s . 
Q28: Please, tick in each category the box estimating to the best of your knowledge how 
your company compares to its close competitors in your industry over the last four years. 
Lower 20 Middle 
Lower 20 
Middle 20 Middle top 
20 
Top 20 
After-tax 
return on 
total assets 
After-tax 
return on 
total sales 
Firm's total 
sales growth 
Dividends 
per share 
Overall firm 
performance 
and success 
* 
Your firm's 
competitive 
position 
1 7 9 
(Question 29) I f y o u w o u l d l i k e t o m a k e a n y o t h e r c o m m e n t s r e g a r d i n g a n y o f t h e 
i t e m s i n c l u d e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n n a i r e , p l e a s e w r i t e t h e m i n t h e s p a c e p r o v i d e d b e l o w . 
Do you wish to receive a complimentary copy of results of this study? 
[ ] Yes [ ] No 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY 
Please return this completed questionnaire in the self-addressed envelope provided. 
1 8 0 
Appendix 4: Definitions of Key Terms Used 
Board of Directors' Attributes: They refer to both board composition and Board of 
Directors' demographic characteristics. 
Board Composition: this refers to the structure of a corporate board. The structure 
includes the board size, the number of Executive Directors, the number of Non -
Executive Directors, number of Independent Directors, the number of Inter-locking 
Directors and CEO Duality and the Appointment Criteria 
Board Demographic Characteristics: these are individual attributes of board members. 
In this study, they refer to age, gender, educational qualification and area of 
specialization of each board member. 
Board Operating Environment: this refers to the situation or condition in which board 
members conduct their operations. They include board culture, and access to information 
that aid in decision-making. 
Formal Independence: this refers to the degree of freedom to make objective decisions 
by board members. This is where no conflicts of interest are expected to arise in the 
board. A board member should not have been an employee of the company where he/she 
is a member over the last five years. 
Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-Making: this refers to the way in which 
board members participate in decision-making at the board level. This includes setting 
board agenda, board meetings and board committees. 
Firm Characteristics: They refer to the general features of firms. In the current study, 
they include Firm age, Firm Size and the Sector in which the organization is categorized 
into using the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) classification 
jm 
Corporate Performance: this refers to corporation's business results over a period of 
one accounting/financial year. The results were computed based on pre-determined 
measures namely Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Dividend Yield 
(DY) and Price-Earnings (PE) Ratio. ROA is measured by computing net income or 
profits after tax divided by total assets. ROE is computed as net income or profit after tax 
divided by total equity. DY is computed by dividend per share divided by market price 
per share. PE Ratio is calculated by market price per share divided by earnings per share. 
In the current study, the performance was computed as an average of a four-year financial 
result using the four measures. 
In the current study, the term Corporate was used interchangeably with Firm and 
Organization 
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Appendix 5: Model Summary for Board Composition and ROE 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R 
Model R R Square Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .845' .714 .624 7.00816 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 5a: ANOVA for Board Composition and R O E 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2329.244 6 388.207 7.904 .000" 
Residual 933.171 19 49.114 
Total 3262.415 25 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 5b: Coefficients of Board Composition and R O E 
Coefficients' 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -8.254 7.174 -1.150 .264 
BDSIZE .305 .775 .056 .394 .698 
EXEDIRNO. 9.782 2.371 .555 4.126 .001 
NONEXIND 2.616 5.092 .081 .514 .613 
INTERLOCKING 11.654 4.878 .323 2.389 .027 
CEODUALITY -17.426 5.985 -.415 -2.911 .009 
Who appoints 
Board Members 
3.885 2.965 .171 1.310 .206 
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 5: Model Summary for Board Composition and ROE 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R 
Model R R Square Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .772' .597 .469 8.89022 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 6a: ANOVA for Board Composition and ROA 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2222.113 6 370.352 4.686 .004' 
Residual 1501.685 19 79.036 
Total 3723.798 25 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 6b: Coefficients of Board Composition and ROA 
Coefficients" 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -4.576 9.101 -.503 .621 
BDSIZE .099 .984 .017 .101 .921 
EXEDIRNO. 11.254 3.007 .598 3.742 .001 
NONEXIND 1.998 6.460 .058 .309 .760 
INTERLOCKING 13.464 6.188 .349 2.176 .042 
CEODUALITY -13.611 7.593 -.303 -1.793 .089 
Who appoints 
Board Members 
1.462 3.761 .060 .389 .702 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 5: Model Summary for Board Composition and ROE 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R 
Model R R Square Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .432* .187 -.070 2.33976 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 7a: ANOVA for Board Composition and DY 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 23.919 6 3.987 .728 .633* 
Residual 104.015 19 5.474 
Total 127.934 25 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 7b: Coefficients of Board Composition and DY 
Coefficients" 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sis. 
1 (Constant) 1.699 2.395 .709 .487 
BDSIZE .021 .259 .020 .083 .935 
EXEDIRNO. 1.006 .791 .288 1.272 .219 
NONEXIND .392 1.700 .061 .230 .820 
INTERLOCKING -1.000 1.629 -.140 -.614 .547 
CEODUALITY -1.956 1.998 -.235 -.979 .340 
Who appoints 
Board Members 
-.341 .990 -.076 -.344 .734 
a. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 5: Model Summary for Board Composition and ROE 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R 
Model R R Square Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .666' .444 .269 21.61741 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 8b: ANOVA for Board Composition and PE 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sis. 
1 Regression 7093.409 6 1182.235 2.530 .057' 
Residual 8878.933 19 467.312 
Total 15972.34 
2 
25 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 8c: Coefficients of Board Composition and PE 
Coefficients* 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sis. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 29.871 22.130 1.350 .193 
BDSIZE -2.897 2.392 -.240 -1.211 .241 
EXEDIRNO. m -4.303 7.312 -.110 -.589 .563 
NONEXIND 30.937 15.708 .434 1.970 .064 
INTERLOCKING 2.542 15.047 .032 .169 .868 
CEODUALITY -36.075 18.462 -.388 -1.954 .066 
Who appoints 
Board Members 
-.805 9.146 -.016 -.088 .931 
a. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
1 8 5 
Appendix 10: Model Summary of Board Demographic Characteristics and ROA 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .267' .071 -.150 11.54185 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board Specialization, FEMALEBMP, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 9a: ANOVA for Board Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
ANOVAb 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sis. 
1 Regression 214.798 5 42.960 .322 .894' 
Residual 2797.498 21 133.214 
Total 3012.297 26 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board Specialization, FEMALEBMP, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 9b: Coefficients of Board Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Coefficients" 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3.215 48.105 .067 .947 
LnCUMAGE 1.034 3.450 .068 .300 .767 
FEMALEBMP -16.278 28.305 -.130 -.575 .571 
EDUC * -1.768 5.932 -.072 -.298 .769 
Board Study 
Specialization 
1.298 1.829 .159 .710 .486 
Board 
Specialization 
-.939 1.184 -.201 -.793 .437 
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 10: Model Summary of Board Demographic Characteristics and ROA 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .316' .100 -.114 11.26783 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board Specialization, FEMALEBMP, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 10a: ANOVA for Board Demographic Characteristics and ROA 
ANOVA b 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 296.292 5 59.258 .467 .797' 
Residual 2666.242 21 126.964 
Total 2962.534 26 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board Specialization, FEMALEBMP, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 10b: Coefficients of Board Demographic Characteristics and ROA 
Coefficients" 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 
•v 
(Constant) -5.805 46.963 -.124 .903 
LnCUMAGE 1.181 3.368 .078 .351 .729 
FEMALEBMP 1.185 27.633 .010 .043 .966 
EDUC M 6.774 5.791 .279 1.170 .255 
Board Study 
Specialization 
1.596 1.786 .198 .894 .382 
Board 
Specialization 
-1.288 1.156 -.278 -1.115 .278 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 10: Model Summary of Board Demographic Characteristics and ROA 
IVlodel Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .486* .236 .054 2.25938 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board Specialization, FEMALEBMP, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 11a: ANOVA for Board Demographic Characteristics and DY 
ANOVA b 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sis. 
1 Regression 33.105 5 6.621 1.297 .303" 
Residual 107.201 21 5.105 
Total 140.305 26 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board Specialization, FEMALEBMP, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix l i b : Coefficients of Board Demographic Characteristics and DY 
Coefficients" 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) -.197 9.417 -.021 .984 
LnCUMAGE .212 .675 .064 .314 .756 
FEMALEBMP'" -1.347 5.541 -.050 -.243 .810 
EDUC 2.083 1.161 .394 1.794 .087 
Board Study 
Specialization 
-.488 .358 -.277 -1.362 .188 
Board 
Specialization 
-.135 .232 -.134 -.583 .566 
a. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 12: Model Summary of Board Demographic Characteristics and PE 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .467' .218 .032 19.11776 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board Specialization, FEMALEBMP, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 12a: ANOVA for Board Demographic Characteristics and PE 
ANOVA b 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Si*. 
1 Regression 2139.634 5 427.927 1.171 .356' 
Residual 7675.266 21 365.489 
Total 9814.900 26 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Board Specialization, FEMALEBMP, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 12b: Coefficients of Board Demographic Characteristics and PE 
Coefficients" 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -108.072 79.680 -1.356 .189 
LnCUMAGE 8.357 5.715 .302 1.462 .158 
FEMALEBMJfc 46.557 46.884 .206 .993 .332 
EDUC -7.684 9.825 -.174 -.782 .443 
Board Study 
Specialization 
3.752 3.030 .255 1.238 .229 
Board 
Specialization 
.420 1.961 .050 .214 .832 
a. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 13b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on ROE 
Model Summary1 
Change Statistics 
Adjusted R 
R R Std. Error of the Square F Sig. F 
Model R Square Square Estimate Change Change dfl df2 Change 
1 .845" .714 .624 7.00816 .714 7.904 6 19 .000 
2 .955" .913 .833 4.67459 .199 4.951 6 13 .008 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND, BDSIZEXBINVOL, CEODUALXBINVOL, INTLOCKXBINVOL, BordappXBINVOL, 
EXEDIRXBINVOL, NONEXINDXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 13a: ANOVA for Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on ROE 
ANOVAc 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2329.244 6 388.207 7.904 .000' 
Residual 933.171 19 49.114 
Total 3262.415 25 
2 Regression 2978.342 12 248.195 11.358 .000" 
Residual 284.073 13 21.852 
Total 3262.415 25 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND, BDSIZEXBINVOL, QfODUALXBINVOL, INTLOCKXBINVOL, BordappXBINVOL, 
EXEDIRXBINVOL, NONEXINDXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 13b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on ROE 
Coefficients* 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sis. 
1 (Constant) -8.254 7.174 -1.150 .264 
BDSIZE .305 .775 .056 .394 .698 
EXEDIRNO. 9.782 2.371 .555 4.126 .001 
NONEX1ND 2.616 5.092 .081 .514 .613 
INTERLOCKING 11.654 4.878 .323 2.389 .027 
CEODUALITY -17.426 5.985 -.415 -2.911 .009 
Who appoints Board 
Members 
3.885 2.965 .171 1.310 .206 
2 (Constant) 1.253 5.269 .238 .816 
BDSIZE .242 1.130 .044 .214 .834 
EXEDIRNO. .092 4.563 .005 .020 .984 
NONEXIND 22.077 12.378 .685 1.784 .098 
INTERLOCKING -12.057 11.741 -.334 -1.027 .323 
CEODUALITY -17.663 10.381 -.420 -1.702 .113 
Who appoints Board 
Members 
28.871 9.255 1.273 3.119 .008 
BDSIZEXBINVOL -.749 .593 -.540 -1.263 .229 
EXEDIRXBINVOL 6.783 3.021 .933 2.246 .043 
NONEXINDXBINVOL -12.408 6.397 -.878 -1.940 .074 
INTLOCKXBINVOL 14.512 4.715 1.132 3.078 .009 
CEODUALXBINVOL -1.467 3.865 -.096 -.380 .710 
BordappXBINVOL -13.733 4.594 -1.205 -2.989 .010 
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data " 
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Appendix 17d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Excluded Variables '1 
Model Beta In t Sin. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearit 
y Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 BDSIZEXBINVOL - .112 ' - .737 .470 - 171 .673 
EXEDIRXBINVOL -.049" - .287 .777 - .068 .551 
NONEXINDXBINV 
OL 
- .029 ' - .139 .891 -.033 .374 
INTLOCKXBINVOL .488' 1 442 .167 .322 124 
C E 0 D U A L X B 1 N V 0 
L 
-.328" -1.041 .312 -.238 .151 
BordappXBINVOL -1 .227 ' -3.169 .005 - .598 068 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), W h o appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO. , CEODUAL1TY, 
N O N E X I N D 
b. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 13d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on ROE 
Residuals Statistics' 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -18.1300 40.8656 14.7008 10.91484 26 
Residual -7.08998 10.57567 .00000 3.37090 26 
Std. Predicted 
Value 
-3.008 2.397 .000 1.000 26 
Std. Residual -1.517 2.262 .000 .721 26 
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 13b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decis ion-Making on ROE 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: ROE% 
- 1 0 1 2 
Regression Standardized Residual 
Source: Research Data 
Mean =-2.80E-15 
Std. Dev . =0.721 
N - 2 6 
1 9 3 
Appendix 13b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on ROE 
Model Summary0 
Change Statistics 
Adjusted R 
R R Std. Error of the Square F Sig.F 
Model R Square Square Estimate Change Change dfl df2 Change 
1 .772" .597 .469 8.89022 .597 4.686 6 19 .004 
2 ,912b .832 .678 6.92861 .236 3.047 6 13 .044 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND, BDSIZEXBINVOL, CEODUALXBINVOL, INTLOCKXBINVOL, BordappXBINVOL, 
EXEDIRXBINVOL, NONEXINDXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 14a: ANOVA for Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on ROA 
ANOVAc 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F SiK-
1 Regression 2222.113 6 370.352 4.686 .004" 
Residual 1501.685 19 79.036 
Total 3723.798 25 
2 Regression 3099.725 12 258.310 5.381 .003" 
Residual 624.074 13 48.006 
Total 3723.798 25 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND, BDSIZEXBINVOL/CEODUALXBINVOL, INTLOCKXBINVOL, BordappXBINVOL, 
EXEDIRXBINVOL, NONEXINDXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
1 9 4 
Appendix 13b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on ROE 
Coefficients" 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) -4.576 9.101 -.503 .621 
BDSIZE .099 .984 .017 .101 .921 
EXEDIRNO. 11.254 3.007 .598 3.742 .001 
NONEXIND 1.998 6.460 .058 .309 .760 
INTERLOCKING 13.464 6.188 .349 2.176 .042 
CEODUALITY -13.611 7.593 -.303 -1.793 .089 
Who appoints Board 
Members 
1.462 3.761 .060 .389 .702 
2 (Constant) 4.669 7.809 .598 .560 
BDSIZE .271 1.675 .046 .162 .874 
EXEDIRNO. 4.696 6.763 .249 .694 .500 
NONEXIND 14.288 18.346 .415 .779 .450 
INTERLOCKING -6.127 17.402 -.159 -.352 .730 
CEODUALITY -37.056 15.386 -.825 -2.408 .032 
Who appoints Board 
Members 
34.452 13.718 1.422 2.511 .026 
BDSIZEXBINVOL -.938 .879 -.633 -1.068 .305 
EXEDIRXBINVOL 5.575 4.477 .718 1.245 .235 
NONEXINDXBINVOL -9.715 9.482 -.643 -1.025 .324 
INTLOCKXBINVOL 14.470 6.988 1.057 2.071 .059 
CEODUALXBINVOL 7.631 5.728 .467 1.332 .206 
BordappXBINVOL -17.522 6.809 -1.439 -2.573 .023 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
1 9 5 
Appendix 17d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Excluded Variablesb 
Model Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlatio 
n 
Collineari 
ty 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 BDSIZEXBINVO 
L 
-.187* -1.055 .305 -.241 .673 
EXEDIRXBINVO 
L 
-.145* N)
 
OO
 
.476 -.169 .551 
NONEXINDXBIN 
VOL 
-.136" -.560 .582 -.131 .374 
INTLOCKXBINV 
OL 
.311* .743 .467 .172 .124 
CEODUALXBIN 
VOL 
.036" .092 .927 .022 .151 
BordappXB IN VO 
L 
-1.403" -2.992 .008 -.576 .068 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., 
CEODUALITY, NONEXIND 
b. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 14d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on ROA 
Residuals Statistics' 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -5.3500 45.2957 18.1288 1 1.13503 26 
Residual -11.96547 14.48680 .00000 4.99629 26 
Std. Predicted 
Value 
-2.109 
J* 
2.440 .000 1.000 26 
Std. Residual -1.727 2.091 .000 .721 26 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
1 9 6 
Appendix 14e: Histogram Showing Board Composition and ROA 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: ROA% 
Mean =-8.95E-16 
Std. Dev. =0.721 
N =26 
Regression Standardized Residual 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 15: Summary of Moderating Effects of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board Composition and DY 
Model Summary' 
Change Statistics 
Adjusted R 
R R Std. Error of the Square F Sig. F 
Model R Square Square Estimate Change Change dfl df2 Change 
1 .432' .187 -.070 2.33976 .187 .728 6 19 .633 
2 .626" .391 -.170 2.44720 .204 .728 6 13 .635 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND, BDSIZEXBINVOL, CEODUALXBINVOL, INTLOCKXBINVOL, BordappXBINVOL, 
EXEDIRXBINVOL, NONEXINDXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 15a: ANOVA for Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board Composition and DY 
ANOVAc 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 23.919 6 3.987 .728 .633* 
Residual 104.015 19 5.474 
Total 127.934 25 
2 Regression 50.080 12 4.173 .697 .731" 
Residual 77.854 13 5.989 
Total 127.934 25 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND, BDSIZEXBINVOL, CEQPUALXBINVOL, INTLOCKXBINVOL, BordappXBINVOL, 
EXEDIRXBINVOL, NONEXINDXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
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Appendix 15b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making (SDM) on Board Composition and DY 
Coefficients" 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 1.699 2.395 .709 .487 
BDSIZE .021 .259 .020 .083 .935 
EXEDIRNO. 1.006 .791 .288 1.272 .219 
NONEXIND .392 1.700 .061 .230 .820 
INTERLOCKING -1.000 1.629 -.140 -.614 .547 
CEODUALITY -1.956 1.998 -.235 -.979 .340 
Who appoints Board 
Members 
-.341 .990 -.076 -.344 .734 
2 (Constant) 3.560 2.758 1.291 .219 
BDSIZE .644 .591 .595 1.088 .296 
EXEDIRNO. -3.158 2.389 -.905 -1.322 .209 
NONEXIND -1.451 6.480 -.227 -.224 .826 
INTERLOCKING .321 6.146 .045 .052 .959 
CEODUALITY .124 5.434 .015 .023 .982 
Who appoints Board 
Members 
-2.343 4.845 -.522 -.483 .637 
BDSIZEXBINVOL -.513 .310 -1.865 -1.652 .122 
EXEDIRXBINVOL 2.872 1.581 1.995 1.816 .092 
NONEXINDXBINVOL .836 3.349 .299 .250 .807 
INTLOCKXBINVOL -.532 2.468 -.210 -.216 .833 
CEODUALXBINVOL -.744 2.023 -.246 -.368 .719 
BordappXBINVOL .711 2.405 .315 .296 .772 
a. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data " 
1 9 9 
Appendix 17d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Excluded Variables'" 
Model Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlatio 
n 
CoIIineari 
ty 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 BDSIZEXBINVO 
L 
-.005' -.019 .985 -.005 .673 
EXEDIRXBINVO 
L 
.159" .560 .582 .131 .551 
NONEXINDXBIN 
VOL 
.116' .335 .742 .079 .374 
INTLOCKXB IN V 
OL 
.033" .055 .957 .013 .124 
CEODUALXBIN 
VOL 
-.322' -.595 .559 -.139 .151 
BordappXB IN VO 
L 
-.022" -.027 .978 -.006 .068 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., 
CEODUALITY, NONEXIND 
b. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 15d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board Composition and DY 
Residuals Statistics" 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value .0300 5.8742 3.0535 1.41534 26 
Residual -2.29104 5.74056 .00000 1.76470 26 
Std. Predicted 
Value 
•<e.l36 1.993 .000 1.000 26 
Std. Residual -.936 2.346 .000 .721 26 
a. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
2 0 0 
Appendix 14e: Histogram Showing Board Composition and ROA 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: DY(%) 
0 1 2 
Regression Standardized Residual 
Source: Research Data 
Mean =-7.74E-16 
Std Dev. =0.721 
N =26 
2 0 1 
Appendixl6: Summary of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Price-Earnings (PE) Ratio 
Model Summary' 
Change Statistics 
Adjusted R 
R R Std. Error of the Square F Sig. F 
Model R Square Square Estimate Change Change dfl d(2 Change 
1 .666' .444 .269 21.61741 .444 2.530 6 19 .057 
2 .779" .606 .243 21.99521 .162 .892 6 13 .528 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND, BDSIZEXBINVOL, CEODUALXBINVOL, INTLOCKXBINVOL, BordappXBINVOL, 
EXEDIRXBINVOL, NONEXINDXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 16a: ANOVA for Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Price-Earnings (PE) Ratio 
ANOVAc 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 7093.409 6 1182.235 2.530 .057' 
Residual 8878.933 19 467.312 
Total 15972.342 25 
2 Regression 9683.081 12 806.923 1.668 .186b 
Residual 6289.261 13 483.789 
Total 15972.342 25 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., CEODUALITY, 
NONEXIND, BDSIZEXBINVOL, CEODUALXBINVOL, INTLOCKXBINVOL, BordappXBINVOL, 
EXEDIRXBINVOL, NONEXlffDXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
2 0 2 
Appendix 16b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Price-Earnings (PE) Ratio 
Coefficients" 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sis-
1 (Constant) 29.871 22.130 1.350 .193 
BDSIZE -2.897 2.392 -.240 -1.211 .241 
EXED1RNO. -4.303 7.312 -.110 -.589 .563 
NONEXIND 30.937 15.708 .434 1.970 .064 
INTERLOCKING 2.542 15.047 .032 .169 .868 
CEODUALITY -36.075 18.462 -.388 -1.954 .066 
Who appoints Board 
Members 
-.805 9.146 -.016 -.088 .931 
2 (Constant) 23.095 24.790 .932 .369 
BDSIZE .426 5.316 .035 .080 .937 
EXEDIRNO. 1.331 21.471 .034 .062 .952 
NONEXIND -32.009 58.240 -.449 -.550 .592 
INTERLOCKING 43.124 55.242 .540 .781 .449 
CEODUALITY -119.564 48.845 -1.285 -2.448 .029 
Who appoints Board 
Members 
-15.243 43.549 -.304 -.350 .732 
BDSIZEXBINVOL -1.673 2.790 -.544 -.600 .559 
EXEDIRXBINVOL -.851 14.213 -.053 -.060 .953 
NONEXINDXBINVOL 33.673 30.100 1.077 1.119 .284 
INTLOCKXBINVOL -20.228 22.183 -.713 -.912 .378 
CEODUALXBINVOL 34.615 18.185 1.023 1.904 .079 
BordappXB IN VOL 9.104 21.616 .361 .421 .681 
a. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data'* 
2 0 3 
Appendix 17d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Excluded Variables'" 
Model Beta In t SiK-
Partial 
Correlatio 
n 
Collineari 
ty 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 BDSIZEXBINVO 
L 
.121* .572 .574 .134 .673 
EXEDIRXBINVO 
L 
.133' .566 .578 .132 .551 
NONEXINDXBIN 
VOL 
.125" .438 .666 .103 .374 
INTLOCKXBINV 
OL 
-.185" -.373 .714 -.088 .124 
CEODUALXBIN 
VOL 
.856' 2.115 .049 .446 .151 
BordappXB INVO 
L 
.462' .695 .496 .162 .068 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Who appoints Board Members, BDSIZE, INTERLOCKING, EXEDIRNO., 
CEODUALITY, NONEXIND 
b. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 16d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Price-Earnings (PE) Ratio 
Residuals Statistics' 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -63.6400 55.0806 14.0342 19.68053 26 
Residual -32.55714 44.59941 .00000 15.86097 26 
Std. Predicted 
Value 
-3.947 2.086 .000 1.000 26 
Std. Residual -1.480 2.028 .000 .721 26 
a. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
2 0 4 
Appendix 14e: Histogram Showing Board Composition and ROA 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: P/E 
Mean =2.60E-16 
Std. Dev. =0.721 
N =26 
Regression Standardized Residual 
Source: Research Data 
2 0 5 
Appendix 17b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Model Sum ma rye 
Model R R 
Square 
Adjuste 
dR 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Change Statistics 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change 
dfl df2 Sig. F 
Change 
1 .267a .071 -.150 11.54185 .071 .322 5 21 .894 
2 .675b .455 .115 10.12663 .384 2.256 5 16 .099 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC, 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL, FEMALXBINVOL, BRDSSXBINVOL, BRDSXBINVOL, EDUCXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 17a: ANOVA for Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
ANOVAc 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sis. 
1 Regression 214.798 5 42.960 .322 .894" 
Residual 2797.498 21 133.214 
Total 3012.297 26 
2 Regression 1371.518 10 137.152 1.337 .291" 
Residual 1640.778 16 102.549 
Total 3012.297 26 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC, 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOU? FEMALXBINVOL, BRDSSXBINVOL, BRDSXBINVOL, EDUCXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
2 0 6 
Appendix 17b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Coefficients" 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Si*. 
1 (Constant) 3.215 48.105 .067 .947 
LnCUMAGE 1.034 3.450 .068 .300 .767 
EDUC -1.768 5.932 -.072 -.298 .769 
Board Study 
Specialization 
1.298 1.829 .159 .710 .486 
Board Specialization -.939 1.184 -.201 -.793 .437 
FEMALEBMP -16.278 28.305 -.130 -.575 .571 
2 (Constant) -46.538 57.792 -.805 .432 
LnCUMAGE 12.876 5.531 .841 2.328 .033 
EDUC -93.851 33.730 -3.833 -2.782 .013 
Board Study 
Specialization 
-5.621 5.246 -.690 -1.072 .300 
Board Specialization 6.761 3.887 1.445 1.739 .101 
FEMALEBMP -195.762 91.488 -1.565 -2.140 .048 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL -3.870 1.448 -3.910 -2.673 .017 
FEMALXBINVOL 104.697 52.917 1.772 1.979 .065 
EDUCXBINVOL 45.725 16.430 5.768 2.783 .013 
BRDSSXBINVOL 2.009 2.950 .698 .681 .506 
BRDSXBINVOL -3.814 2.092 -2.147 -1.823 .087 
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 17c: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Excluded Variables11 
Model Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlatio 
n 
Collinearit 
y 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 LnCUMUAGEXBINV 
OL 
-.309" -1.463 .159 -.311 .940 
FEMALXBINVOL -.290" -.525 .605 -.117 .150 
EDUCXBINVOL -.371" -1.175 .254 -.254 .435 
BRDSSXBINVOL -.380" -1.207 .241 -.261 .437 
BRDSXBINVOL -.561" -1.532 .141 -.324 .310 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, 
LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
2 0 7 
Appendix 17d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Residuals Statistics' 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -2.6449 34.5894 15.3470 7.26297 27 
Residual -18.28939 12.41601 .00000 7.94398 27 
Std. Predicted 
Value 
-2.477 2.649 .000 1.000 27 
Std. Residual -1.806 1.226 .000 .784 27 
a. Dependent Variable: ROE 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 17e: Histogram showing Board Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: R O E % 
Source: Research Data 
2 0 8 
Appendix 17b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Model Summary0 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjuste 
dR 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Chan ge Statistics 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change dfl df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .316' .100 -.114 11.26783 .100 .467 5 21 .797 
2 .685" .469 .137 9.91770 .369 2.221 5 16 .103 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC, 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL, FEMALXBINVOL, BRDSSXBINVOL, BRDSXBINVOL, EDUCXB1NVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 18a: ANOVA for Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics on ROA 
ANOVAc 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 296.292 5 59.258 .467 .797* 
Residual 2666.242 21 126.964 
Total 2962.534 26 
2 Regression 1388.762 10 138.876 1.412 .260" 
Residual 1573.772 16 98.361 
Total 2962.534 26 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC, 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL, FEMALXBINVOL, BRDSSXBINVOL, BRDSXBINVOL, EDUCXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
2 0 9 
Appendix 17b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Coefficients' 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sis-
1 (Constant) -5.805 46.963 -.124 .903 
LnCUMAGE 1.181 3.368 .078 .351 .729 
EDUC 6.774 5.791 .279 1.170 .255 
Board Study 
Specialization 
1.596 1.786 .198 .894 .382 
Board Specialization -1.288 1.156 -.278 -1.115 .278 
FEMALEBMP 1.185 27.633 .010 .043 .966 
2 (Constant) -44.149 56.599 -.780 .447 
LnCUMAGE 13.251 5.417 .873 2.446 .026 
EDUC -92.464 33.034 -3.808 -2.799 .013 
Board Study 
Specialization 
-5.638 5.137 -.698 -1.097 .289 
Board Specialization 4.162 3.807 .897 1.093 .290 
FEMALEBMP -153.264 89.600 -1.235 -1.711 .106 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL -4.367 1.418 -4.448 -3.079 .007 
FEMALXBINVOL 91.948 51.825 1.570 1.774 .095 
EDUCXBINVOL 48.561 16.091 6.177 3.018 .008 
BRDSSXBINVOL 2.170 2.889 .760 .751 .463 
BRDSXBINVOL -2.638 2.049 -1.497 -1.287 .216 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
2 1 0 
Appendix 17d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Excluded Variables'* 
Model Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlatio 
n 
Collinearit 
y 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 LnCUMUAGEXBlNV 
OL 
-.235' -1.108 .281 -.241 .940 
FEMALXBINVOL -.322' -.594 .559 -.132 .150 
EDUCXBINVOL -.229' -.722 .479 -.159 .435 
BRDSSXBINVOL -.269' -.853 .404 -.187 .437 
BRDSXBINVOL -.357' -.959 .349 -.210 .310 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, 
LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 18d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics on ROA 
Residuals Statistics' 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value 4.1358 34.2100 18.0089 7.30848 27 
Residual -15.67999 12.50557 .00000 7.78008 27 
Std. Predicted 
Value 
-1.898 2.217 .000 1.000 27 
Std. Residual -1.581 1.261 .000 .784 27 
a. Dependent Variable: ROA 
Source: Research Data 
2 1 1 
Appendix 18e: Histogram showing Board Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: ROA% 
-1 o 1 
Regression Standardized Residual 
Source: Research Data 
Mean =-6.11E-16 
Std. Dev =0.784 
N =27 
2 1 2 
Appendix 17b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Model Summary' 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjuste 
dR 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Chan ge Statistics 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change dfl df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .486' .236 .054 2.25938 .236 1.297 5 21 .303 
2 .753" .566 .296 1.94978 .331 2.440 5 16 .080 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC, 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL, FEMALXBINVOL, BRDSSXBINVOL, BRDSXBINVOL, EDUCXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 19a: ANOVA for Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics on DY 
ANOVAc 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 33.105 5 6.621 1.297 .303* 
Residual 107.201 21 5.105 
Total 140.305 26 
2 Regression 79.479 10 7.948 2.091 .09 lb 
Residual 60.826 16 3.802 
Total 140.305 26 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FEMitEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC, 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL, FEMALXBINVOL, BRDSSXBINVOL, BRDSXBINVOL, EDUCXBINVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
2 1 3 
Appendix 17b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Coefficients" 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) -.197 9.417 -.021 .984 
LnCUMAGE .212 .675 .064 .314 .756 
EDUC 2.083 1.161 .394 1.794 .087 
Board Study 
Specialization 
-.488 .358 -.277 -1.362 .188 
Board Specialization -.135 .232 -.134 -.583 .566 
FEMALEBMP -1.347 5.541 -.050 -.243 .810 
2 (Constant) -7.832 11.127 -.704 .492 
LnCUMAGE .896 1.065 .271 .842 .412 
EDUC -5.982 6.494 -1.132 -.921 .371 
Board Study 
Specialization 
.362 1.010 .206 .358 .725 
Board Specialization 1.511 .748 1.497 2.019 .061 
FEMALEBMP -4.573 17.615 -.169 -.260 .798 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL -.061 .279 -.286 -.219 .829 
FEMALXBINVOL 3.879 10.189 .304 .381 .708 
EDUCXBINVOL 4.359 3.164 2.548 1.378 .187 
BRDSSXBINVOL -.518 .568 -.834 -.913 .375 
BRDSXBINVOL -.872 .403 -2.275 -2.165 .046 
a. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 19c: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics on DY 
Excluded Variablesb 
Model Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlatio 
n 
Collinearit 
y 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 LnCUMUAGEXBINV 
OL 
-.275' -1.433 .167 -.305 .940 
FEMALXBINVOL -.875" -1.882 .074 -.388 .150 
EDUCXBINVOL -.347" -1.212 .240 -.262 .435 
BRDSSXBINVOL -.552* -2.057 .053 -.418 .437 
BRDSXBINVOL -.680' -2.147 .044 -.433 .310 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, 
LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
2 1 4 
Appendix 17d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Residuals Statistics* 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -1.0933 6.0660 2.7989 1.74840 27 
Residual -2.95836 3.83401 .00000 1.52953 27 
Std. Predicted 
Value 
-2.226 1.869 .000 1.000 27 
Std. Residual -1.517 1.966 .000 .784 27 
a. Dependent Variable: DY () 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 19e: Histogram showing Board Demographic Character is t ics and DY 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: DY(%) 
-1 o 1 
Regression Standardized Residual 
Source: Research Data 
Mean =8.33E-16 
Std. Dev. =0.784 
N - 2 7 
2 1 5 
Appendix 17b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Model Summary' 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjuste 
dR 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Chan, ge Statistics 
R 
Square 
Change 
F 
Change dfl df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .467' .218 .032 19.11776 .218 1.171 5 21 .356 
2 .596" .355 -.048 19.88846 .137 .681 5 16 .644 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC, 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL, FEMALXBINVOL, BRDSSXBINVOL, BRDSXBINVOL, EDUCXB1NVOL 
c. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 20a: ANOVA for Moderat ing Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors ' Demographic Character is t ics on PE 
ANOVA' 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2139.634 5 427.927 1.171 .356' 
Residual 7675.266 21 365.489 
Total 9814.900 26 
2 Regression 3486.085 10 348.609 .881 ,568b 
Residual 6328.815 16 395.551 
Total 9814.900 26 
a. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Predictors: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, LnCUMAGE, EDUC, 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL, FEMALXBINVOL, BRDSSXBINVOL, BRDSXBINVOL, EDUCXBINVOL 
M 
c. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
2 1 6 
Appendix 17b: Coefficients of Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Coefficients" 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model B 
Std. 
Error Beta t Sis. 
1 (Constant) -108.072 79.680 -1.356 .189 
LnCUMAGE 8.357 5.715 .302 1.462 .158 
EDUC -7.684 9.825 -.174 -.782 .443 
Board Study 
Specialization 
3.752 3.030 .255 1.238 .229 
Board Specialization .420 1.961 .050 .214 .832 
FEMALEBMP 46.557 46.884 .206 .993 .332 
2 (Constant) -201.171 113.502 -1.772 .095 
LnCUMAGE 16.266 10.862 .589 1.497 .154 
EDUC -8.685 66.246 -.197 -.131 .897 
Board Study 
Specialization 
-10.497 10.302 -.714 -1.019 .323 
Board Specialization 7.779 7.635 .921 1.019 .323 
FEMALEBMP 100.374 179.680 .444 .559 .584 
LnCUMUAGEXBINVOL -.725 2.844 -.406 -.255 .802 
FEMALXBINVOL -53.449 103.927 -.501 -.514 .614 
EDUCXBINVOL .358 32.269 .025 .011 .991 
BRDSSXBINVOL 9.200 5.794 1.770 1.588 .132 
BRDSXBINVOL -4.464 4.109 -1.392 -1.086 .293 
a. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
2 1 7 
Appendix 17d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics and ROE 
Excluded Variables'1 
Model Beta In t Sis-
Partial 
Correlatio 
n 
Collinearit 
y 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 LnCUMUAGEXBINV 
OL 
-.130* -.646 .526 -.143 .940 
FEM ALXB IN VOL -.209' -.411 .685 -.092 .150 
EDUCXBINVOL -.206" -.695 .495 -.153 .435 
BRDSSXBINVOL -.070' -.235 .817 -.052 .437 
BRDSXBINVOL -.297" -.852 .404 -.187 .310 
a. Predictors in the Model: (Constant), FEMALEBMP, Board Specialization, Board Study Specialization, 
LnCUMAGE, EDUC 
b. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data 
Appendix 20d: Moderating Effect of Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making on Board of Directors' Demographic Characteristics on PE 
Residuals Statistics* 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Predicted Value -10.8204 40.2737 16.8296 11.57930 27 
Residual -29.48722 59.40633 .00000 15.60179 27 
Std. Predicted 
Value 
-2.388 2.025 .000 1.000 27 
Std. Residual -1.483 2.987 .000 .784 27 
a. Dependent Variable: P/E 
Source: Research Data „ 
2 1 8 
Appendix 20e: Histogram showing Board Demographic Characteristics and P/E 
Ratio 
Histogram 
Dependent Variable: P/E 
Mean =-3.13E-15 
Std. Dev. =0.784 
N - 2 7 
- 2 - 1 0 1 
Regression Standardized Residual 
Source: Research Data 
2 1 9 
Appendix 21: Board Culture and Formal Independence 
Variable Strongly 
Disagree % 
Disagree 
% 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
In our Board meetings we 
respect other 
63.2 34.2 2.6 .0 0.0 
The Chairman allows all 
members equal opportunities 
to contribute to discussions 
73.7 21.1 2.6 2.6 0.0 
Most meetings are held in a 
timely manner 
47.4 44.7 2.6 5.3 0.0 
New members undergo an 
induction on procedures and 
rules of the Board 
47.4 28.9 7.9 15.8 0.0 
Board members are punctual 
in full board and in 
committee meetings 
52.6 28.9 10.5 7.9 0.0 
The chairman dominates the 
meeting 
42.1 28.9 13.2 10.5 5.3 
Board members receive the 
annual calendar of events 
44.7 39.5 5.3 7.9 2.6 
Board members are briefed 
monthly by management on 
issues of strategic importance 
and company performance 
35.1 24.3 13.5 24.3 2.7 
Our company has a 
Corporate Governance 
Structure 
60.5 15.8 7.9 10.5 5.3 
Board members access the 
company database when they 
want 
39.5 21.1 7.9 21.1 10.5 
Board members have not 
been employed by the 
company within the last five 
years 
15.8 7.9 23.7 47.4 5.3 
Board members declare 
conflict of interest where 
there is a possibility of such 
an occurrence 
42.1 21.1 18.4 13.2 5.3 
Non-Executive Directors 
have a fixed term office 
18.9 18.9 18.9 32.4 10.8 
Source: Research Data 
2 2 0 
Appendix 22: Board Operating Environment 
Variable Very great extent 
Great 
extent 
Small 
extent 
Not at 
all 
Not 
sure 
Frequent exit of board 
members per year 
0.0 48.6 43.2 5.4 2.7 
Board disagreements 0.0 76.3 18.4 2.6 2.6 
Erratic board meetings 0.0 81.6 10.5 5.3 2.6 
Political interference 0.0 81.6 7.9 10.5 0.0 
Technology usage by board 
members obtain information 
on firms in the same 
industry is high 
15.8 28.9 28.9 23.7 2.6 
The Board discourages 
group thinking 
2.7 54.1 13.5 21.6 8.1 
The Board encourages 
contrarian views by 
members 
18.9 43.2 18.9 18.9 0.0 
Ineffective participation of 
Board members at board 
meetings 
0.0 68.4 18.4 7.9 5.3 
Control of management by 
board 
0.0 13.2 23.7 63.2 0.0 
Control of board by 
management 
0.0 68.4 23.7 7.9 0.0 
Failure of the Board to 
follow up on previous 
resolutions 
0.0 65.8 7.9 18.4 7.9 
The Board evaluates 
individual Director's 
Performance quarterly 
22.9 25.7 5.7 40.0 5.7 
Source: Research Datar 
2 2 1 
Appendix 23: The Board of Directors' Involvement in the Strategic Decision-
Making Process ^ 
Variable 
Very 
great 
extent% 
Great 
extent% 
Small 
extent% 
Not 
at all 
% 
Not 
sure 
% 
The Board usually ratifies strategic 
proposals from top management 
teams (TMTs) 
36.8 36.8 15.8 10.5 0.0 
The Board usually assists top 
management in the formulation of 
strategic decisions within and 
between board meetings 
28.9 28.9 28.9 13.2 0.0 
The Board does not usually involve 
the management in the formulation 
of strategic decisions. 
2.6 55.3 15.8 18.4 7.9 
The Board is usually involved in 
the implementation of the strategic 
decisions 
31.6 28.9 21.1 18.4 0.0 
The Board is usually involved with 
the monitoring of the progress of 
strategic decisions 
42.1 47.4 10.5 0.0 0.0 
The Board usually determines the 
timing of the evaluation and seeks 
more details 
31.6 42.1 5.3 21.1 0.0 
The Board usually determines the 
criteria of the evaluatfon and 
requests additional information 
from the top management 
team(TMT) 
31.6 39.5 15.8 13.2 0.0 
The Board usually independently 
assesses and ascertains the progress 
of the strategic decisions 
34.2 28.9 18.4 18.4 0.0 
Use of financial discounting 
methods For capital budgeting 
54.1 24.3 10.8 5.4 5.4 
Use of payback period for capital 
investments 
54.1 24.3 10.8 2.7 8.1 
Use of Net Present Value ( N P V 
Technique in identifying worthy 
projects 
52.8 30.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 
2 2 2 
Variable 
Very 
great 
extent% 
Great 
extent% 
Small 
extent% 
Not 
at all 
% 
Not 
sure 
% 
Use of checklists to identify 
projects To invest in 
44.4 30.6 11.1 8.3 5.6 
Formal procedures to identify 
alternative Ways of action 
54.1 21.6 18.9 5.4 0.0 
Formal screening procedures 55.6 25.0 11.1 8.3 0.0 
Formal documents guiding the final 
decision 
50.0 30.6 13.9 5.6 0.0 
Pre-determined criteria for strategic 
decision evaluation 
41.7 36.1 19.4 2.8 0.0 
Source: Research Data 
2 2 3 
Appendix 24: Those Who Participate in the Strategic Decision-Making Process 
Variable 
Owner/Shareholders 
Very great 
Extent 
% 
10.8 
Great 
extent 
% 
18.9 
Small 
extent 
% 
35.1 
Not at 
all 
% 
29.7 
Not 
sure% 
5.4 
Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) 
75.7 16.2 5.4 2.7 0.0 
First level directors 
(Immediately below 
43.2 43.2 10.8 2.7 0.0 
Middle level management 1 . 1 27.8 41.7 16.7 2.8 
Lower level management 
Finance-Accounting 
department 
5.6 1 1 . 1 36. 
13.9 19.4 36.1 
47.2 
30.6 
0.0 
0.0 
Production department 14.7 1.8 38.2 35.3 0.0 
Human resources 
department 
13.9 38.9 27.8 19.4 0.0 
Purchasing department 8.6 8.6 54.3 28.6 0.0 
Management consulting 
firms 
8.6 20.0 37.1 34.3 0.0 
Source: Research Data 
l/NlVF*c it v. 
2 2 4 
Appendix 25: Correlation Matrix on Board Involvement in Strategic Decision-
Making 
B o a r d ' s 
Involvement in 
S t ra teg ic 
Decisions 
Female 
Board 
M e m b e r s 
Age of 
b o a r d 
m e m b e r s 
Level of 
Educa t i on 
Boa rd S tudy 
Special izat ion 
Board 
Special izat ion 
Board's 
Involvement in 
Strategic 
Decisions 
Pearson 
Correlation 
1 
Sig- (2-
tailed) 
N 38 
Female Board 
Members 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.029 1 
S ig . (2 -
tailed) 
863 
N 38 40 
Age of board 
members 
Pearson 
Correlation 
- .168 -.230 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.367 .204 
N 31 32 32 
Level of 
Education 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.030 -.040 .144 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.864 .820 .449 
N 35 35 30 35 
Board Study 
Specialization 
Pearson 
Correlation 
-.043 .284 -.057 .072 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.799 .075 .756 .683 
N 38 40 32 35 40 40 
Board 
Specialization 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.124 .041 .113 .297 . 5 2 6 " 1 
Sig . (2-
tailed) 
.460 .801 .537 .083 .000 
N 38 40 32 35 40 40 
Source: Research Data 
2 2 5 
